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ABSTRACT
RHETORIC AND PSYCHOTHERAPY: MAKING THE CONNECTION
MAY 2000
PETER T. RODIS, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. SAN DIEGO
M.A., CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY
M.Ed., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUESTTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Robert Colbert
This dissertation articulates the theoretical and pragmatic foundations of a rhetorical
approach to psychotherapy; an approach, that is, which is informed by the worldview, concerns,
and methodologies of the discipline of rhetoric.
Rlietoric—which originated in ancient Greece—long predates psychotherapy in aiming
to understand the workings of influence or persuasion, both as it occurs between persons and
within persons (i.e., self-persuasion). Persuasion is of critical importance to psychotherapy not
only because it is instrumental in producing change in clients, but because it is an ongoing facet
of everyday life, accounting for a substantial portion of why persons behave as they do. Despite
the apparent commonalities between rhetoric and psychotherapy, the literature on psychotherapy
contains few references to—and fewer substantive explorations of—rhetorical works, concepts,
and strategies. Moreover, the majority of works on psychotherapy which do refer to rhetoric
neglect to root their claims in a rhetorical understanding of the psychology of the individual.
Integrating concepts drawn from rhetoric with contemporary psychological theories of
emotion, cognition, and psychopathology. this dissertation offers, first of all, a construction
of
VI
the individual as a rhetorical subject, or as a being whose psychological capacities are organized
to facilitate the sending and delivery of messages, and the exertion and reception of influence.
Secondly, this dissertation demonstrates how rhetorical insights and procedures can help
psychotherapists meet the daily, pragmatic demands of doing psychotherapy. Accordingly, this
dissertation culminates in a structured, clinically-oriented description of how psychotherapy may
be carried out according to rhetorical principles. The model for psychotherapy proposed here is
intended to enable clinicians to envision a rhetorical framework or logic for psychotherapy cases,
as well as to engage clients in (a) symptom-relieving rhetorical exchanges and (b) the work of
developing greater rhetorical (self)understanding and proficiency.
In articulating a model for psychotherapy, emphasis is placed on the role of
argumentation, both as it is practiced by clients and by therapists. It is suggested that the
fundamental mechanism of healing—that is, the essential occurrence to which therapeutic effects
are due—is carefully constructed, psycho-socially apt, symptom-targeted argumentation.
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CHAPTER 1
THE RELEVANCE OF RHETORIC TO PSYCHOTHERAPY
Statement of Purpose
The broad goal of this dissertation is to articulate the theoretical and pragmatic
foundations of ^rhetorical approach to psychotherapy; an approach, that is, which is informed
by the worldview, concerns, and methodologies of the discipline of rhetoric. Although rhetoric
has been defined in many and diverse ways, a useful, functional definition has been offered by
Sarbin (1995): ^'Rlietoric is the disciplined use of oral and gestural actions for the purpose of
persuading others (and self) of the credibility of the speaker's position" (p. 2 1 6) A more
expansive definition by Bryant (1965) assigns ^\..to rhetoric a four-fold status":
So far as it is concerned with the management of discourse in specific situations for
practical purposes, it is an instrumental discipline. It is a literary study, involving
linguistics, critical theory, and semantics as it touches the art of informing ideas, and the
functioning of language. It is a philosophical study so far as it is concerned with a
method of investigation or inquiry. And finally, as it is akin to politics, drawing upon
psychology and sociology, rhetoric is a social study, the study of a major force in the
behavior of men (sic) in society (p. 36). [italics inserted]
Because an understanding of rhetorical theory is considered an important basis for
utilizing rhetorical strategies in psychotherapeutic practice, a substantial discussion of rhetorical
theories and principles is offered, especially in the initial chapters of this dissertation. In effect,
these chapters offer what might be described as an outline of a rhetorical psychology, which is to
say a rhetorical perspective upon human psychological functioning. Sources of special
importance in developing this perspective include works by Aristotle (1991), Chaim Perelman
(1963, 1969, 1982), Kenneth Burke (1931, 1955, 1966, 1989), van Eemeren and Grootendorst
(1996), and others.
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Paired with its concern with theory, this dissertation is committed to showing that
rhetorical insights and procedures can help psychotherapists meet the daily, pragmatic demands
of doing psychotherapy. Accordingly, this dissertation culminates in a structured, clinically-
oriented description of how psychotherapy may be carried out according to rhetorical principles.
The model for psychotherapy proposed here is intended to enable clinicians to envision a
rhetorical framework or logic for psychotherapy cases, as well as to engage clients in (a)
symptom-relieving rhetorical exchanges and (b) the work of developing greater rhetorical
(self)understanding and proficiency.
Throughout, grounds for validating the utility of rhetorical concepts and strategies are
found in the analysis of clinical and philosophical literature, in case studies, and in the discussion
of psychotherapeutic procedures.
Summary of Argument
At the center of a rhetorical approach to psychotherapy is the notion of clients as
rhetoricians: that is, as persons who—throughout their lives and in myriad ways—use
communicative means to influence others, to shape experience, and to realize their wants and
needs. In accordance with this notion, psychotherapy clients are viev^ed as potent message-
senders and message-receivers, as communicative beings who actively use rhetorical means to
direct their lives, organize their mental and social worlds, control and modulate their own
behaviors, and influence the behaviors and experiences of the persons with whom they interact.
Whereas other approaches to psychotherapy may be rooted in a perception of persons as thinking
subjects (e.g.. cognitive psychotherapy), as physiologic subjects (i.e., psychiatric psychotherapy),
or as sexual subjects (e.g.. psychoanalysis), a rhetorically-grounded psychotherapy views persons
primarily as—in the phrase of Mikhail Bakhtin (1981)—the 'Subjects ofcommunication'', or as
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beings who are largely defined by their need to communicate, their astounding capacities for
communication, their susceptibility to the communication of others, the modes and media by
which they communicate, and the psychological and social ramifications of their communicative
activity.
Rhetorical activity—that is, communicative activity which has the purpose of
influencing, persuading, or otherwise organizing the behaviors of its intended audience—is
pervasive in human existence. In fact, it can be argued that almost all human behavior has a
rhetorical dimension, inasmuch as such behavior generally arises in psycho-social contexts and
functions as a medium of psycho-social influence. Put another way, wherever there is human
behavior, there is reason to ask: What is the social purpose of this behavior? How does this
behavior serve to persuade or transmit the intentions or ''message" of its agent to some other(s)?
Whom—and in what ways—does this behavior affect, or at least hope to affect? And, to what
extent does this behavior exist—whether consciously or unconsciously—for the purpose of
organizing the psycho-social relations of its agent with others (and self)?
While many human behaviors are overtly communicative and rhetorical (e.g., A person
who says ''Give me that shovel or fll tan your hide!"), rhetorical dimensions of other behaviors
may not be so readily apparent. Take for example, the phenomenon of crying or weeping. For
what reason do persons show emotion in this way? Is it a purely automatic, physiologic
response? Or is it also a way of communicating a feeling, a judgment, and/or an experience to
others with the aim of altering or effecting one^s circumstances? Certainly, crying may be used
instrumentally to get the candy one is craving, to make another person guilty or concerned
enough to renounce a stated course of action, or simply to cause oneself to confront more
completely a negative event. Moreover, in the annals of psychotherapy, there are innumerable
instances in which pathologic symptoms appear to have a rhetorical dimension, or to have come
into existence as a way of responding to—and perhaps trying to alter—unsustainable psycho-
social circumstances. Indeed, mental
-'illness-' is often found where communication between
persons is somehow awry; and "cures" in psychotherapy frequently occur when the
psychopathologic argument (i.e., symptomology) of a client is correctly interpreted and affirmed
by a therapist, thus permitting the client to consummate a critical psycho-social need. Behavior,
in other words, often contains psycho-social messages; and when such messages cannot, for one
reason or another, be transmitted overtly through "talk", they may be expressed in any number
of other ways: ways which may well implicate the body, preoccupy the mind, and elude easy
interpretation. However, what is common to all of these situations is that behavior often has
some psycho-social purpose, that this purpose is carried out through communication (however
overt or covert), and that these communications can and do affect self and others, thus shaping
the relational worlds in which persons live.
Because psycho-social action relies far less often on physical deeds, and far more on
spoken words, gestures of affection or affiliation, disaffection and rejection, and so on,
rhetorical proficiency is often critical to the resolution of life problems and to healthy psycho-
social development. Human beings are continually challenged to develop rhetorical
proficiencies; that is, each person—thrust into social spaces wherein he or she must negotiate
courses of action, expectations, attitudes, and beliefs with any number of others—is required to
tTnd ways of communicating which work. Successful attempts {via communication) at winning
the collaboration of others or at achieving affiliation generally lead to positive self-esteem,
increased social support, a heightened sense of self-efficacy, and a number of other gains in
psychological well-being. Additionally, a person who is able to espy and make empowered
responses to the rhetorical strategies of others can avoid such negative consequences as being
"sold a bill of goods", being coopted into unhealthy relationships, or simply misreading everyday
social situations. Rhetorical proficiency is, in other words, very nearly synonymous with social
proficiency. To complicate matters, however, rhetorical practices which work well in one setting
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(or with one audience) often work poorly in another setting (or with another audience). Thus, the
adolescent who sniggers and makes an obscene joke in order to cope with a confusing social
moment might be rewarded by the laughter of his peers, but might suffer the condemnation of a
teacher or parent.
As is true of the social arena, intrapersonal (or intrapsychic) functioning (i.e.,
personality functioning) is also typically organized to some extent by rhetorical forces such as
beliefs, values, roles, the views and demands of others, and other social schemata, each of which
presents a kind of "'argument" regarding how one should behave, think, and/or feel. Thus, the
ways individuals "talk to themselves"—talking which often expresses the automatic operations
of internalized rhetorics—have dramatic impact upon how persons live and feel, and upon their
social trajectories. For example, a person who has internalized the belief that he or she is inferior
to others may well evolve a "way of being"—of feeling, thinking, and acting—which can best be
understood as a reaction to this belief; such a person may expend a tremendous amount of
psychic resources arguing with this damaging, self-replicating rhetoric, resources which might
have been spent far more productively in other endeavors. In contrast, a person who has
internalized a set of theses about self and world which encourage a healthful blend of optimism,
realism, and critical self-awareness is likely to dialogue with self and others in ways that bring
clear and observable rewards.
To summarize, then, even as persons actively exert rhetorical influence, they are also
subject throughout their development to the communicative influences of others. These
influences may be formal, as in the settings wherein education, professional training, or initiation
into clubs or groups are carried out; or they may be informal, as in the contexts of personal
relationships, families, or enculturation. These influences may shape political attitudes, social
beliefs, self perceptions, emotional functioning, and many other aspects of psychological
functioning and social existence.
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Given such a view of persons and the social worlds in which they live, questions which
become germane to the understanding of both human mdividual development and the working of
psychotherapy include: How do persons influence or persuade one another? Which modes of
influence or persuasion tend to be successful and which unsuccessful, which apt to achieve their
ends and which to fail? Can an understanding of how clients have been shaped by specific
communicative practices and dilemmas lead to a clearer understanding of their current
difficulties or symptoms (i.e., psychopathology) as well as how to alleviate these difficulties?
Are there "rules" or conventions which govern communicative practices within social groups?
To what extent are psychological processes such as emotion and cognition "rhetoricized" (i.e.,
characterized in design and function by the aim of influencing self and/or others)? Can persons
be taught how to communicate more persuasively and to more ably "read" the communicative
and suasory efforts of others? Might such learnings—and the gains in communicative efficacy
resulting from them—have a beneficial effect upon psychological well-being? While these
questions constitute only a subset of the questions that arise when a rhetorical perspective is
entered into, they illustrate the unique leanings or gist of such a perspective.
In keeping with the conceptualization of the client as a rhetorician, the problems which
occasion clients to seek therapy are generally redefined and treated in a rhetorical approach to
psychotherapy as rhetoricalproblems: that is, as problems created by clients' difficulties in
generating effective responses to some life-challenge, social situation, person, internal event, or
other problem.
Complementarily, solutions to life problems are seen as emerging from the stimulation
and further development of clients^ rhetorical proficiencies: that is, clients "solve" problems as
they develop ways of effectively making answer to them. Thus, for example, in the treatment of
an eating-disordered client, while a behaviorist psychotherapist might concentrate upon
identifying and extinguishing destructive behaviors and developing positive eating behaviors;
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and while a Freudian psychotherapist might explore the psychosexual dimensions of the client's
eating problems; a rhetorical psychotherapist would treat the disturbed eating behaviors as forms
of communication which, evolving in a particular rhetorical situation (e.g., a family, a culture),
may disappear or change if alternative, more healthful ways of communicating about pain &
pleasure, emotions, needs, identity, and so on can be developed.
From a formal, analytic perspective, efforts to influence others (or oneself) via
communicative action may be considered activities of argumentation. In its simplest sense,
argumentation is the process of communication which is set in motion when "two or more people
make what they construe to be incompatible aims" (van Eemeren et al, 1996, p. 198). More
essentially, argumentation deals with persons efforts to justify what they do, or to obtain warrants
for their beliefs and actions. According to Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), "Argumentation
is an action which always tends to modify a state of affairs (p. 54)." Moreover, "An efficacious
argument is one which succeeds in increasing the intensity of adherence among those who hear it
in such a way as to set in motion the intended action (a positive action or an abstention from
action) or at least in creating in the hearers a willingness to act which will appear at the right
moment (p. 45)." Argumentation occurs in human life both as a regular, ongoing interpersonal
process and as a regular, ongoing intrapersonal process. It is a given facet of interpersonal
existence in that persons are forever required to negotiate their own ends within the web of
opinions, power variables, personality types and other differences that make up all societies,
small and large, intimate and impersonal. It is a given facet of intrapersonal existence in that we
are forever arsuing with ourselves over such matters as how to behave, how to think, what to say,
and how to feel. The concept of argumentation v/ill be useful both to understanding the broad
world-view of rhetoric—which emphasizes the ways that humans appear to be perpetually caught
up in efforts of persuasion and negotiation, justification and legitimation—and the actual practice
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of psychotherapy-which requires the therapist to have technical competence in arguing with
clients and in understanding clients' involvements in processes of argumentation with others.
Accordingly, in articulating a model for psychotherapy, emphasis is placed in this
dissertation on the role of argumentation, both as it is practiced by clients and by therapists. It is
suggested that the concept of argumentation is helpful in arriving at meaningful diagnostic
formulations and in carrying out effective psychotherapeutic interventions. Indeed, if there is a
single insight or perspective upon which this dissertation rests it is that the fundamental
mechanism of healing—that is, the essential occurrence to which therapeutic effects are due— is
carefully constructed, psycho-socially apt, symptom-targeted argumentation. That is, healing
follows when clients are (a) able to construct, express, and be affirmed for those arguments most
consistent with and supportive of their well-being, (b) able to identify and comprehend the
arguments—whether transmitted by themselves or by others—that do them harm, and (c) able to
read with accuracy the arguments implicit in the actions of those persons and institutions which
comprise their psycho-social world. Whereas Freudians may hold that the "healing" that takes
place in psychotherapy has to v^ith repealing repression and dealing candidly with sexual
tensions and conflict; and whereas behaviorists may believe that healing is accomplished by
changing a client's responses to given stimuli; and whereas narrativists may believe that healing
follows the client's successful production of an empowered self-narrative; a rhetorical
perspective on psychotherapy suggests that clients heal as they compose and become able to
deliver arguments which effectively address the problem(s)—whether discrete or developmental,
acute or chronic—which beset them.
By assisting clients in fashioning life-improving arguments, psychotherapists essentially
function as teachers of rhetoric. Not unlike the ancient Greek and Roman orators who taught
"eloquence" or the modern-day professors who teach effective academic discourse to college
freshmen, the therapist's work involves helping clients to identify the rhetorical tasks which
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confront them, to gather together and/or increase the communicative skills and resources at their
disposal, to discover the positions or theses that they wish to argue, and to cobble together,
strengthen, and refine the arguments which will secure their goals. In short, this dissertation
suggests that successful therapy involves the rhetorical training of the client; put another way,
successful therapy deliberately trains the client to meet the demands of his or her rhetorical
situation(s). In so doing, rhetorically-oriented psychotherapy deals with psychic existence in a
fashion that is genuinely pragmatic and useful.
In summary, then, this dissertation has the following aims:
(a) To extract from rhetoric a theoretical framework useful for understanding persons.
(b) To extract from rhetoric a theoretical framework useful for conceptualizing
psychotherapy.
(c) To extract from rhetoric a concrete framework for the doing of psychotherapy.
In its pursuit of these goals, this analysis rests upon—or, alternately, must construct
—
what might be described as a rhetorical psychology, which is to say a rhetorical perspective
upon human persons and their psychological processes and difficulties. A rhetorical psychology
differs from other schools of psychology in its basic assumptions about human identity and
behavior, both individual and social, in that:
(a) it focuses on human behavior as communication, or, stated alternately, upon the
communicative dimensions of any behavior. Taking communication as the heart
and center of human psychological processes, it names and explores the various
facets of human functioning and behavior as kinds of communication.
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(b) it is deeply interested in the factors that make a communicative process or action
either successful (i.e., persuasive and able to effect desired change) or unsuccessful
(i.e., impotent and antithetical to the developmental needs of the communicator).
Such a psychology is foundational to a rhetorical psychotherapy, which is a practice of
psychology which:
(a) suggests that the majority of individual behaviors (be they silent or public, gestural
or spoken) may be understood as communication; that is, thought, speech, and
action are always addressed to some audience, and thus may be said to occur within
rhetoricized contexts.
(b) sets out to understand the problems that bring persons into therapy as having their
roots—and their solutions—in communication;
(c) encourages, discovers, and teaches effective ways of communicating with self and
others;
(d) in most cases, identifies the essential curative process in psychotherapy as
argiunentation, or the composition and delivery of communiques which effectively
address and solve interpersonal problems, reorganize intrapsychic life, or otherwise
assist the client in accomplishing goals or sustaining a positive existence.
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Psychotherapy and Rlietoric: Making the C onnection
Given that psychotherapy as practice almost always takes the form of a communicative
encounter, consisting of utterances and outcries, conversations and colloquies (Neimeyer, R.,
1995), stories and confessions (White & Epston, 1990), arguments and analyses (Ellis, 1971,
1980; Freud, 1967), and a wide variety of other speech acts, it is surprising that it has not forced
Stronger links to those disciplines which take language and communication to be their major
focus of study. A similar thing can be said about psychotherapy research: in general, the major
research trends reflect a disinclination to integrate the core assumptions, methodologies, and
factual findings of the language-centered disciplines. Even in the rising field of narrative
therapy, which has so many obvious and natural links to other language-related disciplines, most
writers appear to approach their topic ab ovo. thus failing to harvest many of the riches of
narrative studies enacted by other disciplines (e.g., literary theory, anthropology).
One of the disciplines with which psychotherapy might reasonably have formed a closer
alliance is linguistics, which concentrates on understanding the structure and operations of
language, especially as these depend upon and reveal underlying cognitive processes (Thomas &
Fraser, 1994). Encompassing phonology, syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics, linguistics is
capable of providing therapists with fine-cutting analytic tools useful to diagnostic clarification
(e.g., in a case which raises the question of thought disorder vs. brain injury), the treatment of
learning disabilities and other cognitive dysfunctions, and aiding persons, especially children, in
meeting developmental challenges. Two other disciplines concerned with language and of great
potential value to psychotherapists are literature and literary theory. As for literature, although
it played an important role in the historical origins of psychotherapy, as Freud' s widely
infiuential incorporations of ancient Greek tragedy attest, it is now rarely employed as an adjunct
to training therapists or to treating therapy clients. Nonetheless, world literature offers to
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psychotherapists numerous carefully rendered texts containn.g highly detailed studies of
confrontations between character and circumstance-or character and character-<.ften quite
similar to those encountered in therapy, as well as precisely crafted images of the social and
cultural milieus in which many clients live (Grant, 1987; Shotter, 1992). Both the novel and
poetry are not simply forms of art, idiosyncratic and "invented,-' but also sophisticated textual
devices for recording social realities (Bakhtin, 1981). Similarly, the efforts by literary, theorists
and critics to ascertain how literary works might be "read" offer meaningful models for
comprehending the ideological stances, cultural prejudices, and imaginal possibilities which
influence the persons whom psychotherapists encounter in their daily work. With the exception
of feminist psychotherapy-which has directly incorporated feminist critical strategies into its
treatment philosophy and protocols—and Lacanian psychoanlysis (Lacan, 1968 1981) strong
links between psychotherapy and literary theory are not currently in evidence (Rodis & Strehorn,
1997).
However, the language-related discipline which is perhaps most directly applicable to
psychotherapy—and yet generally ignored by it—is rhetoric. As Michael Billig, a social
psychologist, has written
,
"To most psychologists, rhetoric is an unfamiliar topic. Its history, its
great works, and even its vocabulary are matters which will be strange to the average
psychologisf (Billig, 1989, p. 9). This disregard of rhetoric is especially odd given the recent
attention to stories, conversation, and other language-based phenomena in recent years,
especially by psychotherapists affiliated with the narrative, constructionist, and strategic therapy
schools. Implicitly, these schools operate in areas of both theory and practice long traversed by
rhetoric. Although each of these schools has accomplished a great deal without an explicit
relationship to rhetoric, it is worth wondering how such a relationship might illuminate, amplify,
and further evolve the work of these schools.
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Because rhetoric has a long and complicated history as well as an extensive purview, it
may be helpful to define rhetoric in a step-by-step fashion.
Rhetoric is the study and the use ofpersuasive or instrumental comnnoncation, or of the
ways by which human beings individually and in groups utilize expressive means for the purpose
of affecting others or accomplishing social ends. According to Gerard Hauser (1986), 'This
means that one person engages another in an exchange of symbols to accomplish some goal.
It is not communication for communication's sake. Rhetoric is communication that attempts to
coordinate social action. For this reason, rhetorical communication is explicitly
pragmatic" (p. 2).
According to Kenneth Burke ( 1 93 1), rhetoric, "by lexicographer's definition, refers ... to
the use of language in such a way as to produce a desired impression on the reader or hearer" (p.
265). According to Burke, "Rhetoric [comprises] both the use of persuasive resources {rhetorica
utens, as with the phillipics of Demosthenes) and the study of them {rhetorica docens, as with
Aristotle's treatise on the 'art' of rhetoric)" (p. 36). In short, the "basic function of rhetoric" is
the "use of words by human agents to form attitudes or to induce actions in other human agents
..." (p. 41). It is "rooted in an essential function of language itself, a function that is wholly
realistic, and is continually born anew; the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing
cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols" (p. 36).
In keeping with this interest in the social purposes, functions, and effects of
communication, rhetoricians seek to ascertain the ways that anything written or spoken might
express an intention, reflect biases or concerns, or influence actions or beliefs. Whereas other
disciplines may study language as. say, a mode of representation or as a means of artistic
expression, rhetoric is concerned with how verbal communication can directly influence the
thought, behavior, or emotions of others. From a certain perspective it can be said that all
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communication, regardless of its intent, has the potential to affect others: a poem, for example
can evoke emotion from a reader, and the information on a plane ticket can galvan.ze a traveler
into action. Such effects of verbal communication do, in fact, fall into the scope of rhetoric.
Accordingly, rhetoric is not isolated to any particular domain in which commun.cat.on takes
place, but rather investigates all such domains, including the discursive worlds of the various
sciences and professions, texts, social groups and cultures, and mdividual persons, both as they
communicate with others and with(in) themselves.
Aristotle (1991)—author of the first systematic treatment of rhetorical theory. The An of
Rhetoric—offered the following canonical definition of rhetoric:
Let Rhetoric be the power to observe the persuasiveness ofwhich any particular matter
admits. For of no other art is this the function; each of the others is instructive and
persuasive about its general province, such as medicine about healthy and diseases states,
geometry about the accidental properties of magnitudes, arithmetic about numbers, and
so on with the other arts and sciences. By contrast, rhetoric is considered to be capable
of intuition of the persusasiveness of, so to speak, the given. That is why we assert that
its technical competence is not connected with any special, delimited kind of matter
(p. 74)
Rhetorical analysis, then, although wide-ranging in its applications, is clearly identifiable and
distinct from other modes of analysis inasmuch as it is concerned with communication or
language as a kind of social action. According to Aristotle, rhetoric is a techne, or a practical
discipline, and, although it may sometimes plunge into deep philosophical waters, it remains
focused on how human lives are measurably shaped and influenced by acts, traditions, and
techniques of communication.
b. Traditionally, the study of language and its various uses has been divided into three
parts, which together form what has been called since the Roman period the trivium. This
scheme remains useful for conceptualizing the domain of rhetoric. The first part of the trivium is
grammar, which coincides fairly directly with what is now the recognized domain of linguistics.
The other tvvo parts are dialectic and rhetoric, both of which deal in the exposition of ideas, but
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which are differentiated from one another in that (a) dialectic deals with logically tenable ideas
in an "objective" fashion, with the goal of arriving at demonstrable
-truths", while (b) rhetoric
deals in "the practice ofjustifying decisions under conditions of uncertainty" (van Eemeren et al,
1996. p. 191) and "in ways of finding, manipulating and expressing arguments in order to induce
belief in the probability or plausibility of propositions advanced" (Moss, 1993, p. 50). In other
words, whereas dialectic is oriented towards finding "truths" of an empirical, objective, or
transcendent nature via formal, rational procedures, rhetoric is concerned with examining the
vaguer, more idiosyncratic, multifarious, and shifting domains of the subjective and the social.
Dialectic is traditionally the domain of serious inquiry into things-as-they-are, unprejudiced by
any ulterior purpose, while rhetoric is the domain of unabashed attempts to influence others.
Naturally, the division between dialectic and rhetoric can be difficult to determine, for
what one person calls "truth", another person can show is only subjective opinion or socially-
conditioned, consensus-driven cant (Bazerman, 1993). The pursuit of this line of logic has led in
the late 20th century to a substantial expansion in the domain of rhetorical inquiry. One example
is Thomas Kuhn's The Structure ofScientific Revolutions (1970), which suggested that even in
the "hard" sciences, "facts" and "truths" are sociallv constructed and nesotiated.
c. Rlietoric first emerged as a formal discipline in Greece during the 5th century,
concurrent with the dissolution of traditional monarchies (which the Greeks called tyrannies) and
the emergence of democratic forms of government (Vickers, 1988). Rhetorical studies at this
time were focused on the development of political discourses, especially the art of oratory, for, in
keeping with democratic approaches to self-government, community decisions were to be
reached only after discussion and debate. The person, then, who could, through the use of words,
most effectively influence the audience could be expected to have the greatest political influence
(Lawson-Tancred, 1994). Rhetoric was also closely identified with legal or judicial contexts.
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which, like politics, relied on spoken and written discourses as the primary method of making
decisions, coping with disagreement and conflict, resolving (or deepening) disputes, influencing
opinion, judging questions and persons, and determining courses of action. Naturally,
rhetoricians concentrated not only on how to make successful oratory, but also on how to
analyze, critique, and derive meaning from the speech acts of others. In keeping with the ancient
uses of rhetoric. Aristotle (1991) proposed a tripartite division of the discipline as follows:
Deliberative rhetoric deals with the role of discourse in making decisions.
Forensic rhetoric deals with the uses of discourse in the making ofjudgments, especially
when they concern questions of right and wrong, legality or illegality, guilt or innocence.
Display rhetoric deals with the production of discourses on any range of topics—for
instance, a eulogy or the presentation of an academic paper—with the purpose of influencing an
audience to share the speaker's perspective, opinions, or values.
Since its inception, rhetoric has known periods of ascendancy and periods of near
extinction, but it has remained a formally recognized discipline throughout its 2500 year history.
One of the most difficult periods for rhetoric was the first half of the 20th century, when
rhetorical approaches to understanding social issues were inconsonant with the curxQnX Zeitgeist,
which emphasized the search for empirical, objective, or scientific solutions. During this period,
departments of rhetoric all but disappeared from colleges and universities on the European
continent, and rhetorical studies survived in the United States mostly in departments of English,
to whose faculty fell the task of training young persons to write (Kinneavy, 1990).
However, beginning soon after the end of the Second World War, with the emergence in
philosophy of new critical interest in studying the construction of knowledge, the publication of
seminal new studies in rhetoric such as Chaim Perelman's & L. Olbrechts-Tyteca's The New
Rhetoric (1969), the rise in the social sciences of awareness of the social and cultural power of
non-scientific and irrational beliefs, and, finally, the explosion in departments of English of
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interest in the study of writing and composition (Horner, 1990), rhetoric has made an
extraordinary comeback. Currently, departments of rhetoric can be found in most major
universities, and nearly all the disciplines, but especially the humanities and the social sciences,
utilize rhetorical methods of inquiry. In 1984, at the Iowa Symposium on the Rl^etoric of the
Human Sciences, the philosopher Richard Rorty suggested that intellectual mquiry throughout
the disciplines was currently involved in what could be described as a ^rhetorical tum'^ (Simons,
1990). The rhetoricization of intellectual study and philosophy is closely identified with what is
more widely known as postmodernism (Angus & Langsdorf, 1993; Derrida, 1992).
d. To the domain of rhetoric can be assigned the following areas of inquiry, skill, and pract
(Kinneavy, 1990), most of which can be meaningfully applied to the everyday lives and
discursive practices of persons, as well as to psychotherapy:
ice
The study of situational contexts
Communication theory
Argumentation
Discourse analysis
Epistemology
Composition studies
Information theory
Propaganda, political rhetoric, and commercial advertising
Literary criticism
Gender studies, including feminist criticism
The study of self-expression
Semiotics and semiology
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e. In summary, rhetoric is a complex and ancient discipline, whose multi-facetedness has
emerged from its interest in studying the various ways that language practices may be shown to
shape, effect, and transform the lives of human beings (Leff, 1978).
As indicated in this definition, rhetoric's interests, although clearly definable, are not
easily confined to one domain or another, for communication rarely takes place that does not
have the purpose of influencing social action. As a result, in keeping with the social
constructionist leanings of the postmodern period, rhetorical perspectives have come into play in
almost all the disciplines during the late 20th century (Simons, 1989a; van Eemeren, 1996).
Explicitly rhetorical approaches can be found in anthropology (Clifford & Marcus, 1986;
Battaglia, 1995), history (White, 1973), and throughout the social sciences and humanities.
Additionally, rhetorical and/or quasi-rhetorical approaches have been articulated in some of the
subdisciplines of psychology, including social psychology (Billig, 1985, 1988, 1989, 1991a,
1991b. 1997), personality psychology (Young-Eisendrath, 1987; Gergen 1991; Hermans &
Kempen. 1993), and cognitive psychology (Billig, 1993; Harre & Gillet, 1994; Globus, 1995).
That psychotherapy generally represents an exception to this expansion of rhetoric is
something of a myster\'. for the common ground between—and thus the potential for—an active
relationship between psychotherapy and rhetoric is substantial and venerable. It is, in fact,
difficult to think of a discipline more directly relevant to the doing of psychotherapy than
rhetoric. Even as in The Art ofRhetoric, Aristotle (1991) offered a systematic treatment of
communicative practices designed to influence an audience's emotions, behaviors, and beliefs,
these matters remain central to the theory and practice of contemporaiy psychotherapy. In the
two and a half millenia since Aristotle, rhetoricians have continued to study communicative
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practices, thereby developing valuable techniques for influencing others, as well as deeply
reasoned theories about the psychology of communication. At present, energized by late-
twentieth-century investigations of the social functions of language in philosophy (Wittgenste.n,
1953; Rorty, 1979), science (Kuhn, 1970; Sandell, 1987; Simons, 1989a), and rhetoric itself-
especially Chaim Perelman & M. Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), Mikhail Bakhtin (1981, 1984a,
1984b), and Kenneth Burke(1931, 1955, 1966, 1989)-rhetoric as a discipline is thriving, and
rhetorical perspectives have been adapted and applied almost everywhere there is academic
inquiry.
Although psychotherapy's disinterest in rhetoric appears counterintuitive, at least two
possible explanations may be ventured. One explanation is that psychotherapy has rejected
rhetoric because of the former's investment in establishing itself as an applied science, related
more closely to medicine than to the language arts (Szasz, 1961). A very different, yet also
compelling, possibility is that psychotherapy has neglected rhetoric because it is already so
radically rhetoricized; that is, having set to work on many of the problems traditionally treated by
rhetoric with methods of its own and in a new, unique setting, psychotherapy may have come to
regard general theories of rhetoric as outmoded, derived from faulty methodology, or irrelevant
to its special province. Whatever the case, despite the apparent family resemblance between
rhetoric and psychotherapy, the explicit, formal links between them have generally failed to
materialize. Rlietoricians and psychotherapists do not attend each other's conferences; no
journal in psychotherapy has sponsored a special issue or colloquium devoted to the exploration
of rhetoric; and courses in rhetoric are not part of the curriculum of training programs in
psychology and psychotherapy. Certainly, rhetoric, being wide in its purview, has often looked
across the disciplinary fence at psychotherapy (e.g.. Burke, 1966); and psychotherapy has yielded
a small number of works expressly declaiming the value of rhetoric (please see Review of
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Literature below), but there does no, exist a substant.ai, ntutually invigorating and reciprocally
inquisitive relationship betv^een the two.
This dissertation rests on the premise that such a relationship is both possible and
desirable, and that psychotherapists and their clients may denve definite benefits from the
employment of rhetorical strategies and frames of reference.
Rationale
While the better part of this dissertation will be devoted to the attempt to provide
specific, concrete support to the claim that rhetoric has value for psychotherapy, as a prelude, the
following broad rationale may be offered:
Rhetoric offers to psychotherapy a language-centered perspective which fits with its own
language-centered practices.
As suggested above, psychotherapy is largely a process of dialogic exchange which finds
its unique character in the efforts of the participants to achieve a positive change in the
symptomology, behavior, emotions, perspective, and/or life of the client(s). Although there are
certain psychotherapeutic interventions (e.g., massage therapy, behavioral conditioning, etc.)
which involve deeds but not speech, the vast majority of interventions take place within the
provinces of, and cannot be imagined in the absence of, language-based communication.
The central ity of language to psychotherapy does not stand apart from but rather reflects
the significance of language to human existence generally. From birth until death, humans are
profoundly affected by language, for it is the primary medium of interpersonal exchange, as well
as the primary tool of enculturation, education, and socialization. Human beings are inveterate
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senders and receivers of messages, and communication can fairly be said to be amongst the
principal tasks and prerogatives of individuals throughout their development. Facility in
communication is valued at all stages of life, and difficulties in the generation, reception, and
comprehension of language may have any number of negative implications for psychological
health, social status, and daily efficacy.
A rhetorical perspective, then, offers to psychotherapy an apt and natural means for
linking what it does with (a) the lived lives of persons, which are virtually in every respect
influenced and shaped by language, as well as with (b) existing psychological theories and data
concerning the role of language in human psychological functioning and development.
As differentiated from many other frameworks for psychotherapy which are expressly
non-language-based—or which, at the very least, do not openly avow the extent to which
language is critical to their construction—rhetoric is well-positioned to capture with clarity and
precision the variety of discursive encounters that may take place between therapist and client,
determining why they occur and how they may be altered for the benefit of the client.
Rhetoric and psychotherapy are both what Aristotle (1991) calls techne, or technical
disciplines, interested primarily in how real-life problems of communication can be solved.
Rlietoric is concerned first of all with how communicative strategies might be used to
accomplish a goal to organize social relations and solve relational problems. Rhetoric is quite
capable of entering theoretical spaces, and, in fact, has been the seat of elegant and compelling
theories about a range of complex issues, including cognition, social relations, and power. But,
as a primarily practical discipline, it has focused on (a) "discovering," explicating, and
evaluating the efficacy of rhetorical strategies used by persons and groups in natural settings, and
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(b) leaching persons how to develop and unplonK-ni n,oro dlVclivo approaches lo
conuniinicalion.
The relevance ol lhesc emphases to psycliolhe.apN is direct and clear,
From its in siiu slud.es, rhclonc has dern ed a v anctN of .ncisive tcchniqnes tor studying
how people eonuntuucate in daily lile. For psychotherapists who arc oHen prinuu-ily interested
in how to chan^^c the eom.nunicative behaviors oi clients such knowledge is clearly precious,
tor richly understanding the conuuunieative worlds oi clients rs ol\cn key to discerning
constructive and novel pathways lor altering those worlds. S,.ch understanding is also hkely to
provide psychotherapists with greater diseenunent m dctcrnnning what changes arc most
advantageous to particular clients. Often, psychotherapists offer clicnis generic .solutions which
may well have linntcd effieacy and appropriateness in certain cultures or situations. In being
attentive to the particulars of discursive situations and setluig.s, rhetoric has a long tradition of
culturally-sensitive practices.
Secondly, Irom its ancient tradition of leaching communicative strategics, rhetoric has
evolved pedagogies of potential utility for psychotherapists, whose work often invoK
psychocducalional thrusl. Originally olTcring training in ancient Greece lo orators with iniliiical
aspirations, rhetoric has expanded its scope over time to include a substantial portion ol lhc
"general educalion^^ of contemporary students, most especially writing, speakin^^, and literary
interpretation. Rhetoric's technology for, say, training Ci)llege iVeshmen to write citcctive essays
may well be a|iplied lo assisting some clients in llie authorship of new solutions to old problems
or lo the artieidation of new roles and identities. Likew ise, rhetoric's lechniciues lor training
debators and lawyers may be useful in assisting cliciUs who must learn to cope w ith li\ ing or
antagonistic circumstances.
In summary, b\ lacing primarily an action-oi iciilcd discipline, whose rijison i/c 'cfrc is
ultimalcl\ linkcti more to icaMife pmblcms and solutions than to ideas and iniderstamlings.
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rhetoric is uniquely friendly to the fast and frequent movements between theory and practice
which psychotherapy-always a dynamic process-seems to require. Bryant (1965) puts this
nicely in the following remark:
Rlietoric IS primarily concerned with the relations of ideas to the thoughts feelin-
motives, and behavior of men. Rhetoric as distinct from the learnings which it us'es isdynamic; it is concerned with movement. It does rather than It is method rather than
matter. It is chiefly involved with bringing about a condition, rather than discovering or
testing a condition. Even psychology, which is more nearly the special province of
°
rhetoric than is any other study, is descriptive of conditions, but not the uses of those
conditions" (in Schwarz & Rycenga, 1965, p. 18).
Also suggested in Bryant's last sentence-and Bryant is by profession a rhetorician-is not only
the notion of a "goodness of fit" between psychotherapy and rhetoric, but also the idea that
rhetoric may provide psychotherapy with some of the utilitarian, process-oriented resources that
traditional, trait-centered psychology often deemphasizes.
Rhetoric and psychotherapy share as one of their principal tasks—and most fascinatin
problems—the influencing of other persons via discursive means.
Conversations with psychotherapists or a reading of psychotherapeutic literature
suggests that the following phenomena are so commonly witnessed that they function as working
assumptions in the field:
We transform many a symptom or problem by transforming our talk about it,
We transform many a symptom or problem by making the right choice with whom to talk
about it.
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We transform many a symptom or problem when we determine why we are talking about
it at all.
We transform many a symptom or problem by being answered by others in ways
different than we have come to expect.
We transform many a symptom or problem when we talk about it for the first time, after
having been silent for a long while.
We transform many a symptom or problem when we place out most negative, darkest,
and most frightening beliefs and opinions in range of a positive counter-argument.
When these assumptions are written out as they are here, we come face-to-face with the very
processes with which rhetoric has been fascinated since its inception. Clearly, talk and dialogue,
words and discourse have a great power, and alterations in what we say, how and where we say
them, and to whom we speak can have profound transformative consequences for us.
But why is this so?
Since Freud, explanations for the transformative power of the conversations that go on in
therapy have largely focused on the therapists' use of a certain expertise or understanding of the
construction of the human personality. In other words, a neurosis may be the product of a
developmental problem during the anal phase, or it may be due to the overlearning of a certain
behavior pattern tliat is now maladaptive. Recognizing these problems, the therapist steps in,
offers insight and prescriptive advice, and problems begin to cease.
More recently, many psychotherapists—such as Milton Erickson (1980) and other
strategic therapists (e.g., de Shazer, 1985), as well as Michael White (White & Epston, 1990) and
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other narrative therapists (Wigren, 1994; Goncalves, 1994a, 1994b; Parry & Doan, 1994;
Mishara, 1995)-have shifted the focus of study to the discursive processes that appear to have
special efficacy for psychotherapy. Erickson's combination of story-telling, paradox, and
double-speak during hypnosis are a wonderful example of what might be called "rhetorical
medicine," or the administration of certain linguistic curatives (Kirmayer, 1988). The narrative
movement's emphasis on the therapeutic benefits of engaging clients in story-telling practices
provides a complement to Erickson's work, inasmuch as the role of primary speaker shifts from
the therapist to the client, and yet still brings about certain benefits.
From a rhetorical perspective, both of these phenomena are explicable as forms of
psychotherapeutic argumentation (please see Chapter 4). Indeed, rhetorical theory may well
provide psychotherapy with the means for a useful meta-theory, or way of ascertaining why and
how certain practices work, thus assisting clinicians in making sound decisions about future
interventions. Rhetorical theory does not compete with other theories about psychology and
psychotherapy, but works together with them.
Persons who come to therapy often come as a result of their difficulty in dealing with
particular rhetorical situations.
All persons can be said to inhabit a number of "rhetorical situations," or situations in
which there is action-oriented dialogue which has the goal of resolving a disagreement. As
several rhetoricians have emphasized, neither individual nor social existence is univocal, or
single-voiced; rather, both are almost always characterized by multiple perspective and positions,
each of which must negotiate the terms of its survival and fultlllment with the others (Bakhtin,
1984a; Perelman, 1963, 1982).
25
TlHs IU..I1, vocal, ami Ihus lcns,o,M,au„hl, slrn.lurc is easily apparcnl in social
rckUionships, or
,„ one puson's rclaUonslup w,.h o.hcs. lor here Ihcrc is e,nilc obviously more
Hum one speaker, and llms more Ihan one uorklview, in evidence. Kven as (he poli.ical lite of
any communUy
.s (ypieally consniu.ed of several parlies, each of, hen, harboring a variety of
clifferenl positions and each ol (hen, n.leni on oul
-persuadm. Ihe olhers, so is interpersonal
existence an nnmersion in dillerences and d.saoreonenis winch denKuul resolntion. The married
cou|de, (he Tanuly, Ihe workplace, (he cimrch, friendship, eim.ilv: all are sites ofaclive mnlli-
vi)calily and liuis of rhetorical exchange.
Yet this structure is also evideni m inliapsychic lile, or in die inlei iial life of Ihe
individual. As iieck cl al. (1979, I 9SS ) noliced, depressed persons are ollen lonnd lo engage in
"internal .sell-lalk" which is |)essimislic, negalive, ami self imderminmg. Aeconliiig lo Heck, one
com|)onenl t)rerreetive psyehotlieiapeiilic Irealmenl olMepiession is lo expose this sell talk and
replace it with more encouraging iillerances. \et, sell talk is not limiled to times ol depression,
but is a common feature of internal life. Vygolsky ( l')7S, l')S()), for example, noliccd that voiing
eliildien (end to openly talk lo themselves when trying lo work out solutions lo ceilaiii problems;
eveiilually, he proposed, this extcr iiali/cul lalk bccoinos iiilcriial, silciillv iMiitlnM', iii;ilui\' iiikI
complex cognilivc processes. Aiul lioiii ihc ;inii;il.s likM;iIiiiv ;iiul pliihisophv llicic arc many
inslaiiccs of micmal convcrsalion, inchuling Socalcs aiul his (/(/(7//^>//, I )osl()ycvksy's
Ululcrurouiul Man ( M)72), ami Shakespeare's (1^^)?) solilo(|ui/m}^ I lamlel ami sell Jehheialm;-.
Kini', I eai*.
Tims, rheloi ic which is primai ily inlcicslctl in siraleuics lor et teclively handlim;
rheltirical silualions applies as much io Ihe miei nal li\ es ol" pcisons as il does lo social
! elal ii>nships. H a [person is unahle lo resolve inleinal conlhcls. ihc resull ma\ he etmlnsitui or
im|mlsive aclion. Il a [lerstm is unable lo rcsisi ne!'ali\e mieinal arivimenis, llie lesuH ma\ he
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demoralization. And, if, on the other hand, a person is able to have judicious, hopeful, and
reasonable internal conversations, the result is likely to be greater happuicss.
As Isocrates said.
The arguments by which we convince others when we speak to them are the same as
those we use when we engage in reflection. We call those able to speak to the multitude
ora ors, and we regard as persons of sagacity those who are able to talk things over
withm themselves with discernment. (In Perelam & Obstrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 41)
Usually, persons come to therapy when one of more of their rhetorical situations have
become (or have always been) problematic, and, as rhetoricians, they are at a loss for how to deal
with these troubles.
For some clients, the problem is primarily external. For example, a 28 year old male
client comes to therapy saying that he is "depressed because 1 got out of prison almost a year ago
and still no one wants to give me a job 'cause Vm a convicted felon." While the client certainly
has internal problems which deserve attention, the source of his difficulty is primarily situational:
If he can find work, his sadness is likely to clear up. The thrust in treatment, then, may well be to
help the client develop a strategy for convincing potential employers that he is worth taking a
chance on. As part of the process, the client may learn in fact to believe this about himself, thus
boosting his morale.
For other clients the problem is primarily internal. For example, a 25 year old unmarried
white woman, the mother of a two year old daughter, comes to therapy complaining of back pain
and general feelings of dysphoria. In the course of the first interview, the woman states that she
has been depressed since her first semester at college, when she "went crazy" and slept with a
number of different men. The client explains that she was raised in a strict Catholic family, and
has always felt guilty about her sexual feelings. She would like to marry the father of her cliikl.
but she docs not feel good enough about herself to be married: "Wouldiri it be sad to be up
there [i.e.. at ihe altar] all fat and with a daughter already?"
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In this short narrative, there is evidence of several problems which will become more
evident in later interviews: a childhood history of sexual abuse, ADHD, eating disorders, and
great difficulty accepting her body.
Rendered in rhetorical terms, however, the situation of the client is roughly as follows:
Noting her deviance from the teachings of church, family, and American culture, the client
accuses herself perpetually of failure, inadequacy, and other horrors. Most especially, she is
suspicious of and ambivalent towards her own body, for the majority of her transgressions
involve her body. Her internal life, then, is staged as an ongoing trial, in which she first
denounces herself, and then answers back in the voices of defensiveness and despair. Her body
and mind have become sites of a rhetorical entanglement from which she has not been able to
extricate herself for a long time. By rendering her predicament in rhetorical terms—that is.
fairly vicious internal debate—both client and therapist may take the first step towards
determining what new arguments or acts of speech may alter this predicament.
as a
Both rhetoric and psychotherapy deal more often with the opinions, beliefs, and convictions
of persons than with "truths" subject to empirical demonstration or scientific proof.
As students of rational-emotive therapy (RET) have shown, psychotherapists are
frequently confronted by instances in which persons' beliefs shape their behavior, influence their
decision-making processes, and either enhance or undermine their psychological health (Ellis,
1971). Accordingly, following Ellis, many RET therapists have tried to bring to their
interventions the vigor of a Socratic interrogation, boldly extinguishing "bad" beliefs and
encouraging reason, logic, and fact (Weinrach. 1996).
The general efficacy of RET methods has been demonstrated by several studies (Haaga
& Davison. 1993). However, these procedures have not always proven either successful (for
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they can arouse potent resistance) or ethical (for they can overly devalue clients' given belief
systems). Is the therapist who dismisses her Sicilian immigrant client's belief in the evil eye
likely to win that client's trust? Perhaps. But there is also a chance that the client's
"superstition" is tied to a wider matrix of cultural and personal beliefs that is not so easily
displaced because it is also life-enriching.
However, regardless of its potential faults, RET is certainly correct in asserting that
therapists are routinely compelled to enter the particular realities of clients' mental worlds,
where beliefs may well be the most powerful of presences. Rhetoric—which has long wrestled
with the problem of how the opinions and beliefs of others may be formed and influenced—can
be an extremely valued ally in such circumstances. Its value, however, is not limited to the
extinction of clients' mistaken beliefs, but extends to helping clients to (a) explore the roots and
formative processes of their beliefs, (b) engage in a process of constructive, agentive
reconsideration of the virtues, uses, inconveniences, and consequences of what they believe, and
(c) engage in a process of authoring new beliefs.
As importantly, rhetoric wraps around the variety of phenomena that may attend
interactions involving belief formation or change. Although particular rhetorics in any domain of
life may be fixed and inflexible—as, for instance, the McCarthyite political rhetoric of anti-
communism—rhetoric as a discipline favors multiplicity and flexibility. According to
Protagoras, rhetoric's special wisdom lies it its recognition that, for every question, at least two
arguments exactly opposite to one another may be articulated (Billig, 1989). As accessed by
psychotherapists, rhetorical concepts and techniques may well lead less often to direct disputes
with clients (although this certainly remains an option) and more often to adroitly channeling
client's disputes with themselves and others towards new possibilities of resolution.
29
Rhetoric has long been identified with psychological healing, the shaping of character, and
other effects currently considered the domain of psychotherapy.
Rlietoric has long nourished an interest in what is currently regarded as the express
province of psychotherapy: the question of how to bring about a salient change in the
psychological well-being of others.
The origins of this interest almost certainly can be traced to the legal and political
realms, wherein speeches were performed for the purpose of moving an audience to action. For
Aristotle (1991) and many other writers who followed him, the movement of others to action
required not only an effect upon their minds, but at least as much upon their emotions, "For
things do not seem the same to those who love and those who hate, nor to those who are angry
and those who are calm, but either altogether different or different in magnitude (141 )r In the
Art ofRhetoric, Aristotle (1991) develops a comprehensive theory of the emotions focused on
the way that emotions are (a) influenced by certain social scripts and scenarios and (b)
susceptible to the effects of certain particular speech acts.
This recognition that the emotions of persons can be strategically influenced or
manipulated has led to direct exploration by Aristotle and many rhetoricians since his time of
precise and reliable methods for so doing (Walton, 1992). And, while it often has been charged
both by rhetoricians and their critics that the emotion-arousing power of language can be used in
self-aggrandizing and destructive ways, the converse has also been much acknowledged: that is,
the proposition that acts of language can bring about good results, including the healing of the
spirit, the making of wise decisions, and the rendering of fair judgments.
Accordingly, Plato—who was generally an outspoken enemy of rhetoric—acknowledged
in the Phaedriis that "rhetoric is like medicine" able to "impart health and strength ... by the
right application of words and training (Spillane, 1987, p. 217). Likew ise, Cicero praised
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rhetonc as an essential and necessary civilizing force in human society, which could transform
persons ^^from wild savages into a kind and gentle folk" (Vickers, 1993, p. 30). And Petrarch,
the scholar whose rediscovery of the great rhetorical writings of the ancients figured prominently
in the making of the Renaissance in Europe, considered the pursuit of 'eloquence' the royal road
to the attainment of both moral virtue and psychological wellness:
...we correct not only our life and conduct, which is the primarv concern of virtue but
our language usages as well...by the cultivation of eloquence. Our speech is not a small
mdicator of our mmd, nor is our mind a small controller of our speech Each depends
upon the other but while one remains in one's breast, the other emerges into the
open...People obey the judgment of one, and believe the opinion of the other Therefore
both must be consulted, so that [the mind] will be reasonably strict with [speech], and
[speech] will be truly magnificent with the mind] (Vickers, 1993, p. 30).
Finally, the 20th century rhetorician, Kenneth Burke (1989), developed a theory of the
relationship between the emotions and discursive processes which bears a keen resemblance to
the attachment theory of Bowlby. According to Burke, persons use discursive means to negotiate
the great emotional and existential paradox into which they are bom: simultaneously
individuated (and thus emotionally needful of separation) and inveterately social (and thus
emotionally needful of communion with others), we use rhetoric to try and secure both.
In these rhetorical traditions—the first focused on the rhetorician as healer and the
second focused on expressive actions as inherently emotional—exists a natural link to the mental
health perspective in psychotherapy, which, after the fashion of the medical sciences, has long
considered psychotherapy a treatment process focused on the eradication of illness.
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Rhetoric provides a rici, and nourishing ground for the evolution of a new, useful
psychotherapeutic theory, which meaningfully incorporates cognitive, social, cultural, aud
personality psychology,
A rhetorical approach to psychotherapy is one rooted in the notion of the human
person-as in Mikhail Bakhtin's (1984a) apt phrase-as the ^'subject of communication." That
is, in contrast to, say, behavioral psychotherapy which takes the "conditionable organism" as the
primary metaphor for the client, a rhetorical approach to psychotherapy defines the client as a
speaker, a listener, a writer, a dialogist, a conversationalist, a speech-maker, an audience, an
arguer, a singer, a truth-maker: in short, as a rhetorician. According to this perspective,
individual persons find their very beings in that universe which is comprised of their own and
others' acts of utterance, interpretation, analysis, and meaning-making. Accordingly, it is in the
study of, participation in, exposure of, engagement in, and interpretation of the client's
communicative exchanges, or dialogues, with the world that therapy finds its foremost activity.
Such a view of the person is not, in fact marginal to psychology, but has resonance with
existing perspectives in other sub-disciplines in psychology.
In cognitive psychology, for example, Rom Harre & Grant Gillet (1994) have offered the
following view of the individual person:
We will therefore identify a person as having a coherent mind or personality to the extent
that individuals can be credited with adopting various positions within different
discourses and fashioning for themselves, however intentionally or unintentionally, a
unique complex of subjectivities (essentially private discourses) with some longitudinal
integrity ...And to be a psychological being at all, one must be in possession of some
minimal repertoire of the cluster of skills necessary to the management of the discourses
into which one may from time to time enter (p. 50).
Harre & Gillet's definition of the person is patently rhetorical: the person is presented as a
rhetorical subject living in a rhetorical world. Grasping the communicative relations in which
the person lives is essential to understanding the very design and function of cognition—and visa
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versa. But a cognit.ve psychology removed from these rhetorical moorings is, for Harre & G.llet,
insupportable: ne.ther mind nor personality are meaningfully
"definable in isolation
... from
historical, political, cultural, social, and interpersonal contexts" (p. 50).
Similarly, Michael BiUig (1991) has articulated a rhetorical framework for social
psychology, his rationale bemg that understanding the processes of everyday thinking and
decision-making-^specially as these effect political beliefs and social attitudes-necessitates
recognizing that these processes are rhetorical. He writes:
bee?fin "h H ''Tr^" °' ^ blind dupe, whose mind hasn filled by outside forces and who reacts unthinkingly. The subject of ideology is a
rhetorical being who argues with ideology. (Billig, 1991, p. 2)
In Billig's view, social existence is everywhere divided and under contention. Persons are not
simply democratic or republican, monarchist or feminist, but are these things only to the extent
that they take positions or argue points of view consistent with these ideologies. Argumentation
IS a continuous process, and one which goes on both between and within individuals. An
understanding, then, of political and social behavior requires that social psychologists grasp the
rough and tumble, push and pull nature of the inherently rhetorical contexts in which such
behaviors occur.
It IS possible to go on citing voices in other sub-disciplines in psychology supportive of
rhetorical perspectives, but the basic point should by now be made: a rhetorical perspective for
psychotherapy can allow psychotherapists to meaningfully integrate related findings and theories
of value to their own practices. Moreover, given that a language focus matches what
psychotherapists already do in their day-to-day work, a rhetorical perspective may attract the
interest of many therapists who do not as a rule keep abreast of research in other sub-disciplines
within psychology.
Discussion
As has been suggested above, psychotherapy in nearly all of its manifestations may be
set within a rhetorical framework. Even schools of psychotherapy which are expressly non-
rhetorical in philosophy and attitude (e.g., behaviorist) are to some extent rhetorical in practice,
for each of them engages in the formal use and study of persuasive or instrumental
communication in order to "form attitudes or to induce actions in other human agents" (Burke,
193 1). There are, however, also schools of psychotherapy which, in focusing on issues of
language in psychic life and in therapeutic change, possess a distinctly rhetorical flavor. Among
these we may count Lacanian psychoanalysis, feminist psychotherapy, Ericksonian
hypnotherapy, constructivist psychotherapy, narrative psychotherapy, and Rational-Emotive
Therapy (RET). Yet none of these schools avows a direct or deliberate relationship to rhetoric,
and so rest either on different theoretical bases (most of them found in scientific psychology) or
have derived their theoretical rationales directly from practice.
In contrast, a deliberately rhetorical approach is one which: (a) draws directly upon the
worldview, concerns, and methodologies of the discipline of rhetoric, integrating these materials
with those developed by psychologists and psychotherapists, (b) emphasizes a rhetorical view of
the person, which is to say a view of the person as centrally defined by rhetorical potentialities,
actions, and engagements, (c) emphasizes a rhetorical understanding of psychological processes,
such as thinking and feeling, psychopathology and well-being, and (d) regards psychotherapy
primarily as a means for helping clients to activate and refine their rhetorical skills and
understandings, thereby acheiving the relief of symptoms and the improvement of their quality of
life.
Naturally, there is no single rhetorical approach to psychotherapy. To say so would be
directly inconsonant with both the reality and the philosophical spirit of rhetoric. In fact, it is
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quite possible to imagine several kinds of rhetorical psychotherapies, one emphasizing the
analysis of familial discourses, another emphasizing power issues, and so forth.
Although committed generally to rhetoric, this dissertation focuses specifically and
primarily on argumentation, a process of central interest in rhetoric since Aristotle (1991). The
rhetorical approach to psychotherapy outlined here (a) regards a knowledge of argumentation as
key to psychotherapists' efficacy, and (b) harnesses and guides the argumentation processes of
clients for the resolution of both internal (intrapsychic) and external (interpersonal) difficulties.
According to Perelman and Olbrechst-Tyteca (1968), argumentation is "the discursive
means of obtaining the adherence of minds." Because argumentation has social action or
cooperation as its chief aim, "An efficacious argument is one which succeeds in increasing the
intensity of adherence among those who hear it in such a way as to set in motion the intended
action (a positive action or an abstention from action) or at least in creating in the hearers a
willingness to act which will appear at the right moment (45)." Whereas argumentation is
sometimes treated as a special kind of discourse, denoted by attention to formal procedures and
rules of logic, twentieth century rhetoric has chiefly studied argumentation as a nearly
omnipresent facet of social existence (van Eemeren et al., 1996, p. 200). Thus, whereas
argumentation in a court of law might require the explicit articulation of a justifiable rationale,
simple utterances in daily life such as "Pass the peas!" may be considered as argumentation
which implicitly stands on unspoken rationales, such as "1 live here and I have a right to feed
myself, so give me them peas!" In essence, to study argumentation is to study the social logic of
any discursive process; and to argue is to achieve a social goal by providing one's claims with
implicit or explicit justification.
In contemporary rhetoric, there are several approaches concurrently taken to the study of
argumentation. According to van Eemeren et al (1996), the first of these is the social sciences
perspective, which emphasizes descriptive and empirical studies of the uses of argumentation in
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particular natural settings. Within the social sciences category can be found the cogn..ve-
developmental perspective^ '^which focuses on argument as a skill or competency, developed
progressively and employed much like other cognitive skills, such as language comprehension,
problem-solving, and moral reasoning ' (van Eemeren et al., 1996, p. 198) Tht practical
philosophy perspective, on the other hand, studies the operations of argumentation in everyday
life as a kind oiphronesis, or "practical wisdom in a given case" (van Eemeren et al., 1996, p.
203). The social and cultural critique approach studies the ways that processes of argumentation
are influenced by the communities in which they are found; "Instead of asking whether an
argument was sound, the questions became "Sound for whom?" and "Sound in what context?"
(van Eemeren et al., 1996, p. 204).
While sensitive to each of these approaches to the study of argumentation, this
dissertation draws most directly upon the cognitive-developmental and the social and cultural
critique perspectives. This dissertation is cognitive-developmental inasmuch as it holds that (a)
all persons engage in argumentation, (b) styles and kinds of argumentation are influenced by
individual differences, (c) styles and kinds of argumentation are influenced by age,
developmental level, and cognitive ability, and (d) argumentation is a learnable skill. This
dissertation is socio-cultural in its approach inasmuch as it holds that: (a) the efficacy of any
approach to argumentation is determined in part by the context and community it hopes to
persuade, (b) an individual's styles and modes of argumentation are highly intluenced by the
socio-cultural and interpersonal contexts in which they have developed or lived, (c) the modes of
argumentation utilized, preferred, or rejected by various communities are susceptible to
identification and analysis, and (d) the modes of argumentation utilized by various communities
are teachable and learnable.
There are at least two broad areas in which argumentation is relevant to psychotherapy.
The first of these has to do with the clients' engagement in argumentative processes in their daily
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lives, past and present, internal (intrapsychic) and external (interpersonal). Typically, clients
come into therapy to get help with some argumentative process or another. It may be that they
want to be able to win the argument against nicotine or alcohol. It may be that they want help ,n
avoiding conflict with their spouse, or in helping their parent see that they ought to be allowed a
greater freedom. It may be that they have been oppressed by social prejudice or racism, attitudes
which contain stridently negative arguments. Or it may be that they are besieged by self-talk
which is demeaning, accusatory, or negating. Usually, clients enter therapy because one or more
of these argumentative situations do not seem readily susceptible to resolution.
Generally speaking, psychotherapists do not explicitly focus on the role of argumentation
in the construction of client's difficulties or the solutions to these difficulties. Yet often
problems are created and/or maintained by certain arguments made by self and others.
Complementarity, problems are often resolved by the construction of new arguments or by the
involvement of new parties in the argumentation process. Because argumentation is a given in
social life, it is the source of much that is good and useful as well as much that can be damaging
or limiting. It follows that a reconstruction of the argumentative processes in which clients are
critically involved may have definite psychotherapeutic benefits.
The second way in which argumentation has relevance for psychotherapy is in
illuminating the dynamics of the discursive relationship between therapist and client. The
dialogues which pass between therapist and client are shot through with argumentation. It is
difficult, in fact, to imagine a therapist who has not developed a distinct belief system or
worldview to argue from, who is unable or unwilling to argue with clients about what something
means or what ought to be done about it, or who has not refined a set of particular argumentative
techniques for moving clients in the direction of positive change. Perhaps the most visible
practitioners of aggressive argumentation are those who make use of Rational-Emotive Therapy
(RET), which encourages the use of disputational techniques to "undercut and disembowel the
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conscious and unconscous i^.onal assumptions
.ha. make ... and keep (.„e ci.en.) e,n„,ionally
disturbed (Ellis, 1971, pp. 1-2). Al.hough less down-and-diny,
.he
.herapeu.ie
.eehniques
employed by mainstream cognitive-behavioris.s sueh as Seek (1985) are also approaches
.o
argumentation. Charting symptoms, eataloguing and challenging negative self-talk, and readin»
up on scientific ^'facts'' about a psychiatric disorder are all ways of building a warrant for a
different approach to living, feeling, and making sense of reality. Another unique approach to
argumentation is that pioneered by Milton Erickson (1980), who, rather than directly challenging
the beliefs and convictions of clients, evolved a kind of specialized talk designed to bypass
objection and resistance. Had any of the approaches to argumentation just mentioned been
openly and explicitly practiced during the ancient Greek or Roman periods, there is little doubt
that they would have been claimed by rhetoric.
Clearly, to develop greater proficiency in argumentation is of value both to clients and to
psychotherapists, each ofwhom—like everyone else in the world—must of necessity do a great
deal of arguing as part of social existence. Proficiency in argumentation may be gained in
several ways. Within the context of psychotherapy, these include but are not limited to: (a)
directly studying and learning certain formal techniques of argumentation, (b) analyzing and
critiquing the arguments at play in the client's particular situation or problem, (c) exploring the
developmental history of the client's argumentative "set", and (d) helping the cleint to express
materials and themes, warrants and grounds, which lend clarity, conviction, and authority to the
client's claims.
At present, scant attention is given to argumentation in the psychotherapeutic literature.
This dissertation has the purpose of suggesting that a focus upon processes of argumentation has
definite clinical value, both for psychotherapists and for clients.
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In conclusion, it can be said that the over-aching purpose of this dissertation is to provide
support for the general position that the study of rhetorical perspectives, concepts, and
strategies-especially in regards to argumentation-has merit for psychotherapy. Given the
similarity of concerns-and yet the dissimilarities of traditions-between the two disciplines, it
is suggested that the establishment of an active, conscious relationship between them offers the
promise of a rich transference of materials. The utilization of so-far neglected rhetorical texts
and ideas may yield detmite benefits in terms of training new psychotherapists, enhancing the
competencies of practicing psychotherapists, and generating new directions for service and
research.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
As has been suggested in the introductory chapter to this dissertation, from a certain
theoretical perspective, all approaches to psychotherapetic treatment might be placed within the
domain of the rhetorical, inasmuch as they are concerned with the instrumental and persuasive
uses of communication. Consistent with this interpretation, the annals of psychotherapy since its
inception might be considered a particular subfield of applied rhetoric: a subfield, moreover,
which could arguably provide a rich basis for assessing the psychological, ontological, and
epistemic bases on which rhetoric—inasmuch as it constitutes a theory of human nature and
behavior—stands.
While such a historical and theoretical (re)interpretation of the discipline of
psychotherapy would certainly be a valuable contribution, it is beyond the scope of this
dissertation's—and this chapter's
—
particular purposes to attempt.
Similarly, it is not within the scope of either this dissertation or this chapter to enumerate
in systematic fashion those approaches or schools of psychotherapy which might fairly be
considered 'relatives' of a deliberately and self-consciously rhetorical psychotherapy. In the
following chapters, as these related schools become pertinent to some particular topic of
discussion, they are mentioned and cited in the course of exposition. Thus, although the
narrative, constructivist, and Lacanian schools of psychotherapy have contributed concepts and
strategies which are similar to some of those which might emerge from a self-consciously
rhetorical orientation, they, in fact, stand on non-rhetorical theoretical foundations, do not make
direct use of rhetorical sources and materials, and are t> pically unaware of the extent to which
they might be reconceptualized as frames for rhetorical encounters between client and therapist.
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Similarly, some self-avowedly
'linguistic' studies (e.g., Labov & Fanshel, 1977) of
psychopathology and psychotherapy-although of clear interest to rhetorically-oriented
therapists-are not grounded in an explicit interest in persuasion and argumentat.on; moreover,
they are typically confined to language-based communication, while rhetoric clearly deals also
with meta-lingusitic or non-linguistic factors.
The purpose of this chapter, rather, is to list and discuss those published works on
psychotherapy which explicitly refer to rhetoric, which directly acknowledge the potential value
of rhetoric as a source of guidance for psychotherapy, and/or which make explicit use of
rhetorical strategies or devices. The scope of this chapter, in other words, is to identify and
review those works on psychotherapy which are avowedly and self-consciously rhetorical. As
such, this review traces the interest—as relatively rare as it has been—within psychotherapeutic
circles for fashioning a vital relationship to the discipline of rhetoric. Additionally, it offers a
summary of how—both in pragmatic and theoretical terms—this relationship has been
envisioned bv other writers.
Perhaps the first writer to declare a direct relationship between psychotherapy and
rhetoric is Erling Eng, who published the journal article ''Modem psychotherapy and Ancient
Rlietoric" in 1973. In this succinct (approximately 3 pages in length) piece, Eng begins by
describing the prevailing popular attitude toward rhetoric as one of distaste: "When the word
'rhetoric' is used today its meaning is pejorative: a communicative appeal to the hearer's or
viewer's emotions, in a way that is dishonest, and to the detriment of reason" (p 493). Eng
traces this negative valuation of rhetoric to an ancient controversy between those philosophers,
such as Plato, who "sought an unattained pole of context free meanings," and the rhetors, who
focused instead on the power of context to create meaning, to influence behavior, and to color
understanding (493).
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This long-standmg and damaging antipathy towards the contextuaHzation of truth En.
suggests, did not destroy or supplant rhetoric; rather, as was recognized by W.J. Ong (1971),
rhetoric was "disrupted, displaced, and rearranged. It became a bad word-as did many of the
formerly good words associated with it. such as art, artificial, commonplace, and so on" (494).
Thus, if, in the contemporary period, rhetoric as "the art of persuasion" has disintegrated
into such philosophically disreputable arts as advertising and propaganda, "...it has conversely
disclosed a possibility latent within it from antiquity, namely the possibility of 'psychotherapy '"
(494). Indeed, suggesting that as part of rhetoric's disruption and displacement, it has been
forced to move to separate sites and adopt various aliases, Eng writes: "Of interest to us is the
fact that it is precisely at the time of the demise of the rhetorical tradition that 'psychiatry'
emerges as a word, followed by the neologism 'psychotherapy' later in the century, in the
1880's." In other words, although too valid to be wiped out by its enemies, rhetoric was all the
same compelled to disguise its identity and to operate under new names. One of the prices paid
for this disruption of identity has been—at least in the case of psychotherapy—an alienation
from its rich historical resources and traditions.
In an effort to briefly illustrate the relevance of the rhetorical tradition to psychotherapy,
Eng refers first to Socrates' Phaedrus. in which Phaedrus argues "Must not the art of rhetoric,
taken as a whole, be a kind of influencing of minds by means of words, not only in courts of law
and other private gatherings, but in private places also? (494). Rhetoric, in other words, is
applicable even to those most private of sites—such as psychotherapy—in which one individual
converses with another about matters most intimate. Secondly, Eng reviews Aristotle's tripartite
schema regarding the 'means of persuasion':
The man who is in command of them must, it is clear, be able: (1) to reason logically; (2)
to understand human character and goodness in their various forms, and (3) to
understand the emotions—that is, to name them and describe them, to know their causes
and the way in which they are excited.
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Each of these skills coalesce in the enthy,.eme, which Aristotle calls "the substance of
rhetorical persuasion" (p. 495). Eng writes:
The word enthymeme derives from the Greek word for the snhere of vir.l n.f
awareness, the thumos With the 'en ' 'in' ^
'"^
'P'^^'^,^^ ^'^-i' ^^'^ective
.
vvitn n -, m
,
and the mstrumenta endin" 'eme' thpcompound sense ,s something like "unity by means of being in the vita aw renes Arecent wr.ter on Ar.s.otle's Rhe.onc, Grimaldi. concludes: "The entt wrnle as he main
dtr::' ° ttt™"iT"^r '"'--"^"^^ *^ '"'^^^'^^ of reason a^™::.* ir'".scourse^ I ,s through the enthymeme that integrative differentiations, in a particularhuman context under particular circumstances, or rhythmic forms, bodity cultura dsoe,al-m the medium of language-are able to be accomplished (p 495)
are
The similarities between psychotherapeutic practice and the rhetorical use of enthymemes
clearly evident. For Eng, psychotherapy may be described as a process of enthymemic
engagement with clients, the objective being to bring about a healthy reintegration of emotion
and understanding, particularly via a careful consideration of and response to the contextual
forces acting upon the client. By recognizing the multiple strands of the client's apprehension of
his or her environment, the psychotherapist may, through the strategic use of argumentation,
braid and rebraid these strands into a strong, healthy cord.
Eng concludes his piece by suggesting that "...modern psychotherapy stands to gain
from acquaintance with its family tree. Familiarity with its genealogy may enable a more sober
appreciation of its own characteristics, both in their likeness to and difference from, sciences and
philosophies" (p. 495). Interestingly, Eng makes no remark concerning rhetoric's potential value
as a resource for improving psychotherapeutic technique, or for extracting novel approaches to
psychological problems; constructing a "'psychohistory' of the possibility of psychotherapy
itself,' rather, is proposed as a way of illuminating psychotherapy's status vis-a-vis larger trends
in intellectual history. Despite this apparent lack of attention to the practical implications of the
connection between rhetoric and psychotherapy, Eng's grasp of "kinship" between the two
disciplines is richly suggestive and useful to the practitioner interested in pursuing such
implications. Unfortunately, this piece is the only one published by Eng on this topic.
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Another early writer to directly link psychotherapy to persuasion (although only later to
rhetoricpe. is Jerome Frank, whose 1961 volume, Persuasion andHeaUn^: A cornparauve
study ofpsychotherapy, was reissued in 1973 and then again in 1991 (note: the page citations
given in this section are from the 1973 edition). Franks' goal in this work is a general one: to
extract from a survey of different psychotherapies an operational understanding of how all of
them work. As he wrote in the preface to the 1973 revised edition, "The thesis of this book is
that it is worthwhile to explore features shared by all psychotherapies, because evaluation of the
differential effectiveness of different techniques, if any, will depend to a large extent on one's
ability to determine the effects of those features common to all" (p. xvii).
While Frank discerns several such common features amongst the various
psychotherapies he surveys, two broad categories are especially relevant to the subject of this
dissertation.
The first of these concerns the nature of psychopathology. According to Frank:
The psychotherapeutic conceptualization of illness differs in a fundamental respect from
the medical one and this difference has important consequences. Insofar as
psychopathological processes are amenable to psychotherapy, they are conceptualized as
expressing disorders ofcommunication resulting from past experiences and the major
psychotherapeutic tools are communicative symbols—that is words (323) [italics
inserted for emphasis].
This view of psychopathology as fundamentally communicative—and as remediable through
communicative processes—is essentially rhetorical, as Frank himself makes clear in later
publications (please see below). Unfortunately, he does not discuss this view of
psychopathology in depth or detail, neglecting to give specific communication-centered accounts
of the etiologies of particular disorders or illustrations of the role played by communicative
dysfunction in particular cases. He does, however, suggest that the common effect of
communicative dysfunction is a condition that may be broadly described as 'demoralization', or
"a sense of powerlessness to affect oneself and one's environment" (xvi). As such.
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psychopathology. in Frank's view, constitutes a state of rhetorical inrpotence or degradation:
Unable to purposefnMy exer, inHuence or control via effective communication, the afflicted
person languishes in some panern of feeling, thought, or behavior that signifies hopelessness and
defeat. Naturally, the psychoptherapisfs role has to do with reversing demoralization. Again, in
the broadest sense:
Psychotherapies may combat the patient's demoralization not only by alleviatina his
specific symptoms of subjective distress and disordered behavior but also and more
importantly by employing measures to restore his self-confidence and to help him totmd more effective ways of mastering his problems" (p. xvi).
Somewhat more specifically, psychotherapy may: provide clients with new opportunities for
learning about the source of their problems and how to more effectively handle them; it may
deliberately "enhance the sufferer's sense of mastery, interpersonal competence, or capability"
(p. 329); it may "help the patient to overcome his demoralizing sense of alienation from his
fellows" (p. 330); or, it may engineer specific and positive states of emotional arousal which
directly combat or counter feelings of demoralization.
But all such techniques require psychotherapists to use influence or persusasion, and this
is the second category of shared features identified by Frank which deserve mention. According
to Frank, "Whatever the specific nature of the psychotherapeutic enterprise, its success depends
on the ability of one person to influence another..." (p. 43). In psychotherapy, the sources of
influence are two: power and similarit>':
Powerful figures, first represented by parents and later by teachers, bosses, and so on,
gain their ascendancy through their control of the person's well-being. They exert this
power through control of the means he needs to achieve his goals and by their ability to
determine the consequences of his behavior. The ability of one person to influence
another also depends on similarities of manner and outlook. These largely determine the
influencer's credibilit\' and also how easily the recipient of influence can accept him as a
model or identify with him. (p. 43) (italics mine)
Pyschotherapists, then, in treating particular clients, must first of all make judicious use of the
power they possess by virtue of being persons of authority, experts in human behavior and well-
being, recognized 'healers,' and persons who, in some fashion, represent society and its norms
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and laws. According ,o Frank, because clients come to psycho,i,erapis,s ,o receive heali„«
psychotherapists immediately possess a significant degree of authority: not unlike religious
healers in ^'so-called primitive societies," psychotherap.sts are believed to have special powers or
abilities (p. 48). This authority may be mcreased as psychotherap.sts demonstrate pertinent or
helpful knowledge, show compassion, engage client's in symptom-transforming experiences,
and so on. Yet, therapists must also to some degree match or show acceptance of the 'manner
and outlook'-^r what Frank calls the "assumptive world"-of the client. If psychotherapists are
unable to validate clients' "implicit assumptions about [themselves] and the nature of the world
in which [they] live" (p. 27), their influence is likely to diminish. For, as Frank points out,
clients are not passive, inert beings or tabula rasae, but active, willing subjects, whose
worldviews must, in some fashion, be acknowledged and accommodated, even when some
portion of their worldview is explicitly targeted for radical change. "Similarity', then, is a term
denoting existential likeness and moral agreement. It also suggests a state of relationship in
which the therapist is perceived by the client as a fellow being, even while being simultaneously
viewed as a special authority.
Although Persuasion and Healing is fundamentally rhetorical in outlook, it was not until
1987 that Frank explicitly made reference to rhetoric in a published work. In this article,
"Psychotherapy, Rlietoric, and Hermeneutics: Implications for Practice and Research," Frank
reiterates one of his central arguments from Persuasion and Healing, namely that "'...in all
cultures patients seek psychotherapy or its equivalent, not for symptoms alone but also because
of their demoralizing meanings, and the effectiveness of all psychotherapies depends at least in
part on their ability to combat this state of mind" (p. 293). However, here, Frank recognizes that,
because psychotherapy has as its primary goal the transformation of meanings, "... it may prove
possible to compare psychotherapeutic practice to two other ancient and respected disciplines
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.ha. operate in the realm of meani„gs_„a,nely, rhetoric (Glaser, 1980) and hermeneutics
(Bauman. 1978; Westheimer, 1985)."
Following Aristotle. Frank considers the similarities beUveen rhetoric and psychotherapy
n regards to four subjects areas: 1) who their recipients are, 2) their goals, 3), the sources of
their inHuence, and 4) their methods of influencing others.
As regards the recipients of rhetoric and psychotherapy, Frank suggests that both "are
susceptible to the influence of others because they are dissatisfied or stressed" (294). While
many works on rhetoric seem to challenge the narrowness of this depiction, clearly indicating
that rhetoric may be brought into play regardless of the emotional state of a sender or receiver,
there is logic to Frank's claim that distress may in some cases enhance receptivity to another's
message. (It should, however, also be noted that distress may also render persons less available
to the rhetorical efforts of others). Consistent with his emphasis on distress, Frank also suggests
that
-'both rhetoricians and psychotherapists flourish in times of social demoralization like the
present," when many persons have "lost faith in the institutions and values that provide a sense
of social stability and common purpose" (294). Again, agreement with Frank in these assertions
is probably less than universal.
As regards the goals of both rhetoricians and psychotherapists, Frank suggests that both
may seek "to enhance the welfare of their targets" (295). For example, while psychotherapists
seek relief from symptoms or changes in the "patient's fundamental outlook on life," rhetoricians
may pursue "increased wealth or rectification of injustices" (295). The difference between them,
however, is that, while psychotherapists are morally and professionally obligated to help their
clients, "(t)he motivations of other persuaders, including rhetoricians, are more varied" (295).
Frank recognized two sources of influence for both rhetoricans and psychotherapists.
The first of these is personal, and includes such features as charisma, personal magnetism, the
"ability to sense the mood of the audience, and eloquence. Moreover, he draws analogies
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between the characteristic virtues of,he effective rhetorician (e.g. withstanding the hosflity of
the audience) and those of the effective psychotherapist (e.g.,
-steadfastness in the face of
patients- emotional displays") (295). The second source of mfluence is co„,e.,ual. and includes
such features as diplomas and certificates, testimonials, and membership in professional
associations.
As for the methods ofmfluence used by practitioners of rhetoric and psychotherapy,
Frank mentions two: emotional stimulation and argument. Characterizing strong emotional
appeals as the "stock in trade of rhetoricians" (296), Frank suggests that such appeals typically
produce effects of short duration, unless they are consistently reinforced. As for argumentation,
Frank suggests that it is not limited to ^logical appeal to reason." but "encompasses all
'rhetorical expression intended to convince or persuade'"(296). Unfortunately, Frank's
discussion of these methods is very brief, consisting of only two short paragraphs.
The similarities between rhetoric and psychotherapy have, according to Frank, certain
implications for psychotherapeutic practice. First of all, Frank proposes that psychotherapists
could profit from "more deliberate efforts to improve their communication with patients" by
using specific suasuory devices such as "vivid metaphors and sensory images" (296). Secondly,
Frank suggests that psychotherapists should feel emboldened to make greater use of "emotion-
arousing procedures," as opposed to relying upon intellectual insight and other "rational,
scientific" strategies (296). Finally, Frank proposes that psychotherapists should make greater
use of implicitly persuasive "symbols of healing," such as placebos.
In concluding his 1987 article. Frank offers a far reaching critique of the discipline of
psychotherapy as excessively self-identitled as a 'science.' when, in fact, it would benefit both
practitioners and patients if it embraced a more rhetorical self-concept:
Both the debate on the scientific status of psychotherapy and the direction of current
research in the field rest on the implicit assumptions that the effectiveness of any form o\
psychotherapy depends on its scientific validity (Grunbaum, 1984). The considerations
reviewed in this article suggest, rather, that the therapeutic power of any form of
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7JuT'"'iy""r'
primarily on its persuasiveness. In this a psychotherapeuticmethod resembles a hterary production more than an applied scienci (300)
'
In 1995, Frank published his third and last piece linking rhetoric and psychotherapy,
^Tsychotherapy as rhetoric: Some implications." This rather short journal article (3 pages in
length) constitutes more of a summary and restatement of his earlier ideas than a novel
contribution to the topic. He does, however, amplify two particular themes.
The first of these is the theme of 'change' or 'transformation.' As in earlier writings,
Frank asserts that most patients seek psychotherapeutic treatment because they are demoralized.
However, here, he states that the foremost function of psychotherapy is to effect a Irans/onnaUon
of those feelings, beliefs, and other features that together form the state of demoralization:
"...[SJuccessful psychotherapy relieves distress and disability by transforming the meanings
patients ascribe to events from negative to positive" (p.90); "All psychotherapeutic rituals seek to
change despair to hope, fear to courage, powerlessness to mastery—thereby leading to
progressive improvement" (p. 90).
According to Frank (and this is the second theme he amplifies in this article), the power
to effect such transformations "...depends less on [a psychotherapy's] theoretical foundations
and methods than on the therapist's ability to create or strengthen expectations that these
particular ministrations will assuage the patient's particular forms of distress and disability"
(p.91). As such, "Therapeutic conceptualizations and rituals are primarily rhetorical devices to
persuade or convince patients of the therapist's healing power" (p. 91).
In summary, Frank emphasizes that while the principal goal of treatment is a
transformation in the experience of the patient, the primary rhetorical mecharusni of such
transformation or healing has to do with the perceived status of the therapist him or herself So
long as patients come to believe that their therapists possess the means and the capacities to heal
them, such healing is possible. Essential, then, to therapists' success is that they convince their
patients of their own healing potential. This may be done in several ways (as Frank described in
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-.ajor one" involves impressing ,l,e pa.ien, with
-wha, rhetoricians tern
.'^-features of the therapist's character, credentials, rcpntation, and the like" (p. 91).
Overall, what Frank suggests in "Psychotherapy as rhetoric: Some implications" is that
psychotherapy should be consciously designed by therapists to function as a translbrmative-
which is say. persuasive-experience. By deliberately establishing titemselves as "healers,"
psychotherapists take the first step in a series of persuasive stratagems which lead to symptom
change or relief.
The evolution in Frank's writing from a broad interest in persuasion to a more explicit
interest in rhetoric may be related to the work of Susan Glaser (1980), who was herself
influenced by Frank. In her book chapter, "Rhetoric and Psychotherapy," Glaser "describes the
application of rhetorical analysis to the content of therapeutic dialogue" (313). Specifically, she
offers a conceptual framework for "analyzing therapeutic transactions," the purpose being to
"explicate specific therapist verbal behavior that might have influential effects on client
behavior" (313). In this work, Glaser acknowledges Frank's book on persuasion, and she
suggests that the features he identifies as common to all psychotherapies might in fact be most
accurately labeled "rhetorical processes," which have the goal and the effect of persuading
clients to change. Approaching these shared features as such—which means analyzing them
from a solid footing in classical rhetorical theory—may lead, she contends, to the discovery of
"some major components of therapist potency, which until now have remained elusive" (3 1 5). In
"Aristotle as Psychotherapist" (1980), his commentary (which is published in the same volume),
on Glaser's work, Frank writes "...this paper has aroused my hopes that rhetorical analysis of
psychotherapy will prove to be a fruitful enterprise" (327).
Glaser herself follows Aristotle in defining rhetoric as "the art of discovering in any
given case all the available means of persuasion. More simply, the study of rhetoric focuses on
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the things people say and how they affect other people" (314).
-Psychotherapy is a rhetorical
process,- she argues
.
.because
"(therapists use the spoken word to alter the.r clients' thoughts,
feelings, and behavior in direct, deliberate ways" (314).
Glaser suggests that therapist rhetorical proficiency-- theoretically as "the
capacity of therapist discourse to influence'" others (316)-is multidimensional, relying on four
central devices.
The first of these devices is ethos appeals. Essentially equating ethos with character,
Glaser-like Frank-focuses particularly on the therapist's need to develop his or her "perceived
expertness, trustworthiness, and attractiveness" (316-317). In a table of "Rhetorical Resources,"
Glaser lists several operationalizations of ethos appeals, such as "Therapists may directly refer to
their own expertise and experience in a given matter" and "Therapists may communicate high
esteem for the client" (3 1 8). Each such strategy contributes to the client's perception of the
therapist as ethically and characterologically capable of benefiting the client, and so inspires
trust, compliance, and an increase in influencability.
The second rhetorical device identified by Glaser is logical appeals. "This variable
focuses on what Aristotle called logos, the content or logical argument of speech" (324).
Although explicitly acknowledging a concern with argument here, Glaser defines argument
narrowly as "reasoned" and "logical" verbal communicafion, which succeeds to the degree that it
provides its propositions with supporting evidence, such as examples, statistics, citations from
recognized authorities, and meaningful analogies.
Glaser's third category of rhetorical device is tension release mechanisms. According to
Glaser, therapy, by definition, involves "vivifying"—or calling attention to and heightening—the
clients' problems, be they anxiety, anger, grief, or some situational difficulty. "The question
now becomes: If the client accepts these problem claims, is he offered a way out of the
accompanying tension and anxiety?" (326). Tension release mechanisms are discursive
51
statements or stratagems that aim specifically at these natural-yet discomfuing-sidceffects of
the therapeutic process^ Examples include describing ".he client's situation as bemg hopeful,
solvable," "offering direct solutions. " or
"
suggesting that "change is already taking place" (319-
320).
Finally, there is the use of stylistic devices. According to Glaser, communication
possesses not only substance, but an expressive style. In order to increase therapists' rhetorical
potency, Glaser advocates the use of anitheses, metaphors, sensory images, and 'balances' (or
"...verbal patterns which put ideas in pairs, in a series, or in other parallel constructions" [327]).
Such devices, she contends, "have the capacity to make what is said seem more completely true,
important, and impressive," although she does not discuss how or why this is so (327).
In the course of describing these four rhetorical devices, Glaser analyzes bits of
therapist-client dialogue transcribed from actual sessions. In these analyses, Glaser focuses on
the verbal behavior of the therapist, commenting on how the therapist's maneuvers illustrate the
effective use of a rhetorical strategy.
In concluding her chapter, Glaser acknowledges that her four-part schema for assessing
the rhetorical potency of therapists is largely theoretical and requires further empirical study and
confirmation. She states:
The most significant limitation of the rhetorical approach described is its lack of an
empirical base. For 2000 years, rhetoric has been approached as an artistic rather than
scientific inquiry....All of this can be remedied, however, through objective procedures
developed in the behavioral sciences. The four components of therapist rhetorical
potency described in this chapter can be stated as hypotheses that can be further
operationalized and tested... Toward this end, coding procedures should be developed
which reliably discriminate rhetorical acts. Such coding procedures have been
developed in other contexts, and there is no reason to assume that they could not be
developed for this purpose.... If therapy is a rhetorical process, examining its rhetorical
components may reveal why and how it succeeds and fails, thereby allowing therapists to
maximize the occurrence and maintenance of therapeutic improvement, and allowing
rhetoricians to better understand the processes by which individuals are persuaded by
other individuals. (331-332)
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In 1987. Robert Spillane published ajournal article titled "Rhetoric as remedy: Some
philosophical antecedents of psychotherapeutic ethics."
Like Eng (1973), Spillane sets out in this article to provide at least a provisional
historical and philosophical context for the argument that psychotherapists and other
'"physicians of the soul' are concerned with rhetoric rather than medicine" (217). To this end,
he considers the use in the Homeric epics of "cheering speeches" for "curative purposes,"
Socrates' remark in the Phaedrus that "Rhetoric is like medicine" able to "impart health and
strength
...by the right application of words and training," and Plato's claim that "rhetoric is
therapeutic when it produces in the soul sophrosyne, a beautiful, harmonious and rightful
ordering of all the ingredients of psychic life; beliefs, feelings, impulses, knowledge, thoughts
and value judgments, (p. 2 1 7)"
Moreover, like Glaser and Frank, Spillane conveys an interest in psychotherapeutic
techne. or in dealing with the practical challenges of applying a rhetorical perspective to
psychotherapy. (More on this topic below).
However, unlike any of the writers considered so far, Spillane puts at the center of his
article a concern with ethics. Following the ideas of Thomas Szasz—who argued that "the
original goal of modern psychotherapy (i.e., psychoanalysis) was to liberate individuals from the
pathogenic influences of traumatic memories and inhibitions"(217)—Spillane argues that
psychotherapy should consciously embrace a "freedom ethic." Recognizing that psychotherapy
is too often placed into the service of far less honorable ideals (e.g., the social control of the
individual), he offers "an ethical hierarchy of language and values for psychotherapeutic
practice" (218).
Spillane begins his ethical analysis by distinguishing between base rhetoric, which
involves the use of "language to deprive people of their liberty and dignity" (e.g.. Hitler), and
noble rhetoric, which involves the use of "language to encourage people to speak clearly, think
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(e.g., Cicero) (p. 217).
Nex,, he explores ,l,e p„ssihili,ies for eiiher base or noble rhetoric in six areas of
language use, eael, ofwl.el, are eon.nu.nly utilized in psyeho.hernpy. These six areas or
runetions- oflanguage are: .he descr,p„ve, ,he advisory, ,he arg„„,en,a.ive, ,he promissory,
,l,e
sig..ali„g (i.e., provoking a response IVon, ano.her), and .he expressive. While lour of .hese
fune.ions had been previously elassitled and analyzed by Popper ( 1 963), ,he advisory and
promissory functions are described as ihe original contributions of Spillane.
The rhetorical use of each of these six functions by a therapist creates a u,m|ue set of
ethical problems.
Use of the descriptive function of language, tor example, raises the problem of what is
true and what is false. Because language is often 'metaphorical/ clients may often express a
'truth' about themselves in terms that may be interpreted in quite different ways. "For example,
when a client describes himself as 'sick,' 'fed-up,' 'burned-out,' 'persecuted,' 'schizophrenic,'
therapists become embroiled in a linguistic game," which involves choosing between the view
that the client is using a rhetorical strategy to strongly convey a message and the view that the
client is "offering a literal description of his condition" (p. 220). If client expressions are taken
literally, the natural tendency is to pathologize, or to see indications of mental illness and then to
react in restrictive, externally controlling ways. If, on the other hand, therapists accord to clients
the right and capacity to use powerful and unique descriptive language, the tendency will be
towards free and respectful discourse. Naturally, Spillane encourages therapists to refrain from
literal interpretations whenever possible.
The use of (iri^iimcnt in psychotherapy also has ethical ramifications. .Although Spillane
does not offer a clear statement of what he means by argument, he suggests that it is "through
arguments that clients become aware of opportunities to choose, challenge experts, autocrats and
54
those who would coerce and control thenr (222) And, ^'As the aim of psychotherapy is to
achieve a relationship free of coercion and control, argument in its var.ous forms acts as a
bulwark against heteronomy" (222). What Spillane appears to mean by these rcnuu-Ls is ,hat, as
a tool in the hands (or mouths) of clients fighting for their liberty, arguing (i.e., disagrcen,g,
debating, contending) can be quite 'noble,' leading to increases in autonomy and Iree-will.
However, when plied by already powerful therapists, "argument can (also) be used for base
ends-to obfuscate and confuse clients" (222) and to impose social control over them.
Spillane's ethical analysis of the six functions of language in psychotherapy leads,
eventually, to a cardinal rule or guiding mission for psychotherapy: that is, "fo contribute to the
creation of noble individuals who are self-affirming and self-overcoming" (223). if, he argues,
psychotherapists are aware of their own rhetorical potency, careful to value and encourage the
rheforical development of their clients, and able fo preforentially discern between 'base' and
'noble' rhetorical plays in therapy, this mission can be fulfilled.
It may be noted that, in contrast fo Frank and Glaser who assay to enhance the rhetorical
potency of the therapist, Spillane is more interested in enhancing the rhetorical potency of the
client. He encourages psychotherapists to adopt a rhetorical lens on psychotherapy not in order
to assist them in becoming more powerful (in fact, following Szasz, he sees them as too powerful
already), but in order to better be able to support the evolution of client agency and autonomy.
In 1989, David Payne published the volume Coping with Failure: The Therapeutic Uses
ofRhetoric. As part of a University of South Carolina Press series entitled "Studies in
Rhetoric/Communication," this book is neither written by a psychotherapist nor intended
primarily for a readership of psychotherapists. It is, rather, a rhetorical study written by a
professional rhetorician which treats 'therapy'—or healing—as a facet of everyday life, practiced
by all persons in innumerable situations (e.g., interpersonal relationships, religious worship.
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courts of law), rather than as a specialized activity conducted by a professional guild who foil
established guidel.nes;
.n fact, for Payne, therapy is one of the pri.a^ organizing princ.ples and
functions of everyday communication. Still, Payne refers to psychotherapy often. Also, in
wedding the key ideas of
-'rhetoric'' and
-'therapy," he frequently considers topics which are
germane to the possibility and practice of a rhetorical approach to psychotherapy. Finally, he
consistently demonstrates what might be called 'psychological mindedness,' and he quite
frequently references psychological studies. Coping with Failure is, then, included in this
literature review as the one specimen of a predominantly rhetorical text which 'crosses over' into
the domain of psychotherapy.
Payne states that:
The chief aim of this book has been to examine failure as a uniquely rhetorical problem.
The examination has involved a reconsideration of what failure is and how rhetoric
operates when failure in addressed, (p. 147)
To this end, Payne offers many meditations on the role that/ai7u/-e—which means to be deprived
of success—plays in self-identity, in social discourses and processes, and in literature and
philosophy. Considering failure to be a central and ubiquitous feature of experience in both
individual and cultural life, Payne follows William James in viewing failures as -'pivotal human
experiences" and as "part of what it means to be human" (3). Payne pursues evidence of a
concern \\\\\\ failure in religion, in art, in science—and virtually everywhere else: "There is little
we say," he writes " that is not in some degree relevant to the facts of our failures and the
possibilities of our failing" (4).
According to Payne, living in a world in which failure is both a historical fact and a
future possibility deeply influences us psychologically. Failure causes us to feel vulnerable and
forces us to cope with this vulnerability. Yet, in the positive sense, failure also causes us to
strive, to be creative, and to look for novel solutions.
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But most importantly for Payne, failure
.nlluenees and shapes the very nature of our
communieation, for it requires the ereation of a rhetorie which addresses all thai fa.iure is and all
that it connotes. This rhetoric is the rhetoric of therapy-or, alternatively, therapcut.c rhetoric:
"[I]n its therapeutic function rhetoric offers compensation and consolation, provides symbolic
ways of transforming self and world, and structures and repairs perceptions and experiences of
problems or errors" (151). Therapeutic rhetoric encompasses all those communicative processes
which address problems and which seek to remediate them. For Payne, the term "rhetoric" is
rightly applied to these processes because they have the goal of inlluencing a change in the
circumstances of self or other.
Frequently in Coping with Failure Payne makes reference to psychotherapy. In the
broad sense, he suggests that all "Psychology and psychiatry, and the entire tradition of therapy,
are based upon the need to explain and treat failure" (p. 4). What he means by this is that life
problems and psychopathologic symptoms or illnesses are either the sequelae of failures or they
constitute failures in and of themselves. Accordingly, the treatment of such problems involves
an address of failure.
While this failure-centered perception of human life and therapy is debatable, Payne
offers valid insights as to how we might think about integrating rhetoric and psychotherapy.
He suggests, first of all, that psychotherapy as we know it meets all three conditions of a
therapeutic rhetoric, in that it makes use of
rhetoric that attempts to put a person or persons in a perceived position of needing
therapy; (2) rhetoric that attempts to address and provide remedies for problems assumed
already to exist in the audience; (3) rhetoric that both creates the need for and supplies
the appropriate therapy (p. 32).
Psychotherapy, in other words, is for Payne a patently rhetorical process, wherever and however
it is practiced.
Secondly, Payne offers two rhetorical strategies which he believes to have special
efficacy for persons trying to cope with failure: compensation and consolation. Those may be
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considered as contributions to a psychotherapeutic techne. Compensation involves defining
faUure in such a way that it can be repaired or erased. Consolation entails preparing a respondent
to accept a failure that cannot be repaired or completely undone. Loss and the fact of the fai
are consolingly interpreted in ways that make the consequences less painful, easier to
accommodate, or even valuable according to some set of priorities" (p. 152). "A compensatory
response may make consolation feasible, or a consolatory response may sufficiently minimize a
failure to make compensation easily possible" (p. 152). In moments when a person is suffering
the affects of failure or loss, uses of compensatory and consolatory rhetoric are recommended,
both in order to make manageable the injury and to instigate new, solution oriented striving.
Thirdly, Payne provides an explicitly rhetorical theory of the self that complements and
reinforces his rhetorical theory of the therapeutic. He writes:
Rhetoric that aims at improving life through perfecting identities presupposes three
things. First such rhetoric is devised on the assumption that identity or the self is
changeable and changing... Second, this rhetoric implies a belief that identity is formed,
sustained, and reformed through communication—through symbolic exchange. This is'
implied in any interactive view of identity formation and change. Third, and^in
consequence of the second assumption, it is assumed that people can be persuaded to
change their orientations and actions by changing their identities, and that the results will
be gratifying and uplifting for selves and society. (19)
According to Payne, many psychologists—including Roy Baumeister (1986)—have proposed
that identity is fluid and adaptable, consisting of a constantly changing set of roles and statuses,
cognitions and emotions. For Payne, the changeable nature of self is, first of all, accounted for or
created by our susceptibility to the influences of others and our need to respond to these
rhetorical pressures. We change, in other words, because of the need to adapt to changing social
contingencies and urgencies. Secondly, for Payne, it is the experience of failure which most
powerfully compels self-change, for it is this experience which (a) produces in the individual a
perceived need—as well as a wish—for self-change or self-improvement, and (b) opens the
individual to the rhetorics about self-value and self-improvement which abound in the culture.
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In h.s construction of scll-idcUity, Payne essentially offers the notion ofa ^rhetoricized
or rl,ctor,cal sell^
-which is to say, a self which cannot be grasped by reference to stable traits,
but must rather be seen as constantly being 'made' via socio-rhetorical processes:
If one's psychosocial identity must manage personal and social pressures through
commumcat.on
.t .s perhaps inaccurate even to speak of one" identity as a fixed or static
entity. It sell-change
.s possible, then it must be conceived of as a process wherein (1)one s personal situation, (2) one's received messages, (3) one's own persuasive actions
and (4) the remlorcemenls that are available combine to form a new public
identity... (29)
^
As we emerge-rcpeatedly-into new 'public identities,' we do so with a crucial rhetorical task
to accomplish: to persuade others (and ourselves) of the legitimacy of these new identities. And
so, Payne proposes, we do, until failure comes again to trip us up and send us into another
protean cycle of reconstruction.
Therapeutic discourses—and psychotherapeutic discourses—in particular are engaged
throughout these cycles of self-creation. These discourses, circulating widely as they do in the
culture and also available to us iti packaged forms in psychotherapists' offices or in places of
worships (to name but two), give us a starting place for self-identity, and they also kick in with
especial potency when we perceive that our current self is flawed, insufficient, or bankrupt.
These discourses may be evil and destructive—as was Hitler's 'therapeutic' strategy in failure-
wracked Germany between the World Wars; or they may be genuinely helpful, as are many
psychotherapies.
To read Payne as a psychotherapist searching for strategy is to emerge more with a new
theoretical framework (and new theoretical questions) than with a hat full of new concrete
techniques. It may also be difficult to get aroimd Payne's preoccupation with the experience of
failure, which acquires a mythopoetic enormity rather like Freud's conception of thanatos;
certainly, there is more diversity and range to human experience and to rhetoric than can be
subsumed under the rubric of failure. But Payne, nonetheless, provides the most thoroughly
considered treatment of the connection between rhetoric and the therapeutic considered so far in
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this review. Most importantly, he manages to go beyond the relatively bounded insight thai
psyehotherapy is a rhetorical process to grasp that life beyond the clinician's olllce
.s just as
thoroughly rhetoricized. His rhetorical models-especially Kenneth Burke-here prove their
value, enco.n-aging Payne to set his thinking about the therapeutic withm a more-or-less totalistic
rhetorical worldview.
In 1 993, a pair ofjournal articles linking rhetoric and family therapy were produced by
Dale Bertram. One of these,
-Rhetorical Theory and Family Therapy Practice^ was written in
collaboration with David Hale and Carl Frusha. The second article, "Missing Links: The Use of
Enthymemes and Their Applications for Family Therapists," was written by Bertram as the sole
author.
In ^^Rhetorical theory and family therapy practice," Bertram, Hale, & Frusha begin by
proposing that:
"[T]he fields of rhetoric and family therapy are inextricably linked. The skillful usage
of language is at the core of both arts. A skilled rhetor and a skilled therapist are both
able to use language to build arguments and stories which produce change" (140).
After briefly defining basic terms (e.g., rhetoric, influence), they suggest that a
knowledge of rhetoric may be especially valued by family therapists in discerning solutions to
the "'stuck' places in therapy" (141). These 'places'—during which the focus of the therapeutic
dialogue has become vague or conflicts appear insurmountable—are created, the authors
propose, by an 'inability of the therapist-client system to discover or generate new means of
persuasion" (141). What both clients and therapists arc in need of is a heightening of their
"persuasive intentionality," or of their goal-directed involvement in the therapeutic process.
As solutions to these difficulties, the authors recommend the use of two "classical
rhetorical techniques." They do not state the sources (classical or otherwise) for these
techniques.
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The first of these devices is the "parastasis catalogue," a list ofhardsh.ps and personal
sacrifices which speakers produce in order to "enhance their credibility" and lend authority to
their positions. "Thus, the person use[s] the list to argue that he or she ha[s] suffered great
hardships for the cause and ha[s] earned the right to speak authoritatively about the cause" (142).
The authors advise therapists against using parastasis catalogues to enhance their own power and
authority; just why, they do not explain. Rather, they suggest that the production of parastasis
catalogues is most appropriate "in situations where it is difficult to obtain a problem definition.
It is used as an intervention to assist clients in clarifying their personal hardships which they
have suffered as a result of their problematic life-situations" (142). Such an intervention, the
authors claim, "serves as a way of focusing therapy" (143). When brought into therapy, the
catalogue can help the therapist identify and build upon the family's strengths, as well as to focus
in on the problems of most critical importance.
The second rhetorical technique described by the authors is the "syncrisis weave," a
means by which, in times of crisis which call for action, "one option[for action] is demonstrated
to be superior to all available options" (Bertram, Hale, & Frusha, 1993, p. 144). Although the
discussion of this technique is too brief to be of much help, the authors' point appears to be that
families are more likely to make more sound and better reasoned life decisions if they list and
compare options for acfion. Also, when used to assess and validate past decisions, the syncrisis
weave may help families to feel more confident about themselves and "to continue doing the
things which are working" (146).
David Bertram's 1993 solo article, "Missing Links: The Use of Enthymemes and Their
Applications for Family Therapists," is also concerned with offering to family therapists a
specific rhetorical tool or device to add to their repertoire. In this article, the focus is on the
therapeutic uses of the enthymeme, which Bertram defines as the act or process of supplying "a
missing link in a speech or conversation" (324). Bertram notes that his definition of enthymeme
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is not canonical. (Indeed, Aristotle defines the enthymeme as a species of argumentation
typically used to persuade an audience in social [as opposed to dialectical] settings. Accordma
to Aristotle, the enthymeme is often similar in structure to the more formal syllogism, but it does
not rest [as the syllogism must] upon the foundation of indisputable or empirical premises, nor
does it require obedience to strict logic. Its purpose, rather, is to gain the adherence the
audience, often through a quasi-logical process of persuasion.) For Bertram, an enthymematic
act has to do with locating the propositions or bits of a story that are missing from another
speaker's address, and then supplying these missing pieces.
In therapy, Bertram argues, one of the therapist's main ftinctions is to deal with
communicative acts or addresses that are incomplete:
"[T]herapists often listen to what is left unsaid in a conversation and find themselves
grappling with propositions that are not explicitly stated ... As the session's participants
interact with one another, efforts are made to link the pieces of conversation together in a
way that makes sense to the therapist and the clients" (324)
By being aware of and then providing such missing links, therapists may be able to pull to the
surface clients' hidden propositions or beliefs, disclose previously unshared segments of life
narrative, and stimulate access to other therapeutically valuable resources.
Yet Bertram focuses most of all in this article on a different kind of enthymematic
process to be conducted by therapists: that of deliberately setting up incomplete narratives,
logical claims, or scenarios which it is then the client's ]oh to complete. In all three of the
examples given by Bertram, the text is taken from hypnotic inductions performed by Milton
Erickson. In the first of the three examples, Erickson says:
Now there are certain things that you want to learn . . . And I want you to be sure that
youMl learn, and I want you to think clearly in your own mind of the various things you
want to learn. And then I want you to realize that you can learn them, and that you will
learn them. (325)
According to Bertram, Erickson's scenario creates an enthymematic opportunit>'— if not
imperative—for the client. Given two clear propositions ([1] 'There are things that you want to
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leam" and [2] You can, and will, learn them."), the cUent must provide the third ('^What are those
things-). According to Bertram, the initial work done by the therapist in setting up this
enthymeme leads the client to a useful place on the therapeutic map-but then leaves h.m or her
there to figure out what to do next. In supplying the "missing links" in a therapeutic cham
already well begun, clients are then enabled to exert their own wills, thus benefiting both from
expert guidance and a sense of personal accomplishment.
Bertram advises therapists to "think enthymematically" whenever engaging clients in
therapeutic dialogue, be it through hypnotic induction or through more straightforward
conversation.
John Stancombe's and Susan White's "Notes On the Tenacity of Therapeutic
Presuppositions in Process research: Examining the Artfulness of Blaming in Family Therapy"
appeared in the Journal ofFamily Therapy in 1997. Here, the authors develop three entwined
arguments.
The first of these is that research on psychotherapy has long overlooked the rhetorical
dimensions of psychotherapy. Even those few researchers newly interested in applying a
"discourse analytic" lens to the study of psychotherapy have so far disregarded the rhetorical,
inasmuch as they have focused more on what is said in therapy and less "on the work the talk is
doing" (23). "Any future research on discourse and the therapeutic process" should, they
suggest, emphasize "rhetoric, persuasion, and accountability" if it is to grasp the mechanisms
behind the observable interplay of words and gestures (39).
Secondly, Stancombe and White propose that rhetorical processes are vividly evident in
the early sessions of family therapy, when "the primacy of culpability and the ascription of
responsibility" dominate discourse (38). It is in the early stages of family therapy, in other
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words, that the participants use rhetorical strategies to tlx blame on others and to absolve
themselves of blame.
By analyzing a transcript of a family session involving 'Lucy" and 'Martin; a divorcing
couple, and their children, the authors set out to show how, in concrete terms, rhetorical blamin.
processes play an important role in the therapeutic dynamic. At the outset of this analysis they
write;
The imphcit propositions are as follows: each parent is anxious to project blame for thebreakdown of the relationship on to the other; each parent is motivated to present
themselves as a responsible caring parent; Lucy's intention is to persuade the therapists
that they do need help; Martinis intention is to persuade the therapists that they do not
need help. A further implicit proposition is that the therapist has some knowledge of the
parents' positioning and is aware of the potential for outright conflict to break out in the
session. (27)
After conducting the promised analysis—and showing the validity of their stated propositions—
the authors conclude with a short commentary on the need for more such work in the field of
family therapy.
Analysis
A meta-analysis of the literature reviewed above yields several patterns and insights.
First of all, a meta-analysis suggests that a rhetorical perspective has by no means
become popular amongst writers and practitioners of psychotherapy. From Frank's first edition
in 1961 of Persuasion and Healing to the present day, there has emerged no 'school' committed
to the exploration and application of rhetoric as a resource for psychotherapists. Nor has there
emerged even a single writer who has pursued a rhetorical perspective vigorously and
consistently enough to have produced a guiding, organizing framework for further study of the
topic. Instead, the history of published work on psychotherapy and rhetoric is slight, generally
consisting of works written in isolation from one another, which reveal little investment in prior
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or future research, and which are more suggestive than exhaustive. Although there is by now a
group of writings on the topic, they do not cohere into the sort of interconnected, self-aware
discourse that marks a mature (or even maturing) subfield, such as has formed around the idea of
narrative, behaviorism, or dozens of other approaches.
Secondly, most of the writings reviewed here offer contributions to a rhetorical
psychotherapy which are largely disconnected both from (a) a coherent, fully envisioned
psychology of mind, emotion, the individual personality, psychopathology, and social interaction
(Payne's Coping with Failure is the exception), and (b) the vast store of concepts and writings
which comprise the discipline of rhetoric.
As for the first of these 'disconnects,' rhetoric offers more than a set of practical
strategies for psychotherapists and other persuaders, but also the grounds for a substantial
psychology of human behavior; as both Billig (1985, 1988, 1989, 1991a, 1991b, 1993,1997) (in
social psychology) and Sarbin (1989a, 1989b) (in the study of emotions) have shown, rhetoric
offers the means and materials for answering important questions about what human beings are
and how they behave. Efforts at a rhetorical psychotherapy which are not similarly grounded in
some sort of undergirding theory about how personality is organized and expressed are
potentially risky; if we are to set about doing something as impactful for the lives of others as
psychotherapy, it is important that the rationale for our actions be carefully though out.
As for the 'disconnect' from the central corpus of rhetorical writings and studies, it, too,
is problematic. Certainly, it is possible to find in almost any work on rhetoric an idea or
stratagem that might seemingly be applied to psychotherapy; given that rhetoric—like
psychotherapy—has traditionally dealt with speech acts, conversations, and other communicative
events, this is not remarkable. But the piecemeal importing of discrete strategies from one side
of the disciplinary border to the other has little chance of producing a coherent, integrated
approach to treatment. Also, to embrace only a fragment of rhetorical theoiy or practice, without
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considering the wider theories of sooal processes or personality functioning in which it evolved,
raises questions: Is the fragment properly understood? How much more useful would it be if it
were part of a coherent approach to treatment?
As a last point, it might be noted that the writers cited above pay little attention to the
concept of argumentation, whether as practiced by therapists or clients. Since Perelman and
OlbrechtsTyteca^s 1969 The New Rhetoric: A Treastise on Argumentation, argumentation has
assumed a central role in rhetorical studies, proving a flexible and highly functional way of
understanding not only what people do when they communicate, but also why and with what
effects upon others. The general lack of attention to argumentation points to an important lacuna
in the literature on rhetoric and psychotherapy.
But these criticisms are not meant to diminish what the writers reviewed above have
accomplished, for it is substantial and promising. Among their many contributions, the works
discussed above have:
1. Validated the key thesis or premise that rhetoric has much to offer psychotherapy in terms of
illuminating how persons behave, conceptualizing what psychotherapy is and how it works,
and providing useful solutions to pragmatic challenges and problems faced by
psychotherapists and clients.
2. Made valuable efforts to historically contextualize the relationship—or lack thereof—
between rhetoric and psychotherapy.
3. Successfully questioned and critiqued the neglect of rhetoric by professional
psychotherapists.
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4. Raised important challenges to established trends in psychotherapeutic research.
Specifically, writers have proposed that researchers should devote more attention to the
mechanics of persuasion (Frank, Glaser), to clients as active rhetors (Stancombe and White),
and to developing schemata which permit the collection of empirical data (Glaser).
5. Called attention to questions ofpower and ethics in psychotherapy. When conceptualized as
a medical treatment process, psychotherapy is apt to pay little attention to questions of power
and ethics; these questions, rather, are displaced by concerns with efficacy and clinical
orthodoxy. Perhaps as a consequence of rhetoric's explicit interest in power (e.g., increasing
the persuasive power of speakers) and ethics (e.g., resolving everyday moral problems
through discussion and debate), the writers noted above push into the foreground questions
such as: Does therapist power matter? Should the persuasive power of therapists be
enhanced? Or should therapists focus on increasing the rhetorical power of clients? What
are the possible consequences of enhancing the power of any participant in psychotherapy?
6. Provided conceptual models (e.g., Glaser, Spillane) for identifying rhetorical strategies
and/or types of discourse employed in therapy.
7. Offered numerous specific strategies for enhancing psychotherapeutic practice.
8. Called attention to the challenges and promises of mounting a vigorous, multifaceted study
of psychotherapy and rhetoric.
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CHAPTERS
PREMISES OF A RHETORICAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE INDIVIDUAL
As was suggested at the end of the last chapter, essential to the cogency and legitimacy
of any approach to psychotherapy is a clear rationale for why and how—in terms of the
psychological functioning of the individual—it works. Just as behavioral psychotherapy is
rooted in an experimentally validated conception of the role that conditioning plays in human
learning and behavior; and just as psychoanalysis rests upon clinical observations of the potency
of sexual forces in personality development; so must any other psychotherapy be able to justify
its emphases and practices vis a vis a viable theory of how persons think, feel, and behave.
Accordingly, the aim of this chapter is to provide a psychological grounding or
foundation for a rhetorically-oriented psychotherapy. If therapists are going to be asked to use a
rhetorical framework for psychotherapy, it follows that they should have a working model of the
individual as a rhetorical subject. In order to construct such a model, it has been necessary to (a)
integrate views of psychological functioning embedded in rhetorical texts with information
drawn directly from the domains of psychology proper, and (b) to rely primarily on theory and
case study, and less on empirical data. Naturally, since there is little literature in the annals of
psychology vv'hich is self-identified as 'rhetorical,' the psychological texts and authors cited hale
from several points in the discipline, many of them not commonly associated with one another.
Nonetheless, these disparate data are meaningfully bound together by rhetorical principals.
The chapter is organized into four sections. The first treats of the broad view of human
"beingness" known as ontology; the second considers the emotions and emotional life; the third
deals with cognition; and the fourth examines psychopathology. Although these pages comprise
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a far from complete rhcorico-psychological portrait of the individual,
.hey do provide at least a
rudimentary basis for conceptualizing and operationalizing a rhetorical psychotherapy.
Ontology
As a first step towards articulating a rhetorical psychology, it is useful to consider the
ontological claims which are either implicitly or explicitly present in most works on rhetoric.
Bedrock premises or 'first principles' in psychology may be considered ontologiccd in that they
assert something basic and universal about the nature of human existence, or what it is to ^be"
human.
Premise 1
: Human beings are rhetorical beings, who are by nature subject to, capable of, and
enmeshed in activities ofpersuasion.
Human beings may be characterized in many different ways. They may be described as
thinking beings {homo sapiens), as playful beings {homo ludens), as spiritual beings {homo
adoratis), and so on. While such metonymies offer insight into human existence, they also risk
exaggerating the importance of the particular feature of human existence with which they are
concerned. To suggest, for example, that human beings are defined in part by their capacities for
religious feeling is valid; but to assert that they are entirely spiritual beings whose primary or
sole purpose is to attain spiritual grace is subject to challenge and refutation.
The characterization of the human being as a ''rhetorical being" is equally liable to over-
statement. Human beings are clearly other than and more than rhetorical beings. Many of the
things that human beings do and are are dictated by forces other than persuasion, such as
genetics, physiologic needs and drives, habits, and so on. Still, human beings' capacity for and
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susceptibility to persuasion is very important to what they are. Remove the capacity for
persuasion from human life, and many processes considered elemental to human identity become
impossible, including education, certain kinds of interpersonal relationship, enculturation, and
religion. Take education: Generally, one cannot, for example, learn algebra unless its rules and
procedures can be articulated in ways that permit them to be absorbed. It is also remarkable how
persuasion may alter what generally appear to be physiologic
-givens" in human life. Hindu
yogis manage to endure extremes of bodily deprivation because they are convinced that such
suffering has spiritual value. Persons told that a certain pasty substance they have just tasted is
pig fat (although it is in reality raw dough) may vomit. Even one's heart rate can be slowed by
calming self-talk.
It is also true that other animals besides human demonstrate some degree of rhetorical
capacity, both expressive and receptive. Dogs can learn to obey the commands of their masters.
Mother bears may teach their cubs through cuffs of the paw. Geese may signal their whereabouts
to one another through honking.
Human beings, however, have rhetorical aptitudes and susceptibilities that appear to
exceed those of other animals. While the uniquely well-developed rhetorical capabilities of
humans may be linked to several factors (e.g., a large cerebral cortex, social systems which
reward specialization and division of labor as well as collaboration and cooperation), most
writers agree that the most important factor is language. Whether the origins of language are
themselves fundamentally rhetorical (i.e., linked to the need or drive to persuade others) is an
open question; Burke (1966), for example, has argued that speech and language originated with
th€ hortatory use of the negative (e.g., the word no).
In her 1998 article 'The ontological foundations of Rlietorical Theory," Kathryn
Campbell delineates three dominant theories amongst rhetoricians regarding the rhetorical
capacities of human beings.
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The first of these theories is the ^traditional theory," which holds that ^man (sic) is
capable of and subject to persuasion because he is, by nature, a rational being" (23). This theory
suggests that it is reason-which is the capacity to objectively discriminate amongst things
according to their virtues and demerits-that allows persons to be moved by the communicative
appeals of others. Accordingly,
-true' rhetorical activity is confined to rational discussion or
debate, just as ^true" understanding is confined to rational apprehension. As Aristotle stated it,
"no rhetoric is genuine which is not based upon dialectics or the art of logical demonstration"
(24). Moreover, because reason makes persuasive communication possible, it also makes
possible social agreement, affiliation, and cooperation. The 19th century German philosopher
Arthur Schopenhauer captures the traditional view in the following passage:
The animal feels and perceives; man, in addition, thinks and knows; both will. The
animal communicates his feelings and moods by gesture and sound; man communicates
thought to another, or conceals it from him, by language. Speech is the first product and
the necessary instrument of the faculty of reason. Therefore, in Greek and Italian, speech
and reason are expressed by the same word, (o logos), il discorso. Vermmft (reason)
comes from verehmen, which is not synonymous with hearing, but signifies the
awareness of ideas communicated by words. Only by the aid of language does reason
bring about its most important achievement, namely the hannonious and consistent
action of several individuals, the planned cooperation of many thousands, civilization,
the State; and then, science, the storing up of previous experience, the summarizing into
one concept of what is common, the communication of truth, the spreading of error,
thoughts and poems, dogmas and superstitions. (Schopenhauer, 1819/1969, p. 37)
The second major theory regarding human persuadability Campbell calls ^behavioristic."
According to this theory, humans beings are "psycho-physiological organisms" with ''certain
innate needs, and persuasion is a process by which these are activated and directed" (26). This
view expands the domain of rhetorical activity in that it takes into account '"irrational" processes
such as drives, instincts, and emotions. Persuasion—even where it relies on rational means— is
considered to be a predominantly strategic activity aimed at manipulating and shaping the innate
proclivities and needs of persons. Rhetoric is, in other words, at its basis a means of tuning or
directing the psychophysiological mechanisms with which humans are by nature endowed.
71
The third theory
.dentifled by Campbell "explains that man is a rhetorical being because
he is a symbol-using or signifying creature capable of influencing and being influenced because
of his capacity for linguistic and semantic responses" (27). This essentially semiotic approach to
human ontology views persons as extraordinarily plastic in nature and possibility. In this view,
persons are nearly as diverse and as capable of novel development as is language itself. Rather
than viewing persons as defined primarily by "given" structures (e.g., innate drives), they are
regarded as beings who are throughout the course of their development defined and transformed
via symbolic means. "While it is true that man is an animal with basic biological needs who
must "live his body," the process of becoming human, of becoming socialized and acculturated,
is essentially a symbolic one in which basic, unlearned needs are linguistically transformed into
socially and culturally accepted motives which can never be divorced form their symbolic
origins" (28). Persuasion, then, is viewed as ubiquitous in human experience. From the moment
a child enters the world, the child is subject to symbolizing processes. In fact, the human world
is itself a symbolic product, radiating cultural-symbolic, social-symbolic, and psycho-symbolic
forces and messages. According to this third theory, human beings are viewed as substantially
"made" by rhetorical processes, and as continuously engaged in "making" the worlds in which
they live via rhetorical means.
Each of the three ontological theories identified by Campbell have a viable counterpart
in contemporary psychology and psychotherapy. The traditional theory fits the assumptions and
practices of many cognitive psychotherapies; the behavioristic model fits much behaviorist
psychology; and the semiotic theory fits the work of many social constructivists. Where
rhetorical theory may make a contribution to these frameworks is, first of all. by making
questions of human receptive and expressive persuadability explicit. Secondly, the question of
persuadability suggests a way of linking these frameworks, or of seeing them as allies in a
process of inquiry.
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Pimisel: Human existence is agonistic, defined by the simultaneous but contradictory
impulses toward unity with others and separationfi-om others.
"^'^e Random House Dictionnry defines agon in the following way:
1
.
(in ancient Greece) a contest in which prizes were awarded in any number of events
as athletics, dramatics, music, poetry, and painting. 2. (in ancient Greek drama) a
formalized debate or argumentation, esp. in comedy: usually following ih^ proagon and
preceding \hc parabasis. 3. Literature. Conflict, esp. between the protagonist and the
antagonist (28).
Many modem rhetoricians, including Burke and Perelman, propose that rhetoric is
linked-both as theory and as a practical discipline—to a basic ontological problem or paradox.
This problem is that human beings are simultaneously individuated but communal, separate but
social. Each of us is an independent "r\ but each of us stands in interdependent relationship
(both materially and psychologically) to others. It is in order to manage this paradox—that is, to
simultaneously be an autonomous self and to be productively joined to others—that we
communicate, or that we engage in rhetorical activity.
Communicative processes thus seem to unfold from an elemental tension between the
impulse towards individuation and the impulse towards communion, as well as from an
intolerance or unsustainability of either extreme. If humans were purely individuated and self-
sufficient—and also purely content with their separateness from others—they would not try to
persuade one another to share their points of view. On the other hand, if human beings were
purely communal, unified, and "of the same mind," the vast diversity and poignancy of
communicative practices would not need to exist. Where there is one reality—or at least
overarching agreement about reality—communication is both simplified and relatively
unimportant. Since, however, human beings do not have a shared reality
—
yet seem to desire
it—they actively labor to accomplish it through communicative activity, and they suffer when
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Ihey cannot have it. Yet, not only is comnuniion dimciilt to achieve even in the best of
circumstances, but people will also reject it should it fail to serve their own interests or match
their own reality.
The situations in which communicative activity occurs are those in which individuals
assay-although all the while standing on their own values, interests, convictions, and end-
goals—to express themselves to others, thus aiming to accomplish solidarity with them, liui
what might be grounds for solidarity for me (i.e., my experience, wishes, words, or thoughts)
may be regarded as inhospitable grounds for my audience. Typically, 1 want solidarity with
others on terms familiar and beneficial to me, and others want solidarity with me on terms
familiar and benencial to them. So it is quite possible that, although we may share the same
generic goal (i.e., agreement or solidarity), we may very often perfectly frustrate each other's
achievement of it.
Communicative activity, then, is a struggle—or to use Ihe ancient (ireek wt)rd, an a^^nn.
It is a struggle tor communion and for individuation. It is a struggle engaged in by all parlies in
any communicative moment, ll is a struggle for dominance, but il is also a struggle K)si through
domination (for domination does not yield communion), ll is a struggle for "prizes" as diverse as
physical survival, social belonging and status, and psychological well-being. It is a struggle
carried out through various strategies of argumentation, (he majority of them informal. And it is
a struggle which is typically experienced b} its participants as one of protagonist (self) pitted
against antagonist (other), with rcsolulion (which is the end-occurrence of all irue comedies) as
its ulliinale goal.
This basic ontological problem—and its connection to rhetoric— is well-stated by Burke
in the following passage:
In pure idenlillcalion /i.e., om'fu'.ss with others] there wt)uld be no strife. Likewise,
tiiere would be no strife in absolute separateness, since opponents can join battle only
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through a mediatory ground that makes their communication possible, thus providing thefirst condition necessary for their exchange of blows. But put identification and divfsion
anibiguously together, so that you cannot know for certain just where one ends and the
other begins, and you have the characteristic invitation to rhetoric. (Burke, 1984, p. 184)
Expressions like "strife," "battle," and "exchange of blows" emphasize the agonistic nature of
communicative activity. But these terms, as Burke uses them, take on even deeper agonistic hues
when they are set into active relationship with the notion that persons struggle most tvpically in
order to secure agreement or oneness with others. As in an Orwellian world, fighting is linked
with the longing for solidarity, and the longing for solidarity often produces fighting.
Human beings, then, can be said to live betwixt and between the poles of unity and
separateness, their communicative activity being the means by which they negotiate their
positions moment-by-moment along this volatile continuum. Sarbin (in Emotions as narrative
emplotments (1989)) states, "Survival as a social being depends on successfully resolving the
exigencies and strains that are endemic to social life ...[R]hetorical acts—the organized use of
verbal and gestural conduct to bring about changes in the relationship between self and other-
are the most powerful means of resolving and/or creating the exigencies and uncertainties that
characterize social life" (191).
Emotion
Premise 3 : Emotions—or emotional life—possess a rhetorical dimension.
As Averill (1993) has shown, the emotions are very well known to most people and yet
e.xceedinslv difficult to define and categorize. Confusion about the nature of the emotions seems
to derive from the fact that they may be conceptualized in many ways, including as (a) innate and
universal patterns of behavior, (b) psychological states accompanied by powerful physiologic
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concomitants, (c) culturally engendered and organized products, and/or (d) entities which vary in
intensity, expression, and meaning from one individual to another. While no one of these
identities can be said to be absolutely true (in fact, as absolute statements, some of them
contradict each other), evidence can be found in support of each one of them.
In all four of these identities, however, emotions can be said to have a rhetorical
dimension. That is, they operate as receptive and expressive instruments of persuasion.
As "innate and universal patterns of behavior," emotions enable effective communication
and facilitate persuasion in many ways. First of all, in being universal, they are immediately
recognizable and do not require laborious explanation or interpretation. If a person says to us,
without evident affect, "There's a fire downstairs," we are likely to first appraise the speaker's
disposition, gather information about the situation, and then, in good time, decide what to do.
But if the speaker yells "Fire!" with a certain intonation of voice, and, moreover, if we see that
he or she displays physiologic signs of fear (e.g.. bulging eyes, ashen skin color, agitated
movement), we are far more likely to leap into action. Secondly, the universality of emotions
allows persuasion to occur even when verbal communication is impossible, as for example, when
persons speak different languages, or when one or more of them cannot speak at all. Infants and
small children, for example, may have access to very little language, but they are able to
communicate very powerfully through emotional displays. Thirdly, in their unambiguousness
and familiarity, emotions can serve to "ground" persons otherwise engulfed in complex and
changing intrapsychic and interpersonal circumstances. Persons use feelings—both their own
and those of others—to make decisions, ascribe value, and render judgments about situations,
perhaps especially those which are most unfamiliar, urgent, or inscrutable. As such, emotions
can persuade persons to adopt courses of action even in uncertain circumstances.
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In possessing potent physiologic concomitants, emotions, once activated, enable
persuasion because they are difficult to ignore or neglect. Rather, once aroused, they typically
compel some form of action. Anger or rage wants venting: sadness wants cessation; fear
demands a reaction to the perceived threat. Thus, if a speaker wants to motivate another person
to take action, arousing that person's emotion can be a very good strategv'. Similarly, we can be
''persuaded by our own emotions'-regardless of whether or not they have been deliberately
aroused by another—to take action which in other circumstances would be unlikely. For
example, an artist who, due to poor finances, accepted a job in a factory, might be persuaded
after a few days to quit the job because of his "unhappiness" there, even though he confinued to
be in desperate financial straits. Falling in love is another familiar instance of being persuaded
from within; aflame with positive emotions, lovers will make choices—including both foolish
and noble choices—that would be unthinkable in other circumstances. And often, it is not simply
the category of emotion that provokes movement, but the intensity, duration, and totality of its
physiologic affects. Mild anger (irritation) is more bearable than a hot rage. And mild anxiety is
more endurable than a full-blown panic attack. Evoking the physiological concomitants of
emotions can be, then, a most powerful rhetorical strategy.
Averill (1980b. 1990) has argued that emotions are, at least to some degree, social and
cultural constructs. This means that cultures have ''blueprints" which organize, give meaning to,
or prescribe rules for the display of emotions. Grief at the loss of a loved one is universal. Yet
the manner by which grief reactions are organized, understood, and displayed may vary
enormously from culture to culture. Renato Rosaldo (1993), an anthropologist, reported:
If you ask an older Ilongot man of northern Luzon, Phillipines, why he cuts off human
heads, his answer is brief, and one on which no anthropologist can readily elaborate: He
says that rage, born of grief, impels him to kill his fellow human beings. He claims that
he needs a place to "carry his anger." The act of severing and tossing away the victim's
head enables him, he says to vent and, he hopes, throw away the anger of his
bereavement, (p. 1
)
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While rage may be a feature of the grief reactions of people all over the world, it appears to have
not only special permission within traditional Ilongot culture but also to have a prescribed pattern
of expression and expiation. In the United States, mainstream culture has a different blueprint
for grief. Grief may cause a person to get drunk, to neglect personal hygiene and well-being, to
weep and feel forsaken, and to retreat from social life. But grief is not generally expected to
become manifest as rage; and sacrificial murder is not perceived as a legitimate curative for
feelings of bereavement. Harre & Gillett (1994), following Stearns & Steams (1988), describe
the cultural context in which emotions are learned as an "emotionology": "An emotionology
includes the ways the people in a particular local culture identify, classify, and recognize
emotions" (148).
From a rhetorical perspective, the cultural encoding of emotions is, first of all, a vivid
demonstration of the degree to which human beings are susceptible to persuasion, even in areas
commonly thought to belong to the body or to be universal "givens." If emotions—or at least the
way emotions are displayed, interpreted by self and others, and even "felt"—can be "trained" or
encoded, it suggests that human beings are liable to persuasion in one of the most potent and
sensitive areas of psychic existence. Shaping anger, sadness, shame, love and other emotions is,
however, an ongoing part of any person's upbringing:
In early life, the emotional behavior of an infant is closely monitored by its parents, who
may accept and validate some of its reactions with the language of consolation and love
(as when the child cries out of hunger or pain) and reject other shows of emotion with
the language of scolding (as when a child's tears seem excessively annoying or
demanding). Somewhat later on, a child's parents will routinely articulate the beliefs
and rules of emotional life in such statements as, "When grandma gives you a present,
you should smile, and say 'Thank you!'" or "Peter is angry because the boy across the
street took his candy." In similar fashion, when the child has become an adolescent, he
will be initiated by peers and popular culture into the very complex doctrines concerning
how to discriminate between lust and love, how emotionally expressive one may be with
members of the same sex, how to go about mending a "broken heart," and so on. (Averill
& Rodis, 1996, in translation)
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The successful learning and performance of the emotionology of one's culture is generally
rewarded. Complementarily, failure to shape a child's emotions in accordance with social rules
and expectations often leads to social rejection and psychological maladjustment. Persons who
"break the rules" of anger, love, or sadness in a given culture may be subject to stern social
judgments, loss of status and opportunity, incarceration (if excessive emotion is paired with
excessive action), and psychopathology. Linehan (1993), for example, describes how the
repeated invalidation of emotional experience may eventually lead to borderline personality
disorder.
Naturally, the rhetorical potency of any person who has approached the emotional codes
of a culture as a kind of science or systematic study is heightened. If one knows how the
emotional codes are "written," one also knows how these codes may be activated, manipulated,
or even (if one is truly masterful) altered to one's own advantage or to the advantage of one's
audience. This general statement may be applied to love (e.g., Lothario), fear (e.g., Stalin),
hatred (e.g.. Hitler), or serenity (e.g., Buddha). Aristotle (1991) proposed that the effective
rhetorician must learn how to deliberately "move" the emotions of his audience. Accordingly, in
The Art ofRhetoric, he attempts to lay bare the social codes which govern ten principle emotions.
For example, after setting forth the social codes for anger, he offers the following bit of practical
advice to rhetoricians who might wish to instrumentally arouse the anger of their audience:
We have jointly said with what sort of people men are angry, in what condition and for
what reasons; it would obviously be necessary in the speech to make the audience such
as to be disposed to anger, and the opponents to be such as those with whom men are
angry and guilty of the things about which they are angry (146).
Anger—like other emotions
—
provides a "handle" for persuasion. If a social actor can grasp
firmly and adroitly the emotions of other persons, the actor can do much to direct those persons'
behaviors, intimate or public, cognitive or physical.
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At the beginning of this section, four main aspects of the emotions were listed. The last
of these is that the emotions are psychic entities which vary in intensity, expression, and meaning
from one individual to another. The notion here is that, even after physiologic and socio-cultural
factors have been acknowledged and taken into account, each of us seems to have an emotional
life which is more-or-less uniquely our own. Individuals differ in their emotionality even when
raised in the same family, provided the same education, and offered membership in the same
macro- and micro-cultures. That persons differ in their emotional vulnerability, perturbability,
constancy, range, intensity, and so on is a matter of constant interest in everyday life and in
clinical psychology. It is also a cause of much perplexity and difficulty, for the struggle to
achieve individual sanguinity, to maintain "healthy" emotional relationships with spouses and
family members, and to negotiate the peculiar emotional needs and demands of individual friends
and co-workers appears to be endless.
How might the uniqueness and variability of emotional life be explained? First of all,
the emotional life of persons may be shaped from the very beginning by any number of
exigencies, physiologic (e.g., illness, heretability), interpersonal (e.g., a mother suffering from
profound postpartum depression), or circumstantial (e.g., financial pressures which require a
mother to be away from home most of the day). Secondly, both behavioristic and socio-cultural
theories of personality development would suggest that certain emotional behaviors—like certain
physical behaviors—can be selected and become prominent through some process of
reinforcement. For example, children who learn that acting sad and angry towards their parents
gets them what they want may continue to use this strategy as adults. Complementarily, the same
children—should they develop meaningful emotional relationships with teachers, peers, or others
who respond negatively to their pouting—may give up their pouting. But given that emotions
also appear to be linked to innate drives and needs, as well as to potent (and thus inherently
reinforcing) physiologic phenomena, emotions are unlikely to be responsive to all strategies
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aimed at their extinction or transformation. In fact, denying a person's emotion may function
only to perpetuate that emotion or even to intensify it to a degree which is pathological.
Emotions, then, are not simply stock items, generic products found in either (or both) the
catalogue of innate needs or the emotionologic rule-book of a culture. They are also exquisitely
unique outgrowths of-as well as functional organs within-the gossamer-fine web of relations
and experiences which make up the life of each individual. Finally, it might be said that the
emotionality of each person has its own unique narrative, or formative story, which can only be
fully understood if taken in its microscopic entirety, word for word, scene by scene, theme by
theme.
That emotional life varies so significantly from individual to individual is, again,
suggestive that humans are receptive to subtle and diverse forms of persuasion. This receptivity,
in turn, indicates that humans may actively influence each other by finding the key to or
breaking the code of—one another's unique emotionality. Not only does successful intimate
relationship require such an individualization of emotional understanding, but so does successful
psychotherapy. By knowing the particular emotional "loading" of certain past experiences,
words, current involvements, images, tones of voice, and other variables, persons may craft their
own actions and expressions in ways which have desired effects. By knowing another person's
emotional "story," a speaker can, in essence, perform readings and reinterpretations, attempt
revisions, and participate in writing sequels. It is partly for this reason that emotional intimacy is
powerful, closely guarded, and sacred. It is also one of the reasons that confidentiality and other
protections are essential to the ethical practice of psychotherapy.
The individualized character of our emotionality may also lead us to instrumentally
"use" our own emotions in different ways. For example, while one person may use anger to try
to alter a disadvantageous or uncomfortable social situation, a second person may grow sad,
while a third may try to brighten the situation through a show of happiness.
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Persons may also differ in how well they are able to perform the emotion they have
chosen to use. Like good screen actors, good social actors ^'do emotions well," while poor actors
seem to have difficulty managing the facial, gestural, and linguistic features that substantiate an
emotional display. Moreover, while good actors can flexibly deploy a range of emotional
displays, a less good actor may have access only to a limited repertoire of emotional displays.
In summary, regardless of what approach is taken to defining the emotions, a persuasive
dimension may be discerned, in the emotional life of humans.
Premise 4: Emotions facilitate/inhibit the expression and reception of messages.
As suggested above, there are many valid ways of defining the emotions. In addition to
the ways listed above, it is possible to conceive of the emotions as organs, devices, or systems of
communication. This conception arises from the fact that the emotions function in diverse ways
both to send messages and to receive them. All the same, as noted by Thimm & Cruse (1993),
"Surprisingly little scholarship has dealt with emotion and emotional talk as a part of
interpersonal communication" (83).
Although the analogy of a two-way radio has limitations, it can be useful as a first step in
thinking about the communicative functions of the emotions. To follow the analogy, emotions
may be seen as devices for discharging, amplifying, and tuning in messages both from one's self
and from others.
First, let us consider the ways that emotions serve to facilitate the transmission or
expression of messages. To start with, emotions often serve as the source or launching pad for
communication. As discussed above, when persons feel emotion, they are often moved to action.
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When Ih.u ;K-,ion is socml ;uMion (i adion which is inlo.uk.l lo h,,v.
.,n dlcU on olhcrs),
,1
..S....IK Kuiniivs so.n. fonn of co.nmunic.lion. A person who is vny anyry, lor example,
IN puMllv wanls lo eonvev iheir anrer lo the person(s) who presumably eausal ,i \n rMu.ne
cases, llie anjMV person niav lake forms of social aelion uhose ann is simply lo eliminate the
ol ten.lmv, P^iilv; more h pu alU
,
lhnnv,h, even venclellas are ways of "sendin,. a message."
Secondly, emolions lacihlale mcssagc-soiulin)» inasmuch as Ihev can invest nneVs commuuiealive
acts whh dil tcrmi' shades of meaning. Take the slalemcnl,
-|l's snowing/' Depenthng on the
IMiIicnlar emotional qnalilv involved m the delivery oflhis slalemeni, it can have (|uite various
meanmj's. I Htcrcd deiectcillv. the news lliat \\\ snowing clearly means something very dillcicnt
trom the same news ntlercd u ilh a tone ol'dclii'lil Thirdly, emotions permil messai'c senders to
adinst or conliol ihc dcjMce of intensilv or |)otcnc\ ot the messages they send A slight lonr of
remorse, lor example, !>ives an apt>loj»,v a very different lc\ cl t>f impact than (K>cs Ihc same
messajie delivered with weeping aiul a rencHni*. of one's garments. Again, the meaning of
messages may he varied dcpeiuhng on the kind and degree of emotional amplillealion one gives
them. I'inall\
,
enh>lii)ns can he invtdved in inhibilinj', or nndereutting the expressive eapacilics
of a message-sender. While virtually all emolional states of a low to nuulcialc inlcnsil\ may
eontrihnie It) a sender's al>ilil\ io express a message, very intense emotions ma\ make
comnnmieation very ilifficnit. I''vci\da\ tliscomse contains many tropes of snch a condition:
Ic was too thunderstuck to titter a wi)!(r\ "She was si> nuscrable she co\\U\ haicly speak.*"
I 'molions may also he said ti> have a selectiv e impact t>n Ihc expressive capacities of speakers;
that is, emotional stales ma\ facilitate expression of messages pertaining to themselves, but
impcile the successfnl expression ol^nessagos dealing with different matters of ctmccins Thus,
lor example, a jicrson snffcrin!', from grief may be capable of tremendous chH|uence during a
euh)gy, but be unable lo partici|)atc in a conversation about woil
Emotions also affect one's level oUeceptivity to messages. First of all, the kind
emotion a receiver is feeling may significantly affect their receptivity to the communications of
others. For example, persons who are afraid may be quite easily controlled by the words of
others (especially those who are believed to possess the power to do them injury), whereas
persons who are angry may not listen to anything that others tell them. Governments which rely
upon terror as a way of maintaining power are well aware of this fact, even as are opposition
political groups which hope to combat terror by encouraging anger and lessening fear. Secondly,
the degree of emotion can affect one's level of receptivit>' to messages. Passionate love—as
opposed to mild affection—can greatly enhance one's willingness to believe the words of one's
lover, even when the hard evidence is chockfuU of rebuttals. Very high emotion of any kind, on
the other hand, is likely to depress one's ability to pay attention and learn while in school or to
receive other, emotionally-neutral information. High emotion cannot only be distracting, but it
can also flood one's awareness, preventing the absorption of new knowledge.
The emotions are, then, best imagined not as simple transmitters-receivers, but as radios
with a wide array of knobs and buttons. The exact settings of the volume controls, the pitch
controls, and the station selector knobs—to name but a few—all matter. Emotions can facilitate,
distort, or even jam communication.
The emotions-as-radio analoav begins to break down, however, when it is recognized
that emotions are in themselves messages. That is, not only do emotions facilitate the
transmission and reception of verbal or gestural communications by giving them color, urgency,
or meaning, but emotions also constitute messages inasmuch as they by definition contain
judgments about occurrences or situations. Emotions ^'say something" about the experiences,
situations, or persons to which they pertain.
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For instance, if people feel fear when they see a snake, that reaction can be said to
contain a number of possible messages, including "Run!", "Snakes are bad!", and so on. In this
example, the emotion of fear "speaks" primarily to the person who has it; in other words, the
message encoded in the emotion is aimed at the subject of the emotion. The value or utility of
this message is that it communicates a judgment about the subject's circumstances which may be
critical to that person's survival.
Emotions may also speak to others. Take, for example, a person who reacts to an event
or circumstance with sadness. Because sadness is typically regarded as a negative emotion, the
sadness "says" something negative about the event or circumstance which provoked it. Other
persons who see this sadness will typically connect it with its presumptive cause (or at least
attempt to do so), which may them lead them to (a) venture judgments of their own about the
event or circumstance, and/or (b) attempt to help or comfort the person who has become sad.
Awareness of the communicative force of emotional displays upon others is probably universal,
which leads to a substantial amount of deliberate drama. A good example is fainting. In 19^''
century England, fainting was generally thought of as a spontaneous, physiological concomitant
of emotional ''shock." If one fainted—and one was usually a woman, for it was not culturally
appropriate for men to faint— it meant that one had been subjected to a sudden and remarkable
burst of emotion, either negative or positive. To faint, then, was to convey a powerful message
to others about one's own condition. And to the extent that such "news" about one's condition
required action from others, fainting could serve as a powerful tool of social manipulation.
It is possible that "messageless" emotions (or emotional episodes) may occur, but they
are probably atypical. No matter what emotion—or what emotional episode—one brings to
mind, it can usually be interpreted as conveying a message. To have, for instance, an episode of
"messageless" repugnance v^ould be very strange and even, perhaps, impossible, for repugnance
is almost always a recoiling from something perceived as odious. Even if the odious thing were
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nor in one's mind, the message of "odiousness" would still have been received
once ^repugnance' had been performed.
Premise 5 : Emotions are discursive acts; or, emotional life
discursive acts, as in a conversation or theatrical play.
'e is a series of interconnected
Implied in the sections above is the notion that emotional life is discursive, or a kind of
conversation which unfolds as a series of symbolic interactions. Emotions function, in other
words, rather like lines of dialogue in a play: they transmit messages, accomplish certain
purposes, demonstrate responses, convey judgments, and modify the relationships between the
speaker and the other members of the "cast."
According to Burke (1989), all symbolic (inter)actions are best analyzed into five parts
which he calls the ^'dramatistic pentad":
.
.
.you must have some word that names the act (names what took place, in thought or
deed), and another that names the scene (the background of the act, the situation in
which it occurred); also, you must indicate what person or kind of person {agent)
performed the act, what instrument of means he used {agency), and the purpose (139).
When set within such interpretive frameworks, emotions are revealed as situated symbolic
actions, performed or committed by particular persons in order to accomplish certain purposes.
They are not merely mechanistic psychophysiological occurrences, but steps in a dialogue. As
Averill (1999) states the matter, "Not only does an emotional episode develop overtime, as does
a conversation, but how an emotion is expressed during an episode varies as a function of the
intended message, the audience, and the setting" (7).
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The implications of this conception of emotional life is striking, most of all because it
requires a qualitatively different approach to the study of the emotions both as universal and as
discrete, individual phenomena. If emotions are acts which possess both agency and purpose,
they must be studied through a rhetorical lens; one must always, ask, in other words, to what
extent do the emotions function as instruments of social persuasion? Secondly, a discursive
model of the emotions requires situating them into at least four frameworks, each of which may
be treated as a kind of conversation.
The first such framework is the person or agent. As Bakhtin (1981), Harre & Gillet
(1994), BiUig (1989, 1993), and others have noted, the self is not a quiet, monolithic entity, but
rather a being endlessly in conversation with itself. Comprised at is it of many ''parts" (e.g.,
memories, desires, physical sensations, etc.), the intrapsychic life of the self may resemble less a
symphony orchestra (with every player collaborating in the production of the same melody) and
more a meeting of the United Nations (with every member arguing its own interests, its own
truth). Emotions play a vital role in the internal conversational life of the self, sending messages
to the mind—and the body, too—about what is valued, what is desired, and what is going on
around one. Within the self, however, the emotions—as only one of the many countries heard
from—may have more or less power and status. For persons characterized as labile or hysterical,
emotions may possess a quicksilver power and intensity that is rarely bounded or challenged,
while repressed persons may tend to regard their own emotions with suspicion. But whatever the
general status of the emotions within the wider universe of the whole person, these emotions may
be said to have their own discursive history, traditions, and current discursive functions. Thus, to
understand a person "emotionally," we must be able to identify how they "do discourse" within
themselves. How, in other words, do they "do" sadness? What does it mean to them? When is it
accepted, when rejected? Unless we can understand the past and present life of the emotions
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within the conversational matnx of the wider self, we may be unable to perform close and
accurate readings of a person's emotionality-.
The second discursive framework is the "emotional episode," or the exchange of
emotions which occurs between two parties in a single dramatic encounter. Examples of
emotional episodes abound in everyday life. Take for example, the moment at a cocktail party
when one spouse espies the other in conversation with an attractive stranger. This moment may
well begin an episode of emotional conversation which centers around jealousy, but which may
also involve emotions of fear, love, anger, and unhappiness. What is crucial about such episodes
is that they require an analytic approach which gives "as much attention to the emotee as to the
emoter" (Averill, 1999, p. 9). In other words, such episodes underscore the fact that it is
impossible to understand the emotions of either of the two spouses without considering the
emotions of the other. When the episode is read as a conversation (which, by the way, is the
mode of interpretation most often employed by the participants in such occasions), each discrete
display of emotion is considered to be pregnant with messages. The smiling, animated
exuberance of the flirting spouse may be read as a commentary on the unsatisfactoriness of the
marriage; the irritation and anger of the offended spouse may be read as "crazy," unwarranted
possessiveness; and so on. Naturally, the interpretive possibilities are many, which adds to the
difficulty of the situation. What matters most, however, is that the emotions expressed and
received by both parties must be understood as a conversation in which the emotions of each
part>' affect the emotions of the other. Outside this dialogic framework, the emotions of each
party can only be grasped poorly.
The third framework for analyzing an emotion is the wider "discourse community" of the
individual. Theoretically, this communit\' includes any person who has in some fashion
contributed to the emotional development of an individual. It includes, then, at the veiy least a
person's immediate family, relational partners, and friends; but it may also include day care
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workers, teachers, characters in books and tlhiis, and so on. It includes, in other words, anyone
who has come into emotion-laden conversation with that person. Consideration of the emotional
discourse community of individuals is a standard facet of most psychotherapies. Since Freud,
psychotherapists have been acutely interested in the ways that a client's emotional life has been
shaped by dialogues with others, especially parents, siblings, and intimate partners. The fact that
Freud found the archetypes for many recurring and primary emotional dialogues in the annals of
ancient Greek drama is suggestive of the salience of a discursive methodology. In any case, this
framework widens out considerably both in space and time beyond the far more narrow confines
of the emotional exchange, provided crucial information about how emotive agents come to
behave the way that they do.
The fourth framework is that of the rules of a society. This category will be considered
below.
Premise 6 : Emotional discourse is guided—but notfully circumscribed—by social rules.
It has already been suggested that emotional life is shaped to a significant degree by the
rules and customs of a community, culture, or social group. Sarbin (1989, 1995), following
Burke (1966, 1989) and Erving Goffman (1959), has offered a 2-part schema for understanding
how these rules figure into emotional discourse or conversation, which is the active dialogic use
of emotions and emotional displays in order to communicate, persuade, and in other ways modify
relational existence.
According to Sarbin, emotional discourse may be viewed as alternately dramatistic and
dramaturgical.
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Emotional discourse is drcunatrsUc when it relies upon tropes, plots, or other socially-
preexisting forms for its expression. Thus, when individuals actualize socially-canonized scripts
for such emotions as jealousy (as when one's partner has flirted with someone else), anger (as
when one has been insulted), or joy (as when one's friend and family celebrate one's birthday),
they are functioning in a dramatistic fashion. Dramatistic strategies can be quite powerful in
emotional discourse because they typically have wide popular support and adherence. Persons
who—in the flux of spontaneous emotional discourse with another person-flnd opportunity to
implement what Burke calls a "dramatistic screen" in just the way that the society would
sanction, often score a coup, for their "acts" may be immediately viewed as possessing authority
and legitimacy. In contrast, persons who fumble or diverge from dramatistic play-acting may
lose ground in the rhetorical struggle with others. A famous example from literature is the hero
of Camus' novel The Stranger (1966), who is found guilty for a murder he did not commit
largely because he failed to grieve in the socially-prescribed way at his mother's funeral. His
emotional "deviance" in a public moment made it possible for the prosecuting attorney to impugn
his character and thus leave him vulnerable to the suspicion that he may have done other horrid
things. This example is especially cogent to a rhetorical approach to emotional life because it
takes the courtroom as its setting. Emotional discourse is quite often about exchanges of values,
about the judging of character, about the moral legitimacy of one's acts, and other matters often
brought into courtrooms; emotional discourse is also often interpretable as a rhetorical contest
between adversaries who seek "justice," "truth," and other ideals at the same time as they must
deal with their own self-interest.
Emotional discourse is dramaturgical when the actors depart from pre-scripted forms
and author their own rhetorical strategies. Whereas in dramatistic discourse, "authorship ... is
far removed from the actor" (Sarbin, 1995, p. 217), in dramaturgical discourse "the actor is also
the actor-playwright and director." Persons who are skilled at rhetoric—and especially at
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emotional rhetoric-may be far less reliant upon preexisting roles and schemata (although they
will certainly access them when it is advantageous) and far more apt to improvise as they engage
in emotional discourse. These improvisations are, of course, guided by similar goals as the more
prefabricated efforts at emotional communication: e.g., to achieve solidarity and agreement with
others, to persuade others of the importance of one's feelings, and so forth. But in taking stock of
and adjusting to far more of the particulars of the situation, the audience or emotee, and so on,
dramaturgical strategies have the advantage of greater flexibility. An analogy can perhaps be
made to a suit or dress bought off the rack as compared to a shirt or dress designed by a tailor
specifically for its intended wearer. A recent example of a successful dramaturgical response to
an emotional situation is Hilary Clinton's refusal to play the role of the angry, vindictive wife
after her husband's very public, embarrassing and costly extramarital affair with Monica
Lewinsky. Her choice not to play out the dramatistic script for a person in her situation might
have backfired had she been viewed as cynical, calloused, or opportunistic. But the particulars
of her emotional comportment were such that she appeared to most persons as having
transcended the prescribed role with all of its inherent protraction of relational disturbance,
estrangement, and violence. Such transcendence in a popular culture familiar with the
dramatism of talk-shows and soap operas caused her public approval ratings to rise sharply.
Such dramaturgical straegies may be essential to what Averill (1997) calls "emotional
creativity."
Both dramatistic and dramaturgical strategies, however, are critical to the making of a
successful rhetorician in the sphere of the emotions. As with actors and politicians, what matters
is how and when emotions are evoked, in what manner they are used, with what facility, and with
what sensitivity to the variables of situation and audience.
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Cognition
Currently, there exist many theoretical approaches to human cognition, each of them
contributing insights regarding how human beings think. Among these are (a) neurological or
brain-based approaches, (b) approaches which emphasize cognition as an information-processing
system (Chomsky, 1972), (c) approaches which attempt to understand the mind/brain as a
functional and ever-changing outgrowth of evolutionary processes (e.g., Bogdan, 1994), (d)
approaches which emphasize decision-making, problem-solving, and other "rational" processes
(e.g., Brehm & Cohen, 1962), (e) approaches which focus on the roles played by attitudes and
beliefs (Festinger, 1957), (f) approaches which consider cognition from social and cultural
vantage-points (Vygotsky, 1978, 1986; Cole, 1996), and many others.
Lee (1998) suggests that the emergence, beginning in the mid-twentieth century of this
wealth of different approaches to cognition is due in part to a major paradigm shift within
psychology. The new paradigm—which she calls ^^cognitivisnV^—challenges the mechanistic
principles of behaviorism, asserting that "conscious thought is primary to human action" (Lee, p.
4). More specifically, cognitivism places central emphasis on what goes on in the human mind,
recognizing that thought is not epiphenomenal or inconsequential but is rather a prime mover and
shaper of experience, behavior, and, even, "reality." Such a perspective is fundamental to
cognitive and cognitive-behavioral approaches to psychotherapy which assert that "cognitions
influence emotions and behavior," that "individuals are believed to respond to cognitive
representations of events, rather than to the events themselves," that "cognitive factors play a
causal role in the etiology" of many behavioral and emotional problems, and that "cognitive
change is a prerequisite to behavioral and emotional improvement" (Reinekc, Dattilio, &
Freeman, 1996, p. 2).
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Reineke, Dattilio, & Freeman (1996) offer the following definition of cognition,
consistent with that used by many psychologists:
As Kendall and Dobson (1993) state, "Cognition is not a singular or unitary concept but
.s rather a general term that refers to a complex system" (p. 9). Cognitions include one's
current thoughts or self-statements, as well as perceptions, appraisals, tacit beliefs or
schemas, attitudes, memories, goals, standards and values, expectations and attributionsThe term "cognition" refers not only to cognitive "contents" but also to the ways
intormation is represented in memory and the mediational or control procedures by
which the information is processed or used. Cognitions, as such, may be viewed as a set
of complex skills (Wiemer, 1997) that incorporate problem-solving or coping strategies
communication and linguistically based knowledge, and interpersonal skills, (p. 2)
As an ordinary concept, cognition can be defined simply as "the process of passing knowledge."
Premise 7: Cognition is agonistic.
A rhetorical perspective on cognition may be initially distinguished trom other
perspectives by its central metaphor: the agon. As described above, the agon is a struggle or
competition between parties in which each seeks the other's agreement, hi keeping with this
metaphor, the mind may be construed as the site of dramas, dialogues, or debates in which two or
more possible "truths" strive to establish dominance, resolve conflict or differences, and to
otherwise persuade each other (or the subject). According to this metaphor, many cognitive
processes (especially "higher" cognitive processes) are not like simple mechanical events which
follow a linear cause-and-effect model, but are rather interactive, discursive processes set in
motion by the need to make selective decisions from amongst more than one possibility. These
possibilities may be discrepant points of view, discrepant memories, discrepant ideologies,
discrepant values, discrepant verbal statements, and so on, each of which presents—or at least
contains within itself—an argument or persuasive claim. Consciousness, then, is (about being)
perpetually challenged to sort amongst the multiple arguments simultaneously presented to it for
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consideration. Arguments that are successful may be those supported by evidence, which are
familiar, which lead to the solving of problems, which enjoy social support, which have
emotional power, which are undergirded by potent memories, and so forth.
An agonistic model of consciousness is different than, say, an information-processing
model of cognition. Both models recognize that cognition involves encoding and decoding data,
fitting information into established categories, and determining an adapative behavioral response
to this data. The agonistic model, however, emphasizes the degree to which all steps in this
process may be susceptible to conflict, disagreement, or dissonance due to (a) the ambiguous
character of the data itself, (b) the apprehension of the data by multiple centers in the brain (e.g.,
a visually beautiful, but bad-smelling object or person is likely to affect the sensory centers in the
brain in ways that present a paradox for thought), (c) the association of the data with multiple
prior experiences or categories, (d) the presence in the mind of more than one conceptual model
for the data, (e) the ambiguous character of the situation in which the data is encountered, (f)
multiple and competing social influences, and so on. Any of these factors may contribute to
making the cognitive processes surrounding a bit of information more like a debate amongst
members of scientific researchers than like a computer's interpretation of a key-stroke.
The sorts of cases typically encountered in psychotherapy provide evidence of the degree
to which the individual "psyche" is many-voiced and thus frequently rife with contestation and
conflict. As is evident, for example, in many cases involving loss and grief, persons struggle
inwardly over what to believe, what to value, and how to interpret the worlds in which they live.
Is the world a 'good' place, or a 'bad' place? Is there an after-life? How is one to define one's
own identity in the sudden absence of a significant other? What persons 'know' appears to be
rarely set in stone, but rather to be ever shifting and undergoing challenge—especially in times of
crisis. These challenges, moreover, frequently conic from within. Although it is certainly
stressful to be challenged by someone else, it is probably more common for persons to be
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discomllled by Ih.ir ow„ ,„.c,™l divisions
.,ul a.nH.Cs. hrcd's trip.nrti.c divisio,, oCh.
psyche inu, id, superego,
.„d cgo-a„d the perpe„K,l wrangHng which lypilied the i„,erac,ions
between these entities-offers a grapiuc MInstration ol an agonistic n.odel of the individual
psyche.
But, I m.u a rhetorical perspective, other, more discreet areas of cognitive activity may be
also viewed as processes in which many 'voices' are in phiy. Take visual perception, for
example. I Imnans not only Ibrm retinal images of the world, they name and interpret these
images. Therelore, when what we see is ambiguous or difficult to name, we may be plunged into
a process of internal debate. This kind of debate may be stimulated, for example, by presenting
persons with visual ccMnmdrnms, such as the famous image that may be seen alternately as an old
woman or an attractive girl. As another example, Billig ( 1 993) describes how persons striving
to verbally express themselves may frequently enter into subtle cognitive debate over word-
choice, or what words to use. While skilled poets may struggle deliberately and at length with
word-choice when trying to perfect a metaphor or .sculpt a rhyme, almost all of us are familiar
with the lightning-quick decisional processes required when we've hit our thumb with a hammer
and must choose between "ouch!" and other, .saltier forms of expression. The fact that the same
person may express him or herself in very dil'ferent ways during ostensibly similar circumstances
raises questions about the nature of cognition. Is word-choice driven by established neural
pathways spontaneously selected by the potency of the stimulus (e.g., the force o\'{\\c hammer)?
Or, does verbal cognition include (a) the simultaneous arousal of several stores of potentially
relevant words/expressions, (b) an appraisal of their relative value, utility, or appropriateness,
and (c) a choice as regards which of them best "fit" or represent the moment? Billig also
suggests tiiat a large portion of intellectual problem-solving (i.e., the kind of thinking that is most
often employed in academic settings) is rhetorical. In order to be able to "think" about, say, the
social antecedents of the Civil War or the ethics of ihe nuclear arms race, a person ninsl consider
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not only one interpretation of the problem (for this might be better called "remembering" or
"regurgitating") but several interpretations. To actively think about such matters, a person must
gather together the available information or perspectives regarding them, study the "case" made
by each, set them into dialogue or debate with one another, and then determine which of them
might be said to make the "best" case. "It is not a matter of uncovering which solution is wrona
in a 'mathematicar or logical' sense, but of choosing between opposing sets of reasonableness,
which might be themselves irreconcilable" (Billig, 1993, p. 124).
are
In the sections below, although cognitive processes and contents of many sorts
referred to, the main topics of concern are those relevant to what Bakhtin (1984a) calls the
"thought-worlds" or "cognitive worlds" of individuals. A person's thought-world is generally
delineated by "higher" cognitive processes and contents such as those mentioned above by
Reineke, Dattilio, & Freeman (1996) (e.g., attitudes, beliefs). In keeping with a rhetorical
perspective, these processes and contents are, first of all, considered as largely socially-generated
and socially-situated entities. Secondly, they are treated as possessing some degree of psycho-
social functionality and utility. Thirdly, they are analyzed as being more or less convertible into
resources for intentional action and behavior.
Premise 8 : The mind is a commimity affair.
One of the most interesting challenges which confronts anyone interested in the study of
the individual mind has to do with determining what the mind's boundaries and borders are.
From birth forward, the mind of the individual is closely bound up with and integrated into a
shared existence with others. Much that is contained in an individual's cognitive universe is
unthinkable outside a social context; complementarily, much that is contained in an individual's
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social world is inscribed within that individual's cognitive universe^ As a result, i, is difficult, if
not impossible, to strictly demarcate the provinces of any individual thought-world, separating
them cleanly from the mental worlds of others.
First of all, what is "in" one person's mind may well have originated in the mind of
another. Take language, for example. Although the capacity for language may be a universal
attribute of the species (Pinker, 1994), language as a concrete entity is acquired only through
social experience. In being a social product-as well as a 'container' of past and present social
learnings, modes of representing reality, linguistic styles, and so forth-language, as we acquire
it, inevitably installs within our own minds "ways of mind" evolved and practiced by others.
According to Bakhtin (1981), language—like most other social forms—is never neutral or
"uninhabited." Rather, it is "shot through" with the presence—as well as the intemions, beliefs,
ideas, and mental habits^f others. Words—singly and in combination—<:ome out of social
domains, they contain socially agreed upon meanings, and they are continually shaped and
reshaped by the demand that they be useful as a currency for social communication. As a result,
when we assimilate them into our own thought-worlds, we are simultaneously assimilating the
thought-worlds of others.
An example illustrating how the individual mind is a site at which other minds also
congregate involves the matter of political ideology. How does one become a communist, or a
democrat, a white supremacist, or a member of the ACLU? Typically, by learning about these
positions from others. Political indoctrination may occur subtly, as vv'hen one grows up in an
home wherein there are the rough makings of a political creed, or it may occur more directly, as
when empowered forces within one's social world insist on allegiance, as occurred during the
Stalinist period in the Soviet Union. In any case, political ideology—once it has taken root in an
individual's mind—can hardly be said to be that person's very own possession. Rather, it brings
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with it-like the Trojan Horse-the notions, histories, accents, and so forth of others who have
embraced it.
But perhaps even more interesting than the introduction into one's thought-world of
ideologically like-minded others is the presence of persons to whom one is ideologically
opposed. The thought-world of the white supremacist, for example, is hardly occupied solely by
images and notions of that which he or she values and celebrates. On the contrary, images
(however distorted) of those people whom the supremacist hates and despises are likely to be
very present and potent. Without such a presence, hate—and thus, arguably, white supremacist
ideology itself—would be impossible. The notion of ideology as a Trojan Horse now becomes
especially resonant, for, hidden in the 'belly' of any ideological stance are also those persons and
ideologies which constitute the 'enemy.' And, while this enemy is necessary to the legitimation
and perpetuation of the ideology (for violence requires belief in another's essential wickedness),
the enemy can also, in certain situations, slip forth and conquer the citadel of belief. It is,
perhaps, to such processes that ideological conversions—such as Paul's on the road to Damascus
or Gorbachev's turn from communism to free-marketism and democracy—are at least partially
due. In any case, whether the ideological 'other' remains consistently hated or becomes the
living center of a new ideological identity, that 'other' is present throughout the course of an
individual's ideological development.
The thought-worlds, then, of even the most ideologically rigid persons are, to some
extent, diverse and heterogeneous, polyvocal and multiplicitous. Put another way, even as we
are part of a communit\' of others, we replicate that community in its diversity within our own
mental universe. Naturally, we each may idiosyncratically assign different value and meaning to
the various members of this community, but this does not mean that even the most devalued
members are not there.
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When it comes, then, to the business of determining what the individual mind is and is
not, it seems defensible to argue for the notion that the mind is a community affoir. Moreover, it
.s a community affair m at least two ways. First, the mind is a community affair because it
comes to being within social spaces, inlluenced by social realities, designed to meet social
demands, and so forth; as such, the mind is-at least in part-^aJe by its community, and so, to
some degree, mirrors it. Secondly, the mind is a community affair in that it functions like a
community comprised of different voices, perspectives, realities, and so forth, which-although
they can be more-or-less harmoniously or constructively coexistent—do not amalgamate into a
single, solid entity or substance. Rather, although there may be certain stable structures (i.e.,
schemas) which organize and provide consistency to the way an individual thinks, these
structures govern a disparate and multitudinous 'body politic' of knowledges, ideas, beliefs,
ideologies, and so on.
Premise 9: The cognitive worlds of individuals are polyvocal, dialogical, and rhetorical,
mirroring the polyvocal, dialogical, and rhetorical social worlds in which these individuals live.
If we hold that tiie mind is like a community which mirrors the social world(s) in v^hich
it has come to being, it follows that the mind must be many-voiced or 'poly-vocal.' Human
beings are profoundly social creatures, born into complex, tightly woven social webs which
nonetheless support substantial individual heterogeneity and diversity. Even the simplest
societies (e.g., the family) are shot full of cognitive disparity, even as they are held together by
potent bonds of mutual attachment and need. Living with others different from ourselves (and
from one another) requires that we learn about how these others view the world, what they mean
when they speak, and so on.
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Fortunately, the brain appears to be reasonably well-equipped to assist us in this process.
Children, especially, are gifted mimics. Not only do they (almost miraculously) usually acquire
language without formal traming, but they also acquire the beliefs, values, phrases, and other
aspects of the thought-worlds of persons with whom they are intimate. The 'self-talk' of young
children-encrusted as it is with moments sampled directly from the speech of their parents,
siblings, and television shows-makes this process vivid. A child of three or four years of age,
while playing, may scold her dolls in the voice of her mother or assume the words and
perspective of a favorite fairy-tale character.
According to Vygotsky (1986), the path of cognitive development for humans is from the
"interpsychic" to the "intrapsychic."
Every function in the child's cultural development appears twice: first, on the social
level, and later, on the Individual level; first, between people {interpsychological). and
then inside the child (intrapsychohgical). This applies equally to voluntary attention, to
logical memory, and to the formation of concepts. All the higher functions originate as
actual relations between human individuals. (1998, p. 57)
Put another way, 'mind' begins as situated within a social, linguistic, and ideological "milieu"
v/herein it copies or learns certain cognitive operations; over time, these operations are
internalized and converted into flexible "tools" for problem-solving, communication, and
meaning-making.
Since, however, the path of learning is from the concrete experience to the
abstracted/internalized function, children 'ingest' directly, substantially, and indiscriminately
large portions of their social milieus. The internalization of these fragments of the speech-worlds
and thought-worlds of others may well bear fruit as practical cognitive skills (e.g., voluntary
attention); but they may also continue to exist in and for themselves as untransformed forces,
which operate more-or-less as 'voices' within consciousness. From Freudian free-association to
Lacanian "mid-speak", psychoanalytic technique has taken seriously the project of exhuming or
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exposing to conscious awareness these voices from early childhood, thus permitting the
individual to complete the project of intrapsychological maturation and cohesion. As Lacan
((1981) wrote, the unconscious may have been m.sleadmgly presented by Freud as some "thin."
comprised of impersonal, primitive forces, but is rather better conceptualized as simply (or not so
simply) "the discourse of the other." For Lacan, then, psychoanalysis assumes a method very
like intensive literary analysis, in which the individual consciousness is deconstructed into its
constituent voices, each of which possesses a dual, mysterious identity as both part of one's self
and as an intrusion or invasion of the 'other.'
Indeed, for Bakhtin, polyvocality does not end with childhood, but is a pervasive feature
of both social existence and individual consciousness. The adult mind, in fact, is likely to be
host to a far greater diversity of 'voices' than in childhood, both as a result of exposure to a
greater number of other persons, cultures, ideas, discourses, and ideologies, and as a result of
expansions in its capacities of understanding, memory, and logic. Take, for example, the author
of an academic book. If one were to turn to the bibliography of this work, one would likely find
cited there a striking number of other authors and works, each of which has somehow been
incorporated into or referenced by the academic writer's book. If one were to construct such a
bibliography for every mind (not merely the written product of a mind)—especially every mature
mind—each such bibiography would be mammoth. Yet, if we search our own minds, we fmd
that, to one degree or another, the 'voices' of vast numbers of others are present in us. These
others might include family members, authors we have read, teachers we have had, figures from
history, characters from television and movies, advertising slogans, and so on. We are each, as it
were, a Tower of Babel; or, to coin a phrase of Bakhtin's, each of us possesses a cognitive world
which is "novelistic" (i.e., like a novel) in its possession of numerous voices.
Such polyvocality sets the stage for dialogue, or for communicative interactions
between the many voices that comprise a community or a consciousness. In society, groups (e.g.,
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iscourse,"
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the society of research engineers, or the United Auto Workers) not only have a voice, but they
use these voices in order to communicate with others. Individuals, of course, function in the
same way. Not only do they possess the capacity to speak, but they use it to speak to one
another. As Vygotsky (1986) puts it, 'The primary function of speech, in both children and
adults, is communication, social contact" (p. 34). Dialogue is not only a feature of social
existence, but a primary preoccupation of individuals and groups in social settings.
If we apply the same rule to what goes on within individual consciousness, we arrive at
an image of cognitive processes which is fundamentally dialogic or discursive. As Harre and
Gillet (1994, p.27) conceptualize the matter, cognition may be described as "private di
or a discussion of one's self with one's self. In this view, many cognitive processes may be
conceptualized as conversations between two or more of the voices acquired during the long
course of one's social development. Thus, when a child who has spit on the floor at school i
commanded to "Think about what you've just done!," he is likely (if indeed he makes any effort
to reflect at all) to access various positions he has encountered in the past on spitting, on proper
conduct in school, and on pleasure and other related matters. As these positions 'talk amongst
themselves', they may allow the child to reach various conclusions about his behavior, why it
was proscribed, and how he might extricate himself from trouble.
Dialogue in social settings can serve any number of possible functions and take any
number of possible forms. However, even in its most pragmatic and utilitarian manifestations
(i.e., to indicate to another person that one is hungry), dialogue involves persuasion. It is, in
other words, driven by some will to affect the mind and behavior of an other.
According to Vygotsky (1986), individual mental activity is similarly rhetorical. It is
rhetorical, first of all, in that it originates in a desire or purpose:
Thought is not begotten by thought; it is engendered by motivation, i.e., by our desires
and needs, our interests and emotions. Behind every thought there is an affective-
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vol.t.onal tendency, which holds the answer to the last "why" in the analysis of thinkinu
Secondly, while Vygotsky suggests that such desire and purpose can at times have a non-social
function (e.g., to find food), it is typically created by and geared towards affecting one's social
surround. While this notion may seem to disagree with the traditional, Cartesian notion of
cognition as a set of neutral, 'rational' capacities, it is, in foct, difficult to rule out the social-
communicative dimension from most occurrences of cognitive activity. As Kuhn (1970)
suggested in his Th(i Structure ofScientific Revolutions, even scientists in 'hard' fields such as
physics and astronomy think in ways influenced by the goal of making sense to other
practitioners. To some extent, then, even 'pure' science may be 'addressed' to others, and thus
shaped to some degree by rhetorical considerations.
But the same may be true of individual thought. Take, for example, Shakespeare's
character, the young prince Hamlet, who learns that his mother and uncle have conspired to kill
his father, the king of Denmark. In his famous "to be or not to be" soliloquy, Hamlet's every
turn of mind is assailed by a fury of relational factors; each 'thought' is set in motion by—and
also nearly rent to pieces by—his simultaneous and conflicting 'affective-volitional' impulses
towards his murdered father, his duplicitous mother, and his murdering uncle. His soliloquy,
studied simply as a 'slice of consciousness', covers a marvelous range of territories
philosophical, psychological, pragmatic, and ethical. But each of these territories is called to
Hamlet's mind not by his neutral and implicit interest in them but by the particular social forces
at play in the moment. Moreover, his mental activities are patently rhetorical, for not only must
he persuade himself of the proper course to take through the dilemma, but he must find a course
that will persuade God, kingdom, and what Perclman (1982) refers to as the "universal
audience." If, as Perclman states, "Everyone constitutes the universal audience from what he
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knows of his fellow men, in such a way as to transcend the few oppositions he is aware of." (p.
33), and if "Each individual, each culture, has thus its own conception of the universal audience."
(p. 33), Hamlet's mental agony becomes all the more apparent: for, how can he persuade a
'universal audience' comprised of the very persons whose enmity with one another was so acute
as to have produced betrayal and homicide? Although our cognitive activities are not commonly
as acutely stressed as were the fictional Hamlet's, the social loading of-and the rhetorical
demands upon—thought certainly can be said to account for much of its content, form, and
quality.
The notion of a rhetorical mind—or a of a mind that 'thinks' by entertaining competing
notions of truth and having them wrestle their way to resolution—is thus the natural outcome or
complement of the notions of the mind as polyvocal and dialogic. In fact, it might be argued that
the three characteristics—polyvocality, dialogicity, and rhetoricity—necessitate or imply one
another. Even as in social life, where individuation leads to heterogeneity, heterogeneity to the
need for communication, and communication to argumentation and debate, apprehension of the
multifacetedness of mental processes leads towards a view of the mind as possessing a rhetorical
dimension.
As noted above, this rhetorical dimension is quite observable whenever obviously
'conscious' processes are involved, such as decision-making or evaluative judgments, for such
processes not only allow—but require—the consideration of more than one possible pathway. In
this sense, even presumably 'independent' thought resembles being caught up in debate between
several competing parties.
104
PremiseJO: Thinking is a process which may be defined as (a) '^arguing
.vuh one s self or (b)
arguing with others within one 's own mind.
As discussed above, in a certain sense, our minds are not really our own, but rather exist
in spaces between-or that are jointly occupied by-ourselves and others. Thus, much of a
person's cognitive universe-that is, a person's "perceptions, appraisals, tacit beliefs or
schemas, attitudes, memories, goals, standards and values, expectations" and so forth-^xists
dialogically and rhetorically. That is, "thought" (a) often has social or communicative
antecedents (i.e., we usually think in ways provoked, modeled, or set in motion by what someone
else has thought, said, or done), (b) is often "addressed" to someone, and (c) often anticipates
retort. Thinking, in short, is often a form of internalized conversation with someone else. As
with the emotions, such "conversations" may follow certain social rules, take familiar forms, and
thus may be to some extent subject to training and predictable in their expression;
complementarily, they may also be socially divergent, transgressive, and rebellious, and they may
assume unique and unprecedented forms. A young Mormon college student, for example, when
"thinking" about whether to accept a proposal to fly to Las Vegas for a weekend of gambling,
may in essence find himself in conversation with his parents, his religious upbringing, and so
forth. At one moment, this internal conversation may ensue with all the piety and formalism of a
scripted morality play; at the next, it may feature scandalous and rebellious leaps of logic and
language. But whether formalized or nonconformist, what matters about such conversations is
that they reveal the social interconnectedness—and thus the rhetoricity—of thought.
Indeed, as Perelman's (1982) analysis of 'the deliberating subject'—or the person who is
debating an issue with him or herself—illustrates, the internal psychological processes of an
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individual may be understood to always function within and to be related to a social network, so
much so that to 'think' is a rhetorical process wherein the individual 'argues' with (internalized)
others about the legitimacy of his beliefs, feelings, choices, acts, and so on
In self-dehberat.on, can we not indeed discern reflections corresponding to a discussion
and others that are merely a search for arguments in support of a previously adopted
position? Can we wholly rely on the sincerity of the deliberating subject to find out
whether he is m quest of the best line of conduct or is leading a case within himself?
Depth psychology has taught us to distrust even that which seems unquestionable to our
own consciousness. However, the distinctions it makes between reason and
rationalizations cannot be understood unless deliberation is treated as a particular case of
argumentation. The psychologist will say that the motives given by the subject in
explanation of his conduct are rationalizations if they differ from the real motives which
caused him to act and of which the subject is unaware. We shall give a wider meaning to
the term rationalization, regarding it as immaterial whether or not the subject is unaware
of the real motives for his conduct. At first sight, it may seem ridiculous that a well-
balanced person, who has acted for very "reasonable" reasons, should try so hard, deep
down inside, to give quite different reasons for his acts-reasons that are less plausible,
but do place him in a more favorable light. This kind of rationalization is perfectly
explained if we regard it as a pleading that is thought out in advance for the benefit of
others, and can even be adapted to each particular anticipated audience ...Actions might
have been performed after careful consideration, but yet have other motives than those
one tries to make one's conscience admit to afterwards. (42)
Here, Pereleman positions the thinking subject within a network of voices even when the subject
is alone. These dialogues, moreover, do not occur merely in the form of casual exchanges of
information, but as a process of argumentation, in which the subject tries to present his or her
motives and acts in terms that will win the agreement of his or her internal interlocutors. Thus,
even in moments of ostensibly independent thought, there is certain to be some other
consciousness, however remote, to which one appeals for understanding or approval. Thus, even
in their most isolate moments, Romeo clings to his Juliette, Socrates confers with his daimon,
and Jesus prays at Gethsemane to his Father. It is quite rare to find the case of a person who
—
especially during an internal crisis—is, cognitively speaking, utterly alone, standing entirely on
his or her ov/n authority. In a strict sense, in fact, such a thing is impossible, for our personal
thought-worlds rely on ideas, phrases, beliefs, and experiences which are, at least to some
degree, gotten from elsewhere and shared. Is it possible to think coherently without referencing
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.1.. llK.uglUs
„1 olhers'.. Is i, possible ,o think at all without drawing flom a common stock of
knowledge? As Pcrchnan has suggested, "Agreement with oneself is merely a particular case
of agrcciiiLMU witli others (41)."
Premise I la: There exist social norms and rulesfor thinking.
Premise lib
: Who we are in the habit ofarguing with determines much ofhow we think.
Evidence supporting the assertion that there are socially-constructed norms and rules for
thinking can be found almost everywhere. Anyone, for example, who has participated in formal
schooling is aware that there arc certain ways of reasoning about a given subject area that merit
approval (and thus a good grade) and other ways which, for one reason or another, are rejected.
The same is true of families: the Greek novelist Nikos Kazan/akis (1956/1965), for example,
described how, in his family, 'bookish' ways of arriving at decisions in everyday life were
treated as ridiculous, while both-feet-on-the-ground pragmatism was respected. As the thousands
of dissidents jailed, killed, or otherwise persecuted around the world each year attest to, political
cultures similarly distinguish between ways of thinking that are legitimate and those that are
criminal. And the list might go on indefinitely. One has only to switch the television from
channel to channel to locate countless discrete cognitive cultures; for, certainly, the rules and
norms for thinking about sports differ from those which apply to soap operas and so on.
(Jl'coursc, the fact that such rules for thinking exist docs nol necessarily mean that
individuals are always bound by thcni. Mrst of all, while llioughl expressed publicly as
communication can be policctl, sileni thought may be free to go where it pleases. I hus, even
where rules for thought have been clearly enunicated, tlicy may apply in reality only U) speech.
Silent dissent and disagreement even while paying lip service to the eslablishcci iiiles o\ ihc
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discourse community-is as common in families, schoolrooms, in marriages, and in the
workplace as it is in societies scrutinized by official censors. Secondly, as indicated above, even
the most repressive societies are (albeit unofficially) polyvocal and thus able to afford
individuals with alternative models of thought, speech, ideology, attitude, and behavior. Bakhtin
( 1 984b), for example, describes how, throughout the middle ages in Europe-a centuries-long
period during which political and religious unorthodoxies were generally punished with brutal
fervor-'carnivalesque' traditions in literature, art, and everyday social life persisted, especially
amongst the lowest, most persecuted classes. According to Bakhtin, carnivalizing modes of
thought are those which—usually subtly or under cover of a sanctioned privilege to 'clown
around'—parody official and sanctioned practices. Thus, even an illiterate peasant living in a
highly rigid and confining social order, could find within his or her milieu modes of thought
which did not merely mirror the social order, but commented on it, criticized it, and even re-
envisioned it. Thirdly, it is within any individuaPs prerogative to openly and purposefully
transgress against the rules for thought within his or her social world(s). In many instances,
deliberate transgression is identified with creativity. As Thomas Kuhn (1970) illustrated,
intellectual rule-breakers include such luminaries as Galilleo and Einstein. But in everyday life,
intellectual rule-breaking serves many purposes besides the fulfillment of notable talent or the
expression of visionary ideas. It also allows one, for example, to alter one's place in the social
order, to defy authority, and to individuate. Of course, even where such deliberate transgressions
yield some positive results, they are also usually punished.
All the same, it is right to say that thought—like public discourse— is bounded by rules
(albeit rules that are to some extent elastic, trangressable, and capable of contradiction). Thought
is rule-bound, first of all, because it is brought into being through discourse with others. That is,
as Vygotsky (1978, 1986) described, our minds are animated and shaped by the persons with
whom we are in social contact, especially during early childhood. Because each of these persons
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possesses an .dentif.able code, style, and parameter for conversation and social interaction, we
must-if we are to interact successfully with them-learn and adhere to these codes, styles, and
parameters. Because others call the food we crave 'milk,' we will call it 'milk' as well.
Because others detest people whose skm-color is different than ours, we may learn to detest them
too. We may, as we go along in life, learn novel ways of adapting to these rules, but adapt we
must or fall out of communicative contact. Secondly, a great deal of what we think requires
language, and so must conform to the rules by which language is bound. This statement applies
both in early life and during our mature years. A child learning to talk is also a child learning to
think. In pre-modern Greece, for example, persons might refer to the sun either as a thing {to
ilios) or as a deity (Helios). The two naming practices might appear unimportant, but they
emerge from—and thus also perpetuate—two very different ways of thinking, the first materialist
and scientific, the second religious and mythopoetic. To personify the sun-or the moon or the
sea or the mountain or any other thing—is to step foot into an animistic worldview which
organizes one's notions of cause-and-effect and nature very differently than if one thinks of the
sun either as a motiveless 'thing" or as a great, burning, spinning ball of gases. As Steven Pinker
(1994) has argued, human languages also contain unique sets of grammatical rules, each of which
has import for how one thinks about the world. English, for example, is
... a "fixed-word-order" language where each phrase has a fixed position. "Free-word-
order" languages allow phrase order to vary. In an extreme case like the Australian
aboriginal language Warlpiri, words from different phrases can be scrambled together:
This man speared a kangaroo can be expressed as Man this kangaroo speared, Man
kangaroo speared this, and any of the other four orders, all completely synonymous (p.
232).
The emphasis on a fixed order in English also implies a certain rigidity or custom of logic; that
is, there is a 'right' way to organize the relationships amongst the things about which one thinks
or speaks. The flexible grammar of Warlpiri, by contrast, permits and encourages variability of
logic in thought and speech. Thirdly, each of us comes to being, intellectually speaking, within
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socia spaces wherein thought is bound by rules regarding what k.nd of premises, logical
constructions, and truth-state.ents are considered proper, legitimate, or sens.ble. Thus, for
example, whereas students
.n Cuba may be expected to use Marx.st frames of interpretation in
thinking and speaking about historical events, the same statements would be met with
denunciation on putatively Mogical' grounds at a meeting of the John B.rch society. The 'truths,'
in other words, on which 'rational' activity
.s based va:^ from community to community, and
often do not translate well at all when one changes communities. Many of the most entrenched
social problems faced by human beings are undergirded by the paradox that what is reasonable
and true for one party is considered an irrational, rule-transgressing absurdity to the other.
The problem, in fact, when we speak of 'rules' of thought and speech is that these rules
are not only flimsy (and thus less authoritative than the firm axioms of physics or mathematics)
but that, in most cases, a counter-rule also exists. Therefore, to 'think' (even as to speak) is not a
straightforward process of applying or following certain given rules, but of rummaging about
among the manifold rules available, testing their utility, debating their relative value, discerning
which are likely to win the approval of others, and so on. As persons (a) grow in knowledge and
intellectual complexity, and (b) participate in and acquire the rules of diverse discourse
communities, thinking may become more cacophonous and arduous. It is relatively easy to
'solve' ethical puzzles like those posed by Kohlberg when one has a unitary frame of reference;
but these challenges get more difficult as one becomes more multi-discursive, because now there
are far more 'right' answers to sort amongst, each of which has some validity.
It is necessary, then, when talking about the 'rules' of thought and speech, to recognize
the category of rules which refer not to rule-compliance (which leads to agreement with oneself
and with others) but to disagreement and argumentation. To say that there are 'rules' which
govern how we disagree with one another may seem paradoxical, but they do exist and they are
probably at least as important as the rules which apply to how we agree. Disagreement is, after
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all, as unavoidable in one^s intellectual life as it is in one's social life. How persons do
disagreement, then, is a crucial characteristic of their social and intellectual behavior.
When it comes to the rules for disagreement and argumentation, there are, first of all,
those which are effectively 'written into' the social code. There are, for example, prescribed
ways that children can/should disagree with parents, that professional colleagues can/should
disagree with one another over matters of business, and that adversaries in courts of law
can/should settle conflicting claims and assertions. While these rules for disagreement are
certainly not universally adhered to even within formal communities, they have a definite force
and power. In many circumstances, if one violates the code for how to approach disagreement,
one is likely to lose one's advantage—and may even lose one's position and authority. The
parent, for example, may pull rank on the discourteous child, the disagreeable colleague may be
ostracized, and the offensive legal disputant may be chastised by the judge. These formal or
quasi-formal rules for disagreement, when steadily reinforced, may also directly influence an
individual's intellectual behavior, even when the individual is thinking privately. Thus, for
example, a person who has been steadily schooled within the family to listen to, absorb, and
appreciate the positions of his or her opponent, may have more tolerance for his or her own
'cognitive dissonance,' and thus may be capable of good internal problem-solving. Likewise, a
person who has been trained both physically and mentally in the arts of Tai Chi may be more
likely when thinking to allow contradictions to stand and not feel forced to bring them to
resolution.
Secondly, there are the kinds of 'rules' for social disagreement which perhaps tlrst begin
as arbitrary habits or routines but then eventually acquire the status de facto guidelines for
thought. To call them "rules' may be a misnomer in that they lack any kind of deliberate social
or cultural raisou d'etre. All the same, habits and rules are, in practice, often difficult to tell
apart from one another. Take the way that persons in a family disagree with one another. That
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children and their parents can avoid serious disagreement over the course of their lifetimes is
usually a pipe dream. More commonly, they disagree about much, they disagree vehemently, and
they often find it very difficult to bring their major disagreements to resolution. The result is that
one's family funcfions (among other things) as a school for disagreement, and in it, children
practice and rehearse certain moves and strategies that may them serve as templates for how they
think in the future. The thought-world of the novelist Virginia Woolf, for example, appears to
have been structurally influenced by the unique pattern of her disagreements with her
overbearing, hyper-rational father (who was a professional philosopher) and her indirect, hyper-
competent mother. Woolf 'argued' with her father in numerous ways: she painted him
unfavorably into her novels, she helped to found the unconventional Bloomsbury group, she
wrote essays against the social suppression of women, and she episodically suffered from
depression. To call her depression a form of disagreement with her father may actually be
slightly incorrect: given that she typically grew depressed when 'in between' literary works
suggests that she was most vulnerable to despair when she was not actively involved in arguing
for her worldview and against his and others like him. Arguing with him and winning—at least
within the parameters of her own work—was healing and vitalizing, even as arguing with him
and being crushed as she was during her upbringing was demoralizing and depressogenic. But
even though Woolfs father was tyrannical, he taught her his mindset, his own style of thinking,
his tricks of logic. One of her achievements is that she not only learned these, but that she saw
through them. (One must hope that all children eventually do this.)
But whether the rules for agreement and disagreement in each person's life/mind are
modeled after existing social codes or evolved out of unique characterological conflicts, the point
is that they do much to organize the way that an individual thinks. Who we are in the habit of
arguing with is a potent strand in our intellectual destiny.
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Premise 12
: Effective thought is thought which isfound by one 's audience to be persuasive.
Above, it has been suggested that thought is always addressed; that is, it evolves as part
of a dialogue with others or with one's self. As such it, presupposes an audience. Audience, in
other words, is present in thought from its very beginnings.
But just because one's thought is instigated by and directed towards an audience does not
guarantee that that audience will find the thought valid or persuasive. Most of us are all too
familiar with quite the opposite form of reception from our intended audiences: Our remarks
may be rejected as impolite, our assertions of feeling treated as selfish, our compositions rejected
by our teachers, our opinions met with laughter rather than high regard from our peers. And so it
is, generally speaking, for most persons: Agreement with others—though highly desirable—is
relatively rare. Moreover, agreement with ourselves may not be as common as is usually
supposed.
Audience, then, even though it may be credited to some degree with bringing thought
into being, giving it shape, and affording it a field for actualization, also presents thought with a
significant problem. This problem is that audience has a significant censoring power or authority
where thought is concerned. This power is most evident at the point at which thought is actually
expressed, for here the audience may accept and validate the thought, or reject and turn away
from it. If a thought is accepted by an audience, it has achieved the most desired goal:
agreement. If a thought is rejected, the thinker is faced with a host of considerations and
difficulties: Was the thought rejected because it was intrinsically 'wrong,' ^bad,' or poorly
made? Was it rejected because it did not jibe with the audience's beliefs or interests? Was it
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rejected because the audicKc was vvrong-lieaded, ill-informed, prejudiced, insecure, craven,
unintelligent, or otherwise tlawecl'? Should the thought be retracted? Amended? Should the
thinker learn to live with the audience's disagreement? In fact, it is likely that a good deal of
what we call 'thinking' is probably better designated as a process of rethinking' an initial
impulse or inspiration m light of these audience-oriented questions and others like them.
Sometimes (and at best) we engage in such rethinking before we meet with actual rejection;
anticipating the responses ofone's audience is the mark ofa mature thinker. But it is also
mevitable that we also meet with overt disagreement and need to rethink our course.
But by listing these questions the problem of tiic audience begins to grow more apparent
If every thought has as its goal the persuasion of some other, than the very value of the thought
may be determined, at least theoretically, not by the thinker but by this other. Within such a
frame of reference, intrinsically 'good,' creative, valid thoughts may be tossed on the trash heap
because nobody understood or liked them. Complemcntarily, stupid, banal, and evil thoughts
may be accorded great prestige simply because they played well in the minds of others. In
reality, we are quite familiar with both of these phenomena. Original thinkers and artists like
Van Gogh or James Joyce often meet with resistance and disagreement, while persons like
Madonna and Dan Quayle achieve national prominence. More commonly, wc take part in
numerous scenarios everyday in which our thinking is more a sort of popularity contest than a
scientific or objective endeavor. Whether in our personal or work lives, our thinking is often
directed towards finding consensus and approval; and when we do not find these, we tv pically
negotiate, come up with a new idea, or concede the field. In any case, when wc consider the roI(
of the audience, thought (or, at least, 'effective' thought) may be best construed not as a solitary
affair but as an act of co-creation, fhe audience which is present at the beginning and at the em
of the thinking process may not be doing any of the work, but he or she may enjoy a substantial
amount of inllucnce over the process and the ultimate outcome; and this infiuence increases to
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the degree that we value the audience's agreement. It follows that, if our audience is an
intelligent, objective, nourishing, imaginative, principled, and honest one, our thinking may
benefit from the collaboration; but if our audience lacks these qualities, our thinking may be
compelled to abandon them, too.
One reaction to these problems has been to try to remove or invalidate the audience
the arbiter of cognitive value or effectiveness. Accordingly, in many important discourses-
especially formal discourses—audience is (a) constructed as the enemy of 'truth' and as a
repository for error, misguided opinion, and superstition, or (b) anticipated as an obstacle and
protected against via the implementation of certain devices, rules, or strategies on the part of the
thinker. First, consider religion. In religious discourses, the author of 'truth'—the god himself
or one of his prophets—is typically presented as inspired by or possessed of understandings
which are unearthly and thus meaningfully out of conformity with the worldview of the human
audience. In the books attributed to the prophets of the Old Testament, for example, the people
of Israel who comprise the audience are described as debased and fallen, and thus unable to see
truth even when it is set directly before them. The prophets converse with God, perform
miracles, and rage against the powers that be, all the while challenging their audience to abandon
their established convictions and rediscover the path of truth. Likewise, in the New Testament,
Jesus must contend perpetually with audiences hostile towards his message and his person. Even
Jesus' own disciples—the persons who have witnessed most directly Jesus' sanctity and
authority—lose hold of the truth in times of crisis. According to traditional Christianity, even
after Christ's crucifixion and apotheosis, the problem of the audience remains: Each believer
must struggle continually within his or her own mind against his or her 'unbelief,' thus seeking
conversion into an audience truly receptive to Christ's message. As another example of the
denigration or questioning of the role of the audience in a religious text, Euripides' (1978) play
The Bakkhai describes the arrival of the "new god," Dionysus, in Greece, where he is persecuted
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by the King, Pentheus, as a charlatan. Pentheus' initial rejection of Dionysus is not unprincipled.
Rather, as a rational, civic-minded, and conventionally pious person, Pentheus finds the dancing,
singing, labile cult of Dionysus unseemly and disruptive. Moreover, he suspects that Dionysus^
claims to being a god are lies of the sort that only unscrupulous or mentally unbalanced persons
would tell. Unfortunately for him, he misses the boat on both points: However wild Dionysus or
his followers may be, and however like an impostor he may appear, Dionysus is a god. And
Pentheus, as a consequence of his error, is forced to suffer a miserable death. In each of these
examples from religion, the common theme is that the audience was not only wrong, but
disastrously wrong. Human beings, it is suggested, are typically possessed of untrue notions,
thus causing them to mistakenly disagree with God and his mouthpieces. The disagreement of
the audience, then, is treated not as proof of the prophet's error but only as evidence of human
proneness to error.
In the history of philosophy, efforts are more often directed towards imposing limits
upon the audience's role as the arbiter of thought. In philosophical discourse, arriving at
indisputable truths comes not, as in religion, from divine appointment but from the use of certain
technologies of thought which are considered intrinsically valid. Complementarily, the audience
is typically characterized less as ontologically tlawed (e.g., by the curse of the Fall) and more as
only as valid as the methods by which it reasons. The end result is that only thinking of a certain
kind is acknowledged as credible and truthful, while other kinds of thinking are deemed
categorically illegitimate. The thinker who uses the proper method, then, may autonomously or
even in the face of opposition from an audience travel a clear path to definitive conclusions.
Whether in the isolation of the laboratory or study, or in the thick of disputation, the truth may be
gainsayed. Among the ancient Greeks, for example, methods of reasoning which might reliably
lead to truth—and which might prevail over and against even the most hostile audiences—were
carefullv elaborated. Dialectics, as these methods were called, were modeled as much as was
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possible after mathematical logorhythms; for mathematical logorhythyms, when applied
faithfully to a given problem, yield an indisputable conclusion (Aristotle, 1991). Of first order
amongst dialectical methods as applied to non-mathematical problems was the syllogism, a
device which Plato used masterfully in the Socratic dialogues to expose inconsistencies in his
disputants' arguments and to distinguish mere opinion from truth. Descartes (1826), committed
to establishing empiricism as a correction to the wide-spread tendency to reason from widely
shared but unproven presumptions, asserted in his Rulesfor the Direction ofthe Mind,
"Whenever two men come to opposite decisions about the same matter, one of them must
certainly be in the wrong, and apparently there is not even one of them who knows; for if the
reasoning of one were sound and clear he would be able to lay it before the other as finally to
succeed in convincing his understanding also" (in Perelman & Olbtechts-Tyteca, 1969, p.2).
Undergirding Descartes' assertion is the conviction that reasoning soberly and systematically
from observable 'fact' is not only a capability of the individual, independent mind, but that such
reasoning guarantees victory over the opposition of an audience, should such opposition present
itself. According to Toulmin (1972), the 18"' century philosopher Immanuel Kant was of the
same disposition: "In Kant's view, there really was one and only one genuinely coherent way of
thinking about any particular subject-matter, whether in scientific theory or everyday life" (p.
421) "(T)he same 'necessary structures' of rational thought had as much authority, in Kant's
view, over the thinking of angels, or the inhabitants of other planets, as they did over human
thought" (p. 422). In each of these cases, faith is expressed in an objective, empirical reality that
exists independent of thought but may be discovered through the proper mental discipline.
Matters of audience or social approbation, therefore, are sui generis irrelevant to truth-finding.
The real judge is the method.
Several movements in 20"' century philosophy, however, have made it difficult to persist
in dismissing audience as cpistemologically and cognitively unimportant. Writers who have
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contributed to social constructivist models of knowledge-formation and cognition include Rorty
(1979), Wittgenstein (1953) Derrida (1981), Foucault (1978, 1979, 1990), Vygotsky (1978,
1986), Kuhn (1970), Coles (1996), Perelman ( 1969, 1982), Bakhtin (1981, 1984a). and many
Others.
In The Realm ofRhetoric (1982), Perelman offered the following critique of efforts to
exclude audience from even the most formal approaches to reasoning. To start with, he proposes
that philosophers have long failed to honor the distinction drawn by Aristotle between analytics
(or purely formal reasoning of the sort involved in mathematics) and dialectics. Unlike
analytics—which are "independent of personal opinion" (p. 2)—<iialectical reasoning
presupposes premises which are constituted by generally accepted opinions. The
generally accepted premises are those "which are accepted by everyone or by the
majority or by the philosophers— i.e., by all, or by the majority, or by the most notable
and illustrious of them."
In certain cases, what is generally acceptable is probable, but this probability
cannot be confounded with calculable probability. On the contrary, the meaning of the
word eidogos, which is usually translated as '^generally acceptable" or "acceptable," has
a qualitative aspect which brings it closer to the term "reasonable" than to the term
"probable."...
We can immediately see that dialectical reasoning begins from theses that are
generally accepted, with the purpose of gaining the acceptance of other theses which
could be or are controversial. Thus, it aims either to persuade or convince. But
instances of dialectical reasoning are not made up of valid and compelling inferences;
rather they advance arguments which are more or less strong, more or less convincing,
and which are never purely formal. Moreover, as Aristotle noted, a persuasive argument
is one that persuades the person to whom it is addressed; this means that, unlike the
process of analytical reasoning, a dialectical argument can not be impersonal, for it
derives its value from its action on the mind of some person. (Perelman, 1982, pp. 2-3)
The gist of Perelman's argument may be reduced to the following simple statements: (a)
dialectical reasoning—even as practiced by Socrates—rests less on premises which are purely
self-evident and more often upon assertions which are widely shared, which is to say
presumptive, (b) dialectical reasoning thus consists of arguments, which is to say
communications which aim at persuading others, and (c) persuasion amounts to acting upon or
winning the adherence of other minds. Thus, from start to finish, dialectical reasoning is
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audience-based. It is audience-based at the beginning because, in selecting premises fron. which
to reason, it must select premises which are widely agreed upon. If premises are chosen which
the audience does not share, the entire process will be mired in disputation and failure.
(Perelman describes later in his volume how Socrates, in each of his famous dialogues, is careful
to have his opponents agree on certain premises before moving forward with his argument.) And
dialectical reasoning is audience-based at the finish because-even if there is no disagreement
about premises-disagreement regarding the conclusions drawn from the premises leaves the
parties divided and the validity of their arguments undetermined. In short, dialectical reasoning,
like other forms of communication, ''presupposes a meeting of minds between speaker and
audience" (pp. 9-10) inasmuch as it involves some degree of common interest or experience, and
"it tries to gain a meeting of minds" (p. 1 1) in its conclusions.
Of course, the vast majority of cognitive acts engaged in by individuals on a daily basis
are not self-consciously dialectical. However, most thoughts—even the casual, quicksilver ones
that pass through the mind, unvocalized—share with dialectical discourse the problem of the
audience. How is a meeting of minds to be accomplished? And what is one to do if such a
meeting is found to be elusive? As Perelman states. "Even in private deliberation, where the
person who advances reasons and the one who receives them are the same, the meeting of minds
is indispensable" (p. 1 1).
If we make, then, the accomplishment of a "meeting of minds" the measure of a
thought's effectiveness, we must recognize the necessity of persuading the audience, even when
it is difficult or unpleasant. Otherwise—even though we may believe ourselves to be
unappreciated geniuses—we have failed a principal test of what it means to think w ell.
According to Linda Flower, a composition specialist, naVve writers—^like naive thinkers—tend to
be ""egocentric" as opposed to audience-based. In her textbook for freshman courses in
composition and rhetoric. Problem Solving Strategiesfor Writing—Third Edition (1989), she
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focuses on helping young writers radically reorient themselves in order to consider not only what
they ^nmt to say in a piece of writing but also how their words are likely to be received by a
reader. In ^transforming writer-based prose into reader-based prose," the writer's position and
values are not, ideally, surrendered or obscured. Rather, they are presented in a fashion that is
directly and consciously considerate of the reader's positions and values. Flower gives the
example of a young woman who has decided that she wants to leave college for a year to think
about what she really wants to do with her life; the problem is that her parents don't support her,
fearing that she'll drop out and never return. In her first draft of her letter, "Ann" begins "I wish
you would try to see my point of view and not be so conventional...." This I-oriented approach
is disputational and provocative—hardly likely to result in a meeting of minds with her parents,
(p 209). After assuming a reader-based perspective, she writes:
As I told you the other night on the phone, , I want to consider taking a year off from
college to work and be on my own for a while. I've been thinking over what you said
because this is an important decision and, like you, I want to do what will be best in the
long run, not just what seems attractive now. I think a lot of your objections make a lot
of sense .... (pp. 209-210).
In this second draft, Ann affirms her parents' basic premises, ensuring that there is agreement
between herself and them, at least at the outset. This in itself is mollifying and conciliatory.
Later, she offers new information that her parents have not thought about, and gradually builds to
the conclusion that leaving school for a year is a smarter, saner, more mature move than to take a
degree that might not lead her to a fulfilling career. Reading it, one feels that her parents are
quite likely to approve— if not of the decision itself then of the thoughtfulness with which their
daughter came to her decision.
As Perelman (1982) suggests, similar principles apply even when we are thinking to
ourselves. To think in ways which do not even convince ourselves is not uncommon. Most
persons will acknowledge that they frequently find themselves thinking in ways that they do not
approve of or fmd to be erroneous. Psychotherapists who employ Rational-Emotive Therapy, in
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fact, teach their clients to dispute their own "irrational," automatic thoughts, recognizing that
these thoughts "very frequently "cause" or "create" dysfunction of emotional or behavioral
consequences" (Ellis, 1980, p. 5). Similarly, when inwardly reflecting on a course of action we
might take, or when developing a retort we intend to make to another person, we typically
undergo a process of internal conversation and debate, during which we may find it difficult to
win agreement from ourselves. It is quite reasonable to imagine that healthy persons, then,
resolve internal conflicts the way that healthy persons resolve interpersonal conflicts: As
recommended by Perelman (1982) and Flower (1989, 1994), they search for common premises,
present arguments as well supported by evidence as is possible, and otherwise enact the
discipline or methods that lead to agreement.
The statement, then, that effective thought is thought which isfound by one 's audience to
be persuasive, does not mean that the audience has sole power to determine whether or not a
thought is valid. Rather, it suggests that thoughts—inasmuch as they are communicative
events—must take into account the person(s) to whom they are directed. When such
consideration is given, the independence of one's thought is neither betrayed nor surrendered.
Rather, via such consideration, thought recognizes the possibility of taking forms which will
also appeal to other minds, thus producing the desired status of agreement. Naturally, in
presenting thought (even when it is silent) as a process that involves both the thinker and the
audience, the pure autonomy of the thinker (e.e., as presented by Descartes) is questioned. But
the loss of this mythic autonomy is compensated by the acquisition of ways of thinking that may
lead in the direction of the individual's social empowerment and psychological health.
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Psychopathologv
Premis^: Psychopathology may be placed under the rubric ofargumentation or symbolic
action.
Premise 14: Psychopathologic symptomology may be renamed ysychopathologic
argumentation "
ion;
In beginning this discussion, it is important to ask a fundamental, two-part questi
What is the 'psychopathologic/ and how can it be neatly distinguished from the domains of
'normal' psychological functioning?
Answering the second part of the question first, it can be simply stated that the
psychopathologic often cannot be neatly distinguished from the normal. Such neat boundaries
elude us, first of all, because behaviors, personality traits, feelings, and ways of viewing the
world which are odd in one context may be quite common and 'logical' in another. For example,
tearing one's clothes, sobbing, and screaming are acceptable behaviors when first reacting to a
tragedy; but if one engages in these practices in the absence of the usual provocation or for too
long a period of time, the ways in which they are judged by others is likely to change. Cultural
factors, too, may affect judgments regarding the normalcy of any given behavior. Even the
authors of the DSM-IV—the manual perhaps most explicitly dedicated to standardizing the
psychopathologic—acknowledge that cultural factors must be "systematically" considered in
order to safeguard against psychiatric misdiagnosis (p. 843). Deciding, for example, whether or
not a woman who talks out loud to spirits should be identified as psychotic must take into
account the cultural context in which she was raised and how such behavior is viewed in her
culture of origin. Secondly, all psychopathologic taxonomies—whether professional or
personal—express a particular and thus unavoidably slanted point-of-view on behavior. Another
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way of putt.ng it is that any labeling of a behavior or condition as psychopathoiogic involves the
rendering of a judgment, and all such judgments rest upon or issue from a definable, culture-
specific set of values and knowledges. Professional psychology is itself such a specific culture,
and its judgments about the mental health of others-however empirically based-are
inextricable from its own system of values. Certainly, there are urban, working-class
neighborhoods in the United States in which smoking marijuana is not widely viewed as
pathological-regardless of what the DSM-IV has to say about it. In these neighborhoods, to
pathologize pot-smoking might be considered prejudicial; moreover, this prejudice might be
commonly identified with persons from a very different socio-economic background. For
Thomas Szasz (Simon, 1984), the fact that psychopathologies do not exist independent of
specific social constructs was plainly revealed when, in 1977, the question of whether or not
homosexuality should be considered a mental disorder was put to a vote by the American
Psychiatric Association. The fact that the APA voted to stop treating homosexuality as a disease
only drove the point deeper. If disease categories can be created and then nullified by
professional majorities informed by socio-political agendas, all behavior, theoretically, is
susceptible to pathologization. Yesterday homosexuality, today table tennis. Embracing any
psychopathoiogic classification, then, is fraught with some measure of arbitrary social judgment
of a serious and potentially destructive sort. In the end, it is probably necessary—even when
dealing with such apparently undeniably problematic symptoms as severe memory loss, self-
mutilation, or paranoid hallucinations—to recognize that 'psychopathology' is externally
determined, that it is determined by comparison to the 'normal,' and that, from other
perspectives, it may be judged as something other than pathological. Recognizing these
conditions is not meant to question whether or not psychopathology exists at all, but to clarify
what is going on whenever we say that it exists.
Now to answer the first part of the lead-in question: What is the 'psychopathologiC?
Respecting the considerations mentioned in the paragraph above, it is fair to say that the
psychopathologiC refers to those behaviors or affects which are-in kind or degree- (a)
abnormal or aberrant (as compared to the vast majority of other persons in a given domain), (b)
constitutive of or causing an impairment in some domain of daily functioning, (c) expressive of
an abnormal mental (i.e., mind-situated) state or condition, and (d) indicative of suffering,
distress, or harm either on the part of the individual manifestmg the symptoms or other persons
affected by the symptoms. Put more simply, the psychopathologiC consists of those patterns (or
syndromes) of experience or behavior which appear unusually maladjusted to or out of
compliance with the demands of the social environment and which seem to issue from a
disruption of psychological functioning or development (Maxmen & Ward, 1995).
General theories about psychopathologiC origins, etiology, and course are several. These
include the biomedical approach (Donaldson, 1998), an emphasis on genetic factors (Hall, 1996),
the biosocial or diathesis-stress model, (Zuckerman, 1999), the neurological model (Luria, 1973),
the developmental approach (Rolf et al, 1990), psychoanalytic or family dysfunction models
(Bowlby, 1982, A. Freud, 1965), environmental or ecological models (Apter, 1982), cultural and
political perspectives (Brown & Ballou, 1992), and others. Although many of these models
differ dramatically in how they understand the causes and nature of psychopathology, they agree
in utilizing the four conditions listed in the paragraph above.
A rhetorical approach to psychopathology complements these theories in proposing that
psychopathology is—either essentially (i.e., at its ver>' root) or effectively (i.e., in one or more of
its effects)—communicative. That is, its signs, symptoms, and other manifestations may be
construed—even when they have an organic basis—as portions of an active, suasory dialogue
with self and/or others. As suggested throughout this essay, human beings are inescapably
involved in rhetorical relations with self and others: relations, that is, which involve
124
communications with ^purpose. Accordingly, sifting out the purpose or intention of
communicative interaction is an unavoidable and ongoing part of existence. AppHed to
psychopathology, such a perspective forces consideration of the possibility that psychopathology,
too, may be animated by rhetorical purposes and intents. Are psychopathologic signs and
symptoms part andparcel ofcertam processes ofargumentation^ Do they, in other words, exist
primarily as a species of ac/c/r^W communication, whose purpose is to influence others, albeit
using unusual and remarkable means? On a case-by-case basis, the answer to such a question
will not be always positive. Indeed, clinicians not infrequently confront cases in which there is
not a rhetorical root to the client's psychopathology; the etiology, rather, is quite plainly
physiologic, perhaps rooted in a congenital vulnerability, in the body's response to extreme
environmental stress, or to a neurochemical imbalance caused by drug abuse. Still, even in such
cases, the individuals involved stand in a rhetorical relationship to self and others. In such cases,
the better question may be then: How do the psychopathologic signs and symptoms alter or affect
the individual's rhetorical understanding ofand position in the world'.' This is an important
question, for it recognizes that even persons suffering from severe organic disorders such as
dementia or schizophrenia are socially and intrapsychically alive, and thus must contend with
questions of rhetorical understanding and identity. In fact, in some cases, organic syndromes
—
although they cannot be said to have rhetorical causes—involve a sharp need for rhetorical
engagement and clarification. The schizophrenic's disjointed reading of the world, the
Alzheimer patient's paranoia and distrust, the depressed person's distorted understanding of
relationships: all of these are rhetorical effects of great potency which require rhetorical
affirmation and intervention.
In both types of case—that is, both where psychopathology is (a) essentially rhetorical or
argumentative and (b) merely has rhetorical effects or consequences—the four conditions used in
defining psychopathology arc met:
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(a) psychopathologic communication is abnormal or aberrant;
(b) psychopathologic communication causes impairment in daily functioning,
(c) psychopathologic communication is expressive of an abnormal mental (x.^,, mind-
situated) state or condition, and
(d) psychopathologic communication is indicative of suffering, distress, or harm either
on the part of the individual manifesting the symptoms or other persons affected by
the symptoms.
Again, however, it should be stressed that this is not to say that rhetorical factors either account
for or represent the cure for aU psychological disorders; such a totalistic perspective is clearly
unsupported by research data or by clinical lore. The point, rather, is that rhetorical factors are
present and important
—
albeit to varying degree— in the presentation and treatment of the
psychopathologic, and that attending to these factors may contribute positively even in the
treatment of clients whose illness is caused and driven by non-rhetorical forces.
Psychopathologic dialogue is essentially rhetorical in nature when it is: (a) provoked
and/or sustained by relational problems with important others, and (b) fundamentally aimed at
affecting, moving, or influencing self and/or others. In these cases, psychopathology does not
have a predominantly physiologic basis, but rather evolves directly out of the rhetorical (i.e.,
agonistic) situation of the individual. As has been observed in earlier sections of this chapter,
such situations—even at best—are psychologically trying, for they involve the individuaKs
struggle to achieve agreement with self and others in a field marked by disparate needs and aims,
multiple streams of influence, and powerful forces of persuasion. As such, essential
psychopathology includes within its compass the majority of cases involving family dysfunction,
relational problems, personality disorders, some cases of depression, behavior disorders, and
other syndromes which in some fashion are due primarily to environmental or relational insult.
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deprivation, stress, discomfort, or negative influence. In such cases, the psychopathologic
manifestations possess an essentially argumentative logic: that is, they are communications
sculpted in exceptional circumstances out of exceptional materials designed to influence certain
persons who, it is believed, cannot be reached in other ways. Essential psychopathology, then,
might also be called psychopathological argumentation. Unlike more common efforts at
argumentation, psychopathologic argumentation is characterized by excess, lack of self-insight,
non-verbal forms of communication, a fundamental doubt or uncertainty about the chances of
success, and other aberrant or primitive features. Persons who grow rigid with panic, who sink
into depression, who mutilate their bodies, or who display other psychopathologic si]
saying something; they are transmitting messages, making appeals, stating cases, disputing
others' messages or arguments, exacting revenge, or carrying out any number of other rhetorical
processes. That they are using means of argumentation which are uncommon, inscrutable to
others (as well as themselves), rejected by others, and disruptive of everyday functioning does
not disqualify these means as argumentative; for, like other efforts at argumentation, they are
aimed at winning the assent of other persons, other minds. That the theses argued for are (at
least superficially) primitive, idiosyncratic, or bizarre again does not constitute a disqualification:
if politics or law are any sort of indication, it is quite common for persons to argue zealously and
at great cost for theses which might strike a 'rational' person as nonsensical. In short, to 'read'
psychopathologic signs as non-argumentative risks missing their essential character and logic.
In keeping with the notion of psychopathology as argumentation, Thomas Szasz (1961)
identified the somatic symptoms associated with psychological distress as "commimication by
means ofbodily signs" (116). According to Szasz, the use (or misuse) of the body as a means of
communication may be considered a form of "protolinguistic communication," which is to say a
way of sending a message that is (like language) symbolic, but which (unlike language) depends
upon physical gesture:
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An hystencal symptom, say a seizure or paralysis, expresses and transmits a messaoeusually to a specific person. A paralyzed arm, for instance, may mean: ^1 have sinnedw. h this arm and have been punished for it." It may also mean^l wanted ne ed oobtam some forb.dden gratification (erotic, aggressive, etc.) by means of this ar^.' (1 19)
One of the problems with protolinguistic communication is that it is obscure and thus requires
special energies of interpretation: "...to obtain the hidden meaning, so to speak, of a message
framed in the idiom of bodily signs, it is necessary to translate protolanguage into ordinary
language. (120)
Nonetheless, according to Szasz, psychopathologic communication—like other
'languages'—possess three functions: "the informative, the affective, and the promotive" (127)
The principal informative use of psychopathologic communication is to send a message about the
condition of the sufferer him or herself. Typically, this message is some variant of "I am in
pain." The affective use of protolanguage involves deliberately arousing "certain emotions in
the listener and so induce him to undertake certain actions" (129). According to Szasz, the fact
that psychopathologic behavior and symptomology is typically difficult, upsetting, and stressful
for others is no mistake: it is supposed to be, for how else to secure the attention and compliance
of persons with whom communication has been for some reason or another difficult to secure?
The third function of protolinguistic communication is the promotive, which has to do with
"mak(ing) the listener perform certain actions" (130):
The clearest form in which patients (and physicians) have employed "body language" is
undoubtedly in its promotive usage. I refer to such symptoms as, for example, headache
or dysmeorrhea in a woman who feels overburdened. By communicating in terms of
these complaints (symptoms) she may be able to induce her husband to be more
attentive and helpful toward her. And if not her husband, her physician. (131)
Szasz's summary of the communicative nature of psychopathology is as follows:
In general, whenever people feel unable—by means of "normal" mechanisms, such as
ordinary speech—to prevail over the significant objects in their environments, they are
likely to shift their pleas to the idiom of protolanguage (weeping, bodily signs). In other
words, when one's love object fails to "listen" to verbal complaints or requests, one will
be compelled, or at least tempted, to take recourse in communicating by means of iconic
body signs. We have come to speak of this general phenomenon, which may take a great
variety offorms, as "mental illness. " As a result, instead of seeing that people are
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engaged m vanous types of communication set in diverse communicational (or social)
situations, we construct-and then ourselves come to believe in-various tvpes of
mental
,1 nesses such as "hysteria^ ^'somatization reaction,"
'i^ypochondri^sis "
schizophrenia," and so forth, (p. 130) (italics mine.)
While Szasz does not use the words 'argumentation' or 'rhetoric' in his discussion of
psychopathology, his construction of the matter is, in all essential ways, rhetorical. By setting up
psychopathology as a kind of 'language' which is guided by communicative imperatives (chiefly,
the will to affect or influence others), he places it within a rhetorical dimension, both as regards
its evolution and its treatment.
To some extent, psychology since Freud has had possession—and has also made use—of
rhetorical principles in its understanding of psychopathology. Freud himself believed that
traumatic early childhood experiences often became symbolically encoded in the neurotic
presentations of adult patients. In his approach to psychoanalysis, breaking the code—or reading
the language—of the neuroses was critical to symptom relief.
But a fully rhetorical approach to psychopathology goes beyond symbol ization to the
level of argumentation, or symbolic action. It views psychopathology, in other words, not as a
kind of passive flowering of symbolic wounds or discomforts, but as an active rhetorical process,
as something in which the sufferer is energetically engaged. Thus, while a rhetorical approach
agrees that trauma (i.e., injury) of some sort is usually involved in the creation of essential
psychopathologic communication, it does not go along with the reduction of psychopathology to
nothing more than a symbolic byproduct of psychological trauma in the same way that a bruise is
the byproduct of physical trauma. Psychopathologic communication is an answer to—not just a
reflexive symbolization of—a traumatic experience. Moreover, it is an answer which aims to
transform the individual's plight or situation, typically by seeking to affect some other party or
agency. As such, psychopathologic communication is decidedly aimed at persuasion. When the
source of the trauma can be directly identified as a person (e.g., chronic neglect by one's
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mother), the rhetorical structures of the psychopathologic response can be seen most clearly. A
child of twelve years who has been chronically rejected and neglected by her mother does not
merely carry the ^signs of a trauma^ her ^signs/ rather, are better understood as efforts to answer
to her mother's neglect in ways intended to transform her own deprivation. Whether her 'signs'
are symptoms of depression, rage, delinquency, schizoid detachment, or sexual promiscuity, they
constitute portions of a rhetorical dialogue with the mother in which attempts at influence (a) are
primary, (b) have a history of being thwarted, and (c) as they are frustrated, become
progressively aberrant and provocative in form. Psychotherapy must, then, be about more than
tracing psychopathologic symbols to their sources of origin: It must be about (a) making sensible
and validating argumentative behavior, (b) informing and shaping such behavior so that it has a
greater chance of success, and (c) engaging in such behavior during therapy in ways that allow
transformations in the fundamental rhetorical situation or dilemma of the client.
While the focus in this section has so far been upon psychopathology which is essentially
communicative and rhetorical, it is also important to briefly discuss psychopathology which
—
although it does not originate out of rhetorical situations—has significant communicative and
rhetorical effects. A review of the DSM-IV, the ICD-IO. and perhaps nearly every other
document committed to elaborating a taxonomy of psychopathologic syndromes and symptoms
reveals a close attention to communicative features and patterns. Among the Z).W-/F criteria for
schizophrenia, for example, are delusions, hallucinations, and disorganized speech, all of which
may reconfigure the individual's communicative relationship with self and others. While many
researchers continue to emphasize the important role that psychosocial stress plays in the
development and course of schizophrenia, the disease is widely believed to have a biological
basis. Even, however, assuming a purely biological basis for schizophrenia, its impact upon
communicative behavior is an important matter in its own right. For example, 90 % of
schizophrenic patients report auditory hallucinations, the majority of them involving voices
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(Ma^xmen & Ward, 177). These voices may ''whisper or shout, comment on the patient's actions,
or demand morally offensive acts'' ( 1 77). Patients hearing such voices typically respond to them
in some fashion: perhaps by carrying on conversations with them
,
telling the voices to go away,
or acting on the voices' instructions. As such, a schizophrenic's presentation-while
'disorganized' from a conventional point of view-may also be rhetorically organized vis a vis
the voice or voices he or she is engaged with. Failure or unwillingness to attend to the character
and 'spirit' of this rhetorical engagement may prevent a clinician from understanding the
patient's phenomenology, and thus impede therapeutic treatment.
Similar things may be said of schizophrenic patients^ rambling and incoherent speech
styles. First of all, these styles—when treated seriously as aspects of communicative behavior-
are characteristic enough that they may be defined as 'types/ Peusner (1987), for example,
suggests that schizophrenic communication commonly possesses at least two ^patholingusitic'
features. The first of these is 'jargonaphasia,' or "^a completely incomprehensible jargon,
consisting of incorrectly employed real words (semantic jargon) or neologistic sequences of
phonemes without any resemblance to real words and devoid of any meaning (phonemic jargon)'
(218). The second, 'schizophasia,' is 'lexical disorder in the form of incorrectly real words
(semantic paraphasias) or newly coined words (neologisms), and a very elaborate sty le described
as ^bizarr' ('bizarre') and Werschroben' ('eccentric')" (217). Secondly, both jargonaphasia and
schizophasia clearly create rhetorical difficulties: how can communication between individuals
be successfully carried out when these confounding and eccentric styles are in play? According
to de Decker & Van de Craen (1987), these difficulties may not be entirely accidental. Rather,
these authors suggest that schizophrenic communication may well constitute ^"an avoidance
strategy used to escape certain threatening and compulsive situations'' (25 1 ). According to this
interpretation, 'bizarre' communicative patterns serve a basic rhetorical or anti-rhetorical
purpose: to prevent being coopted, moved, or obliged by the communications of others. In
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contrast to normative communication-which is structured in such a way as to achieve or
enhance ^cooperation' with one's interlocutor-schizophrenic speech is structured to undermine
cooperation. As such, the communicative ^styles' of persons with schizophrenia-though
perhaps undergirded by a biological disturbance-<:annot be treated as meaningless, non-
functional epiphenomena. Rather, they may be construed as deviant or remarkable rhetorical
devices called into existence by a profound reorientation of one's rhetorical relationship to self
and world. Non only is the mind of the schizophrenic dis-integrated into separate voices engaged
in their own demanding (and often dangerous) rhetorical dramas and struggles, but the
schizophrenic's vulnerability to external others is greatly increased. In order to compensate for
or reduce these vulnerabilities, the schizophrenic may adopt an 'uncooperative' stance towards
communication. Made-up words, whirling logic, zig-zagging sentences: all may be devices for
eluding the 'otherness' which continuously threatens the weak, disintegrated, and powerless self.
Schizophrenia, then, like several other disorders with non-rhetorical causes and
etiologies, nonetheless has potent rhetorical effects. Careful consideration of and attention to the
rhetorical dimensions of these syndromes may well have beneficial consequences, both in terms
of treating patients and in terms of understanding the conditions which aftTict them. The
therapist, for example, who is able to involve the schizophrenic patient in a non-threatening,
cooperative dialogue—even for a few moments—has helped that patient achieve a precious bit of
calm and consubstantiation in the midst of a nearly continuous rhetorical windstorm. Also,
therapy which—because it is informed by rhetorical strategies and aims—achieves such
moments regularly may well lead to significant, cumulative improvements in a patient's
condition.
As Petrarch, the Renaissance rhetorician stated it:
Our speech is not a small indicator of our mind, nor is our mind a small controller of our
speech. ...Therefore, both must be consulted so that [the mind] will be reasonably strict
with [speech], and [speech] will be truthfully magnificent with [the mind], (in Vickers,
1993, p. 30)
Premise 15: Psychopathology is addressed
iving
As has been suggested above, if psychopathology is to be conceptualized as a kind of
argumentation, it follows that it generally has an addressee or audience. In other words,
inasmuch as psychopathologic signs and symptoms, gestures and actions, evolve out of and are
sustained by rhetorical relationships with concrete, particular "others,' they also constitute
efforts to influence these concrete, particular others. As such, psychopathology is like a
message, writ in terms and phrases that express the speaker's/sufferer's portion of a dialogue
with an other(s). Moreover, it is dialogue with a purpose: to achieve agreement with this other(s)
on terms essentially beneficial to the speaker/sufferer.
Crucial to understanding any particular psychopathologic expression, then, is grasping
(a) the rhetorical situation out of which it emerged, (b) the relationship between its sender and
the person(s) to whom it is directed, and (c) its rhetorico-functional rationale. Each of these
understandings is connected to the fundamental fact that the psychopathologic message is
intended for someone else to receive, affirm, and make answer to. As such, it is as dynamically
alive—and as tense with dramatic energy—as a speech being delivered on a stage or in a
courtroom. If the speech is not heard—or, if heard, not affirmed or assented to— its speaker
cannot complete his or her intended journey. Without the consummation of at least some degree
of agreeable response from the interlocutor, the speech—although spoken—remains in effect
undelivered; and the speaker remains in effect saddled with the task of finding a way to get the
message through, be it through sheer persistence, a shift in tactics, an alteration of terms, or some
other transformation.
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The fact that psychopathology is addressed is one of the principal reasons that
psychotherapy is capable of healing potency and efficacy. If psychopathology was not
addressed-if, that is, it existed outside an active effort at communication with an other-it is
hard to imagine that the presence of a listening, affirmative, responsive interlocutor would make
a substantial difference. However, when a therapist provides the client with an avenue for the
successful completion of his or her rhetorical task, the client can begin to replace
psychopathologic strategies of communication with strategies that hurt less, are less often
rejected by others, and that create less disruption of body or community. Psychopathologic
communication is, in the vast majority of cases, a learned or acquired process that may, when a
different rhetorical dynamic is established that aims deliberately to resolve agonistic dilemmas,
be unlearned and supplanted.
The therapist's power devolves, then, from his or her power to reconfigure any number
of the dimensions of his or her rhetorical relationship with the client. First of all, by entering
into dialogue with the client precisely at the point where the clients" communication is most
stressed, obscure, and unreceived, the therapist steps into the role(s) previously inhabited by
some other significant interlocutor(s). Secondly, by honoring the client's psychopathologic
message as (at some level) legitimate and intelligible, the therapist sanctions the client's
rhetorical urge and activity, intelligence and sensibility. Thirdly, by validating the client's right
to speak—even via psychopathologic means—the therapist legitimizes and venerates the client as
an active, viable, speaking (and thus fully empowered) self. Fourthly, by 'reading' or confirming
the messages embedded in the client's psychopathologic argument, a basis is provided for a
restatement of these messages in non-psychopathologic terms and gestures. Fifthly, by
promoting an understanding of the rhetorical situation out of which the psychopathologic
argument arose, the therapist can assist the client in grasping the mechanism of his or her own
psychological health and unhealth. And so on.
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PremiseM: Psychopathology may be caused by the rhetorical miseducation of the individual.
Complementarily, psychopathology may be corrected by the rhetorical reeducation of the
individual
From Freud's investigations of the early childhood experiences of his neurotic patients to
ongoing efforts to identify the parenting practices which correlate with depression, anxiety, or
conduct disorder in offspring, psychologists have attributed much psychopathology to patterns of
feeling, belief, or behavior learned WxXhm the family. Such learning is rarely driven by
deliberate pedagogy. Still, within every family, the lessons doled out, rehearsed, skipped,
happened into, or strictly avoided can do children either definite good or measurable harm.
If family life and the upbringing of children are studied from a rhetorical perspective,
emphasis is naturally placed on communicative behaviors and processes—especially inasmuch as
they involve the expression, reception, and negotiation of influence, the making of arguments
and the achievement of healthy consubstantiation. Such study can begin from the very first
moment in a child's life, considering questions such as. How does the child express its needs and
desires? How do the parents respond to these needs and desires? To what degree do the parents
respond positively to the child's influence upon them and their lives? As the child matures and
becomes responsive to and able to engage in linguistic communication, questions similar and
new may also be asked. But, throughout, the overarching question concerns the degree to which
such communicative transactions constitute a de facto rhetorical education for the child. How, in
other vv'ords, does the child learn—through its experience in the family—to argue and to respond
to the arguments of others? Will the child learn to argue primarily by means of overt emotional
display? Through the presentation of reasoned positions'^ By means of coercion and
manipulation? Will the thwarting or disregarding of some essential need of the child result in its
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needing to utilize a psychopathologicai mode of argumentation? Or, will the successful solvin.
of interpersonal conflicts as they arise impress upon the child a strong sense of how to secure
agreements even in novel situations?
Take, for example, the role that argumentation plays in emotional self-regulation.
Persons who are able-^ven when confronted by disappointment, insult, or adversity-to remain
relatively unruffled are those, typically, who are able to present themselves with self-soothing,
encouraging arguments. It is not that they fail to experience emotional arousal; it is that they have
learned a means of responding to emotional arousal which is adaptive. Such learnings may well
have begun in infancy or early childhood, when a parent reliably provided comfort in times of
distress, offering developmentally apt arguments for how to cope with not getting one's way,
losing one^s favorite toy, or being frightened. Adults experiencing emotional dysregulation may
be taught to repeat certain mantras, 'affirmations,^ or other crisp statements which in effect argue
the merits of moderation over excess.
Adults with extreme symptoms of emotional dysregulation may meet criteria for
Borderline Personality Disorder. In the passages below, Linehan (1993), offers a rhetorical
analysis of the etiology of this disorder, suggesting that the disorder originates in family
environments that systematically invalidate—and thus fail to nurture—the communicative
capacities of a child. This communicative malnourishment results in psychological
malnourishment.
An invalidating environment is one in which communication of private experiences is
met by erratic, inappropriate, and extreme responses. In other words, the expression of
private experiences is not validated; instead, it is often punished and/or trivialized, (p.
49)
Invalidation has two primary characteristics. First, it tells the individual that she is
wrong in both her description and her analyses of her own experiences, particularly in
her views of what is causing her own emotions, beliefs, and actions. Second, it attributes
her experiences to socially unacceptable characteristics or personality traits, (pp. 49-50)
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The consequences of invalidating environments are as follows. First by failin" to
validate emotional expression, an invalidating environment does not 'teach the child tolabel private experiences, including emotions, in a matter normative in her larger socialcommunity for the same of similar experiences. Nor is the child taught to modulate
emotional arousal.
...
Second, by oversimplifying the ease of solving life's problems, the environmentdoes not teach the child to tolerate distress or to form realistic goals and expectations.
Third, within an invalidating environment, extreme emotional displays and/or
extreme problems are often necessary to provoke a helpful environmental response....
Finally, such an environment fails to teach the child when to trust her own
emotional and cognitive responses as reflections of valid interpretations of individual
and situational events. Instead, the invalidating environment teaches the child to actively
invalidate her own experiences, and to search social environment for cues about how to
think, feel, and act. (p. 51)
Good parents, Linehan implies, teach their children communicative proficiency by
utilizing a highly responsive and consistent dialogic style: By giving their children a clear
sounding-board for their communicative behaviors, the children learn which of these behaviors
work and which don't; even more importantly, they learn that they matter as persons. Damaging
parents, in contrast, neglect to give their children communicative affirmation or feedback.
Denied of any way of assessing the viability of an argumentative strategy (and the only way to do
this is by observing the responses of one's audience), the child of such parents may fail to
develop stable, trustworthy, and effective modes of communication. Such children's emotional
volatility in adulthood may be considered, then, the consequence of a brutal rhetorical
impoverishment: Never having learned the fundamentals of healthy argumentation—both in
liason with others and in regards to self—they lack the means for organizing their feelings, their
social relations, and their behaviors.
We learn from Linehan—as we might from any applied rhetorical analysis—that
environments possess a rhetorical structure: that is, they communicate messages, and these
messages have both intended and unintended impact on persons. Crucial to the degree of well-
being (or psychopathology and suffering) of any person is the rhetorical healthfulness of his or
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her surround. Environments saturated with demeaning, insulting, or negative arguments may
well produce some form of psychological dis-ease or illness. As Franz Fanon, Malcolm X, and
numerous other persons of African heritage have testified, the psychological costs of living in a
world that regards you as inferior are enormous. An.xiety. rage, depression, even sociopathy
may, be traced to an individuafs "mis-education' by oppression. The 20'" century has been
witness to numerous important efforts to challenge disparaging cultural forms and behaviors-
including misogyny, ablism, homophobia, and antisemitism—yet psychology as a discipline has
been relatively late in identifying their psychopathogenic mechanisms as well as their
psychopathological affects.
Psychotherapy, in particular, is ethically obliged to be able to provide some degree of
rhetorical (re)education to persons who, by dint of some form of environmental insult or
deprivation, find themselves unable to function healthfully. In many cases, psychotherapy is
faced with this exact challenge: (1) to offer an explicitly rhetorical account (like Linehan's) of
one's 'disorder' or suffering, (2) to develop a broad rhetorical framework for understanding such
universal phenomena as the emotions, cognition, psychological health and unhealth, social codes
and relationships, and so on, and (3) to provide specific training in and opportunity to practice
the concrete rhetorical skills or adaptations needed to produce an increase in well-being.
Concludin^ Observation
As was suggested in Chapter 2. an effective rhetorical psychotherapy requires a well-
conceived theoretical foundation. Such a theoretical foundation would, ideally, integrate
psychological and rhetorical concepts and findings into a comprehensive, unified view of the
individual as a 'rhetorical subject' living in rheloricized social contexts. The premises sketched
and discussed in this chapter go only a short distance towards this goal. It is hoped, lunvevcr.
138
that enough of a basis has been provided to pennh the description of a general approach
psychotherapy, which is the aim of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
PRACTICING RHETORICALLY-ORIENTED PSYCHOTHERAPY
Introduction
It has already been suggested that psychotherapy is fundamentally (and functionally) a
process of argumentation, and that it is from providing clients with a sense of success in
argument-making that many of the chief benefits of therapy are obtained. The aims of this
chapter are to further elaborate this perspective, and also to demonstrate how it may be actively
and strategically employed by psychotherapists.
As such, this chapter presents the essential ingredients of a manual or practitioners'
guide for rhetorically-oriented psychotherapy. This is not to suggest that it deals only with M>hai
(e.g., strategies, practices, etc.) psychotherapists might do, but, as importantly, why these
strategies make sense. The discussion here, in other words, attempts both to operationalize
psychotherapy as a rhetorical endeavor and io remain attentive to why—within the terms of a
rhetorical psychology of the individual—these operations are indicated.
This chapter begins w ith a listing of some of the major conceptual shifts required by
therapists interested in using a rhetorical model. These shifts take into account the raison d'etre
of psychotherapy, the situation or setting in which psychotherapy takes place; tlie identities of
both therapist and client; the activity or process of psychotherapy; the purpose and goals of
psychotherapy; the skills of the psychotherapist, and so on. Following this section, there is a
technical discussion of what it means to argue (as well as what it means to argue therapeutically),
an analysis of the diagnostic process, and an elaboration of several basic strategies of
psychotherapeutic argumentation. Each of these sections is intended to offer therapists
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grounding-both philosophical and strategic-in what it means to do therapy from within an
explicitly rhetorical perspective.
It should also be noted that there are several aspects of the psychotherapeutic process
that the adoption of a rhetorical framework does not alter. For example, to conceptualize
psychotherapy as a rhetorical process does not necessarily require a shift in the affective or
attitudinal stance of the therapist vis a vis the client. Therapists will likely continue to wish to be
supportive, to be affirmative, to maintain trust and integrity, and to recognize the client's various
needs for a positive relationship with the therapist. Likewise, therapists will continue to wish to
take note of and to respond to emotional processes, to work for shifts in non-adaptive cognitive
patterns and habits, and to take seriously developmental (including psychosexual) processes. As
Frank (1961/1973) noted, despite their many differences, the various schools of psychotherapy
share certain common features; and as Seligman (1995) has suggested, what makes
psychotherapy effective is often the quality of these common features.
Nonetheless, adopting a rhetorical model for psychotherapy is not merely to obtain a
different theoretical vantage point on therapy, but rather can lead to distinct differences in the
ways that therapists understand, carry out, and evaluate their work.
Part 1: Conceptualizing Rhetoricallv-Oriented Psychotherapy
Raison d'etre
A basic question that we may briefly revisit at this juncture is. What justification is there
for a rhetorically-oriented psychotherapy? Why should it exist?
A basic answer to this question is that a rhetorically-oriented psychotherapy should exist
because—in emphasizing rhetorical processes— it goes directly to the heart of why many clients
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have difficulties and how they may solve them. Put another way, it should exist because it is
salient to the goal of assisting rhetorical beings in resolving those rhetorical problems which
inflame emotions, disturb social functioning, distort or confuse social roles, invalidate the client
as a subject, produce feelings of helplessness, obstruct the formation of prosocial beliefs,
negatively impact relationships with self and others, and so forth.
As suggested in earlier chapters, psychotherapy is hardly the first exposure clients have
to a rhetorical setting or to argumentative processes. Quite to the contrary, not only are clients
(like all other persons) steeped in argumentation throughout their lives, but the very
problems/symptoms which bring them to therapy are often appropriately conceptualized as parts,
phrases, modes, efforts, and/or strategies of argumentation. Thus, from the first moment that
they enter therapy, clients bring with them a rhetorical identity (formed perhaps over their life-
course, perhaps in an effort to adapt to a particular rhetorical situation), they are actively engaged
in rhetorical agons or struggles (both with(in) themselves and with others), they tell tales of
rhetorical encounters, they have need of greater rhetorical understanding, efficacy, and skill, and
they may manifest symptoms indicative of psychopathologic modes of argumentation.
It is, then, precisely because the everyday social and psychological existences of persons
are shot through with argumentation that a rhetorical psychotherapy—by attending consciously
and explicitly to argumentation—has the promise of great efficacy. In other words, by choosing
to give priority to processes which are already, in the natural lives of persons, a rather continuous
facet of their activity and critical to their well-being, psychotherapy has a certain guarantee of
salience as well as the prospect of rewarding clients with learnings that have enduring usefulness.
By accepting a focus on argumentation as central to their sense of purpose or ethos,
psychotherapists can illuminate some of the chief mechanisms that have caused clients to suffer,
provide an explanation for why their suffering has assumed the particular forms it has, offer an
active, empowering identity to the client as a person already skilled (due to experience) in some
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aspects of argumentation, and initiate a deliberate, ordered, and encouraging process whereby the
argumentative capacities of clients may be palpably and functionally enhanced.
It is sensible, in fact, to advance the general proposition that rhetorically-focused
psychotherapy should exist because there is some process of persuasion (a) that has occurred or
is occurring to the detriment of the client, and/or (b) that needs to occur in order to liberate,
empower, or advance the fortunes of the client. Sometimes, the person who needs to be
persuaded is the client him/herself; at other times, the greater need is to enable clients to
effectively persuade certain other persons somehow essential to their own well-beina (e.a. a
parent, spouse, boss, or antagonist). Psychotherapy exists—and needs to exist—in order that
these tasks of persuasion may be carried out. It is especially crucial in cases wherein the
persuasions which have occurred or failed to occur have had a debilitating affect on the client,
rendering the client confused, silenced, or otherwise unable to carry out the tasks felt to be so
urgent.
By concentrating its efforts on illuminating the argumentative processes in which the
client is already critically involved, rhetorically-oriented psychotherapy responds directly to what
the clientfeels is most urgent (for the client is already urgently engaged), while also opening the
door to a wider education in the arts of arguing beneficently and effectively with self and others.
Another way of saying this is that rhetorically-oriented therapy accepts and treats seriously the
'dramas' of living in which clients find themselves; and then it assays to teach the skills that can
enable clients to navigate these dramas successfully.
Conceptualizing the Therapeutic Setting as a Rlietorical Setting
A redescription—in explicitly rhetorical terms—of the therapeutic setting or situation
might be as follows: Fundamentally, the setting is one in which two persons—one ofwhom (i.e.
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the client) is primarily a speaker, and the other of whom (..e., the therapist) is prinKu-,ly an
m.//.«c._engage in dialogues motivated by the goal of enhancng the spcaker\s capacities to
engage in those argumentative processes which are crucial to his or her psycho-socal wcll-hcin.
According to Aristotle, argumentation
is composed of three f^ictors-the speaker, the subject, and the listener-and it is to
the last ot these that its purpose is related (1991, p. 80).
These same three basic factors may be said to constitute the therapeutic situation, inasmuch as
the speaking client, the listening/judging/responding therapist, and the texts which form their
exchanges are the sine qua mm elements of the process. Put another way, therapy is a rhetorical
or dialogic process between a client who has a job to do (i.e., to create and deliver an argument
sufficient to the demands of the psycho-social crisis in which he or she finds themselves) and a
therapist who is there to help the client's job get done.
Conceived as such, the therapeutic setting bears resemblance to four other settings more
traditionally associated with rhetoric: the courtroom, the political assembly, the theater, and the
classroom. As in legal settings, therapeutic dialogue may often focus on questions of right and
wrong or good and evil, and it may take the form of accusations and rebuttals, the search for
justice or the assignation of responsibility. As in politics, therapy is frequently deliberative in
nature, concerned with determining what future course of action is most productive. As in the
theater, therapy frequently involves the playing out of dramatic encounters and the learning,
execution, and criticism of dramatic roles. As in classroom settings, therapy frequently has a
pedagogical dimension, being concerned not only with the accomplishment of certain learnings,
but also with the question of how best to convey these lessons to a 'student" with unique needs
and capacities.
In therapy—as in each of these other settings—the speaking client is confronted with ihe
task of delivering an argument that the audience will persuasive. When the audience-
therapist conveys that he or she is persuaded, the speaker-client's argument is essentially
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validated; from here, the therapeutic dialogue turr^s in the direction of such questions as, How
now can other significant persons in the client's life come to be exposed to this argument- How
can the client's argument be adjusted so as to find acceptance from an audience of a particular
(and perhaps especially problematic) character or perspective? And so on. When the audience-
therapist demonstrates that he or she is not persuaded, the speaker-client's argument confronts
the need for transformation, and so sparks investigation into the nature of the client's goals and
purposes, the degree to which the client has taken into consideration the needs and values of
others, and the manner and form of the client's delivery.
Take, for example, a client who has had an extramarital affair and has come to therapy in
order to work out why this happened and what she should do about her marriage. At the start of
therapy, the client lacks a set of coherent arguments: She cannot really explain to herself why
she had the affair, she is unclear what she wants to communicate to her husband, and she is at
odds with herself for having both risked her marriage and for having failed to escape it. Her
therapy, then, occurs within a setting committed to the discovery and or creation of these
arguments. By engaging an audience-therapist skilled in helping her work from the rough jumble
of facts, feelings, roles, and other matters to a set of coherent arguments—moral, relational,
emotional, intellectual, and so on—the client may be enabled to steer her way out of crisis and
towards a more positive future. Again, critical to this process is the recognition that many of
these arguments are already being made, but have taken forms—some of them maladaptive, if not
psychopathological—which require discovery, revision, and efficacious restatement.
In closing this section, it may be helpful to comment on the final phrase of the quotation
by Aristotle above, wherein, after listing the three basic factors in argumentation, he gives
primacy to the audience (as opposed to the speaker or subject): "...and it is to the last of these
that its purpose is related (1991, p. 80)." As presented so far, rhetorically-oriented
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psychotherapy would seem to run counter to Aristotle's dictum, for the emphasis in therapy is
clearly on the development of the speaker-client as opposed to the audience-therapist.
In fact, supplying a fuller context to Aristotle's quotation-as well as to rhetorically-
oriented psychotherapy-eliminates the apparent contradiction. What Aristotle means is that
argumentation is aimed always at persuading an audience; persuasion of the other is the raison
d'etre of all argumentation. Skilled and effective arguers recognize this; they realize that, ,f thev
are indeed to be successful in winning the agreement of their audience, they must so devise their
arguments that (without betraying their own goals, needs, or values) the audience will find favor
with them. Unskilled arguers are essentially egocentric: Perhaps because they are unable to
grasp what the audience values, perhaps because they feel an overwhelming urgency about the
importance of their own message, or perhaps because they simply do not have a sound
conceptual model of how effective communication works, they put forward 5e//-oriented
messages that audiences find unconvincing. Of course, what Aristotle did not consider—but
which therapists must confront regularly—are those cases in which (a) the speaker is a child, a
person is in psychological crisis, or a person otherwise mentally, culturally, developmentally, or
educationally unequipped to think strategically about audience, (b) the intended audience is
deeply intimate (e.g., a parent or spouse), and the modes of communication between speaker and
audience largely irrational (or even non-verbal), or (c) the speaker has a developmental needXo
be egocentric for a while, thereby identifying the values, goals, needs, and so forth that will later
enable him or her to interact persuasively—and communally—v/ith various audiences.
Even, however, in those cases (which are probably the majority!) in which the therapist
must initially adapt substantially to the ego needs of the client, the work moves steadily towards
assisting the speaker-client to locate his or her intended audience(s), submitting the dialogue with
those audiences to clarifying rhetorical analyses, and then using the results of these analyses (as
well as other teachings) to develop truly audience-persuasive modes of argumentation. Thus,
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even where rhetorically-oriented therapy is concerned primarily with the client-speaker, it
persistently teaches the arts of audience-awareness. As such, it might be said that concern with
either the speaker or the subject leads eventually to concern with the audience.
Finally, as will be elaborated below, clarity about questions related to speaker-audience
interactions is likely to follow from a more careful treatment of the complexities that inescapably
surround the concept of audience.m psychotherapy. For, first of all, when we speak of audience
in the therapeutic setting, we may be talking about (a) the therapist, (b) other persons m the
client's life, or (c) the client him or herself. Secondly, when we speak of audience, it is
necessary-as Perelman & Olbrects-Tyteca (1969) do-to distinguish between "real" audiences
(i.e., actual persons in all their idiosyncracy and imperfection) and the "ideal or universal
audience" (i.e., the empathic, just, lucid, attentive, discriminating audience). The importance of
this distinction may be illustrated by a brief example. In treating a client who has, all his life,
been tormented by a harsh, accusative, selfish father, the therapist may well need to help the
client detach from this ogre-ish "real" audience, as opposed to encouraging him to orient more
nearly to him. Instead, the therapist may (a) assist the client in constructing and internalizing an
image of the ideal audience, (b) establish him or herself in the role of the ideal audience, and/or
(c) help the client to orient to persons in his life who are more like the ideal audience, which is to
say more capable of cooperative, mutually beneficial communication and relationship. Finally,
in speaking of audience, we must acknowledge the versatility of roles and functions potentially
performed by the therapist, who may variously (a) assume the role of primary audience for the
therapist, thereby supplanting or taking over the role(s) previously held by real persons in the
client's life (to some extent, this process is recognized as transference), (b) play the role of the
ideal audience, (c) serve as a rhetorical coach or teacher, attentive to issues of speaker-audience
relationship, or (d) playact various persons in the client's life. More on the therapist's use of the
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audience role is offered below, in the section titled "Conceptualizing the identity of the
therapist."
Conceptualizing the Identity of the Client
As has been addressed at length in earlier chapters, rhetorically-oriented psychotherapy
perceives the primary identity of the client as that of ^ rhetorical subject, which is to say a
communicative being, actively engaged in mutually persuasive relationships with others. Above,
the phrase speaker-client has been used as a way of emphasizing the client's native identity as an
active, speech-endowed, communicating person, who, by participating (in psychotherapy and
elsewhere) in rhetorical analyses of his or her own person, situation, and relationships with
various important audiences, may further develop rhetorical awareness and efficacy. The
emphasis on the client as speaker clearly sets rhetorically-oriented psychotherapy apart from
many other approaches which tend to place the client, instead, in the role of the audience. In
such approaches—especially, perhaps, Rational-Emotive Therapy (RET)—the client's task is to
receive the wisdom of the therapist, whose role, complementarily, is to aggressively attack and
eradicate the mistaken beliefs of the client, replacing them with more a more 'rational' set of
doctrines. This positioning of the client as the audience of the therapist is tantamount to a
composition professor teaching her students how to write by having them read—and then copy
out—her own essays. How such methods might encourage self-trust, creativity in thought or
emotional life, and any number of other valuable rhetorical characteristics is an open question.
Also, conceptualizing the client as a rhetorician is, by definition, a contextiializing
psychotherapy. That is, it views persons as set in—and living in—relationship to other persons,
institutions, social and cultural frameworks, and so forth. One cannot be a rhetor if one has no
one else to be in dialogue with; and one cannot properly understand the shape and content of a
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rhetor's arguings
.niess one takes stock of who they are arguing with, wl,a. the disagreement is
about, and what has produced it.
Several aspects of the client's identity as a rhetorical subject are of importance to the
therapist.
The first of these concerns the client's rhetorical situation. In other words, what are the
agons or persuasive struggles in which the client is currently involved? To whom is/are the
client's behavior addressed! Is the client addressed to/struggling against aspects of his or her
own body? Is the client addressed to/struggling with a partner, a parent, or some other intimate
person? Is the client addressed to/struggling against certain aspects of his or her cultural world?
Naturally, in order to grasp the client's rhetorical situation, one must learn who the other
players are; as suggested above, each rhetorical situation is constructed of speakers and their
audiences/interlocutors. Even clients who are profoundly egocentric (from a rhetorical
perspective) are nonetheless influenced by those with whom they stand in mutually-persuasive
relationships. Thus, for example, a 16 year old girl insistent that her parents are so stupid that
she refuses to listen to them is nonetheless a person who cannot be adequately understood apart
from these rejected parents; taken together, these arguers—and the positions taken by each-
make possible the elucidation of even the angry child's 'silent argument.' Rlietorical worlds are
inhabited worlds; and to understand the rhetorical situation of a client requires at least some
grasp of the other persons who share the situation with him or her. Indeed, constructing the
rhetorical situation of a client requires coding all aspects of the case (including the various
elements of the client's psychological presentation) in terms of speaker-audience dynamics, in
which each bit of 'text' (i.e., data) is understood as addressed to another with some
argumentative purpose. The end result, conceptually, is rather similar to a dramatic script, in
which each 'voice' is understood as being in direct engagement with some other voice.
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Secondly, conceptualizing the client requires knowing what his or her arguments are.
Subjects who speak and argue naturally have positions, goals, claims, and points of view.
Treating the client as a composite of various arguments (or
-arguings'), each of wh.ch has some
audience and belongs to some situational context, is central to rhetorically-oriented
psychotherapy. Again, it is important to remember that arguments are not always verbalized, and
they may even be poorly grasped by the persons who hold them. Especially in the
psychotherapeutic situation, it is common to find persons arguing with one another in ways
remarkably different from the ways 'professional' arguers (such as lawyers or academics) do.
Therapists, then, must become skilled in locating the arguments embedded in personality styles,
nonverbal gestures, psychopathologic signs, and other psychological pehnomena.
Thirdly, conceptualizing the client requires asking to what degree the client may be
regarded as afunctional rhetorical subject; that is, how adept is he or she at carrying out the
rhetorical tasks with which he or she is confronted? Does he or she have a lucid "read" of the
rhetorical situation(s) in which he or she finds him or herself? Does he or she know the audience
well enough to be persuasive? How, also, does the client 'stack up' vis a vis his or her primary
interlocutors? Is the client dominated by a rhetorical antagonist? Is the client so tethered by
guilt that he or she cannot express his or her purposes clearly and directly? Is the client so
overcome by the situation that he or she has resorted to a psychopathologic means of
communicating his argument? In short, how effective and realistic is the client as a
communicating subject? Such assessments lead the way towards intervention; for. as therapists
discover areas of rhetorical strength and weakness in clients, they may engage in training them
—
both by developing specific strategies for working through concrete rhetorical problems and by
dealing more broadly with rhetorical concepts, skills, and issues germane to the client's life.
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nceBtualizinir Psvchopatlioloajc Symptoms Rlwnr;.,|
In the last part of Chapter 3, substantia! attention is given to the rhetorical dimensions of
psychopathology. More specifically, psychopathology is described as either (a) essentially
argumentative; which is to say, an explicit form of symbolic action, aimed at communicating a
message to self or others, or (b) as effectively creating marked (and often unusual) rhetorical
problems and difficulties; schizophrenia is used as an example of a biologically-based psychiatric
disorder which nonetheless requires rhetorically-oriented intervention in order to assist afflicted
persons in managing relationships with self and others.
Learning to view psychopathology through a rhetorical lens may be one of the most
difficult challenges facing therapists trained in other models. Yet, doing so has many benefits,
among them (a) positioning symptoms within a relational, real-world context, which clients can
identify with concretely, (b) encouraging the view that even symptomology may express
purposive effort and intention (thus affirming the authorial capacities of the client), and (c)
suggesting that other ways of communicating the same messages—and with much better
results—are possible.
Take, for example, the case of an 1 1 year old boy who has, for six months, displayed
classic signs of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD), including obsessions about being
infected by germs, compulsive handwashing, counting rituals, elaborate rituals at bedtime, and
other symptoms. When these symptoms became so pronounced that they were interfering with
his entire family's capacity to function normally, his parents brought him to therapy.
The first step in treatment was to reframe OCD rituals and obsessions as self-persuasive
efforts (i.e., argumentative strategies) to cope with or to control a particular set of anxieties.
When viewed this way, the rituals and obsessions were not only accorded a function (and thus
validated as instrumental communication), but they were set into a dialogic framework (i.e., they
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were described as part of the communication between tiie boy and his body). In short order, as
the boy saw his symptoms not so much as "weird" but as legitimate efforts to help himself deal
with something called 'anxiety,' he experienced a shift from embarrassment to empowerment.
The relief from anxiety-about-being-anxious helped clear his mind, enhance his curiosity, win his
alliance, and increase his receptivity to the next stages of treatment.
Next, anxiety was discussed as part of the body's essential, built-in, message-sending
apparatus. Specifically, anxiety was described as the body's way of sending messages about
dangers in the environment. It was suggested that such messages are inherently uncomfortable,
because they are designed to get one's attention and to move one to action. It was proposed that
bodies which lack such capacities can be very short-lived; in a dangerous world, one needs to be
alert to what can cause harm; so having anxiety is, in balance, a good thing. But, it was
suggested, it is also quite possible to experience an excess of anxiety—which is to say, to be
receiving messages about danger when, in fact, there is no actual threat to one's well-being.
Such excesses, it was suggested, can develop in several ways, but one of the most common ways
is through some process of learning (or association). Just as parents willfully educate their
children to be anxious about such things as crossing the street, an extraordinarily negative
experiences can sometimes serve to 'teach' a person that an otherwise neutral thing is dangerous
and should be feared. When this happens, a person may find themselves in the middle of an
unsettling argument: On one hand, the body can be sending "Danger!" messages, while, at the
same time, 'logic" might be saying, "There's nothing to be afraid of, and you're a wierdo for
feeling like you do!" Every person, it was proposed, has eventually to learn how to manage their
own message-sending capabilities. It's like, it was suggested, learning where the knobs are on a
radio and what to do with them to get a good, clear station.
When the boy was asked what—in the past or present—had made him feel anxious or
overwhelmed, he remembered that he had had difficulty learning to read (and thus handling other
acaduuic work) while in llrsl, second, and Ihird grade. Dtun.,
.h.:. 1, he h.ul worried lhal
'H' .uenlally retarded, or ih;., he would ^^muI t.p uo.kn^^, as a garha,,. M..n. " I le
acknowle<l^.ed lhal he had never openly arlieulaled ihese worries lo anolher person helore: They
iK.d seemed ioo frighlening even io i.lk ,,l>oul. so he had kept (hen, lo hnnseif. l-ven (hou,h he
.u>w reads well and gels ail A^. .nul ir-.. h. uotdd iVequently revert to sueh ihon.hi:. and wo.ncs.
especially should some new topic introduced m :,ehool seem dillu nil, I he boy\s iheio. u .d
silnalion eonid now be seen more clearly; Intrapsychieally. he was locked in a struggle between a
powerlnl. persuasive accusation rVou are stupid!) and his longing lo defend Inmscll againsl it.
Because this struggle was kept secrel. hr had Ikhm. imable to enlist other persons as allies and
sui^porls I aeking a direct, decisive, persuasive counler-voice to the voice ofaccusation. the boy
hiid Imned in-. lead ni ihe direclion oftrying lo inin olT or block on! ihe accusing voice through
various rituals.
The next singe in treatment was U) interrogate and argue with Ihis voice of accusation:
Was it realistic for a boy who had learnetl lead, and who now gets A's aiul ITs, u» worry alu.ni
being a failure? Whal righl did this voice of accusatit>n have lo nu ni, Irighlen, anti istdale hm
from t)lhers? Wasn'l il line lhal e\en wheie iheie are i^bslaeles and pnthlnn-.. (here flre usually
ways olMealing w iili ihem?
I he peiinllimale stage in IrealmeiU was lo supplani ihe rituals and obsessions widi nuu'e
effective—which is lo say, genuinely calming and/or solnlion-focused- self-argumentative
strategies. More speciUcallv, the boy was traineil lo (a) uiili/e rela\ati(»n leehniques aimed al
reilneing the physical and menial symplonts id'anxiely, and (b) write ih)wn the particular
aeailemic t|»ieslions/pu//les lhal were causing hnn anxiety, ami then lo ai range h'l a inioring
sessiiMi w iih either his teacher or his pau nis wilhm ihe same day.
I'inidly. Irealnu nl Imned lowauh. learning the nioie gt-neral skills (d'reeogni/ing \n hrn
iine is in a stale (d mieinal disev)ndorl i>i debate; adi>pling a Inni nuu at :Aa\u c lowanls one\s self
IS"^
(and others) that fear and suffering do not need to be tolerated; learning how to work out and
articulate what messages one's body, mind, and environment are sending; and, learnmg to form
rhetorical alliances with others when assaulted by a threatening experience or idea.
Conceptual izing the Identity of the Therap ist
Above-when discussing the identity of the client-it was proposed that the rhetorically-
oriented psychotherapist needs to be prepared to assume a range of roles, each connected in some
fashion to an essential identity as the audience for the client, which is to say the person
positioned to receive, interpret, and make answer to the argumentative efforts of the client, no
matter how oblique or aberrant their manner of expression. While one or another of these roles
may become primary at each phase of treatment, it is more common for the therapist to cycle
through two or more of them quite rapidly. Whatever the particular role or set of roles being
played, the essential goal is the same: To support the client in being able to make those
arguments that (a) produce relief from specific pathologic symptoms and (b) that lead to lasting
increases in the client's rhetorical proficiency in daily life.
The first role played by the therapist is that of the ideal audience, which is to say the
astute, affirming, just-minded, illuminating, non-disparaging interlocutor who grants that the
client is seeking what all arguers seek: i.e., to achieve meaningful agreement or consubstantiation
with others in a manner that is beneficial to the self The ideal audience, in other words, assumes
(and palpably radiates the assumption) that the client is, for valid reasons, and in more-or-less
valid ways, attempting to negotiate a valid rhetorical problem. In thus validating the client as a
rhetorical being (a) entitled to rhetorical activity and yet (b) circumscribed by inherently
problematic circumstances, the ideal audience grants the client a sense of station and dignity.
The ideal audience, in other words, recognizes and stands up for the rights of the client to be a
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rhetorical subject, while a, the same time framing rhetorical problems and dilemmas as a natural
(even if onerous) face, of the human condition. The ideal audience, then, acts to challenge the
shame or sense of failure that may accompany psychological suffering. Moreover, in reframin.
rhetorical problems as generated by desire-at least at some level-of the arguers to achieve
communion, the therapist as ideal audience promotes an optimistic, solution-oriented philosophy
of life. In other words, the goal of life implied by the ideal audience's outlook is to accomplish
communion with others, just as the goal of psychotherapy is to discover the means by which
specific assays towards communion may be actualized.
Along with these ethical commitments and qualities, the ideal audience is one who
possesses technical skill and competence as a hearer, discriminator, and responder to the
messages of others. To be an ideal audience, a therapist must be able to grasp what is being
communicated by the speaker-client, its purpose and import, the context out of which it emerges,
and its connection to the messages of others.
Such ideal audiences are what we hope to find in courtrooms, classrooms, legislative
assemblies, and other settings where 'truth' is valued. Of course, such ideal audiences are rarely
encountered in their purest form. But certainly, in the good judge or teacher, one finds qualities
of integrity, neutrality, and ability to fairly and lucidly engage in rhetorical exchanges that sets
them apart from the naturally more self-interested interlocutors which inhabit private existence.
And, often, mere shades of difference can enable a professional person—like a therapist—to
assume the role of an ideal audience.
In functional terms, the therapist plays the role of the ideal audience whenever he or she
serves as a sounding board, amplifier, clarifier, supporter, or illuminator of the client's
arguments. Offering no opposition or resistance to the client, the therapist as ideal audience
instead seeks to nurture the expressive capacities of the speaker. In speaking to the ideal
audience, then, the client has the safety and latitude to discover his or her messages, to identity
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the causes or roots of these messages, and to feel empowered about communicating openly,
without disguise or subterfuge, and without fear of recrimination or abuse.
The second role played by the therapist is as proxy for the original, real-life audience for
the client's arguments. As proxy-or stand-in-for the client's actual parent(s), spouse, abuser,
etc., the therapist 'listens' (and responds) in a manner which replicates but also illuminates the
logic and meaning of the actual audience's responses. In this process-<:onceptualized by Freud
as transference-the therapist may interact with the client (a) as //he or she were the original
audience, but also (b) in a way that clarifies, critiques, and eventually transforms (in a positive
direction) the rhetorical relationship with the client. By recapitulating the processes of
disagreement (non-consubstantiation) that engendered the client's psychopathology even while
moving towards a stage where agreement is offered to the client, a therapist may help the client
not only to grasp "what happened" but also to envision an overcoming of the rhetorical impasse.
However, in playing the role of the proxy, the therapist must always retain the qualities of the
ideal audience; that is, even while accepting the client's right to argue as if the primary audience
were in the room; and even while demonstrating how and why the primary audience may have
behaved as he or she has; the therapist must continuously emanate compassion, approval of the
client's right to argue, and illuminating critique of the argumentation taking place.
The third role played by that of the therapist is that of the Judge, which is to say an
audience actively concerned with questions of ethics (i.e., right and wrong) and value (i.e., good
and bad). According to Aristotle (1991), an audience ''must be either a spectator or a judge, and,
if a judge, one of either the past or the future" (80). Judges concerned with the future engage,
Aristotle says, in discourses of deliberation, the primary forms of which are exhortation (i.e.,
endorsement, encouragement, or approval) and deterrence (i.e., disapproval). In their efforts to
help guide future courses of action, judges of the future are concerned primarily with ''advantage
or harm, as to exhort is to urge as being more advantageous, to deter to dissuade as being more
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harmful" (81). Judges concerned with the past engage forensic discourses, tlte primary forr.s
of which prosecul.on and defense, and the goals of which are to accomplish,„.„c. and
abjure injustice.
Engagement with issues ofjustice is probably unavoidable in any kind of psychotherapy
but in rhetorically-oriented psychotherapy it is elemental, if, for no other reason, than that
arguers rarely fail to enjoin the ethical dimension when they argue. In therapy-as in everyday
life-persons engaged in rhetorical exchanges ground their arguments in some theory or
conception of ethical rightness. Naturally, some of these theories are more egocentric, others
more universal; some based on religious teachings, others on the exigencies or desires of the
moment; and so on. But, it is extremely rare to fmd argumentation that is divorced from or
absent of ethical claims. Thus, in choosing to deal with argumentation, therapists are
unavoidably confronted with the ethical dimension. But the need to deal with issues ofjustice—
and, moreover, to accept in this process the role of the judge—goes deeper yet when it comes to
therapy. First of all, persons who suffer from psychopathologic symptoms are quite frequently
persons who have (at least from the perspective of the client) suffered a severe injustice. Take,
for example, a young woman whose anorexia has developed as a way of protesting her mother's
detachment and preoccupation with her career; although the mother could not be convicted in a
court of law of neglect or any other crime, it is not unreasonable to agree with the client that, to
some extent, her mother has injured her. In fact, failing to grasp the client's ethical argument
would greatly obstruct the progress of therapy, for until the client feels that the injustice against
her has been declared and condemned, and until the client's own strategies of protest have been
vindicated, it is doubtful that she could retract the psychopathologic version of her complaint.
But secondly, exactly because arguers engage in processes which aim to affect others (and so
may either do palpable good or harm), therapists must be able and willing to examine the ethical
aspects and implications of clients' arguments. Take, for e.xample, a client with anger problems.
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When this client gets angry, he claims that it
.justified: people have treated him disrespectfully,
blocked him from reaching a goal, or interfered with his chosen way of living. By getting
angiy-which may involve shouting and swearing, threatening to harm others, and/or pushing
and hitting-he means to convey the message, "Hey, I'm not taking it anymore! You screw with
me, you get hurt!" There is no question here that the client's preferred way of communicating
when feeling "screwed with" can do substantial harm to others, thus compelling the therapist to
intervene as a judge.
But therapists also effectively enter into the role of the judge whenever they engage in
deliberative or forensic discussion of another person's argumentation, even when it is not as
physically dangerous as that of the angry client just discussed. For, as Aristotle indicates, when
the question concerns ''advantage or harmr we may be dealing with emotions, relationships,
finances, schooling, and countless other matters. Therefore, when, in the process of working
with clients on learning to argue more effectively and productively, therapists need to frequently
ask such questions as. If you were to say that to your teacher, what harm might come of it? If
your goal is to sensitize your mother to how you are feeling, how would giving her the silent
treatment advance your cause? And whenever such questions are asked, judgment is both
implied and invited; judgement functions as the discourse—or discursive act—without which
strategic and ethical decision-making cannot occur.
The fourth important role available to the therapist is as a rhetorical coach or teacher.
While it may seem imprecise to label a speaking, discoursing teacher as an audience, in fact, the
label is quite suited. For, as rhetorical teacher or coach, the therapist is concerned continuously
with the client's evolution as a speaker and rhetorical analyst. Thus, even if moved to instruct or
educate, the therapist remains in the position of witness to and responder to the speaking, acting
client, tailoring the instruction given in order to precisely advance the client's rhetorical growth.
In fulfilling this role, the therapist resembles closely what most students would hope to find in a
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writing tutor: a person, that is, who (among other things) can: educate them m the rules of certain
important discourses, encourage them to discover their own beliefs and "theses,' allow them to
experiment freely with self-expression, help them conceptualize their audience, and work with
them (phrase by phrase, premise by premise) in fashioning those arguments which will move and
persuade their audience. In this role, the therapist may enter into more abstract and didactic
spaces, asking clients to read about communication strategies, to practice certain strategies and
then report on them, and so on. Typically, the coach/teacher role becomes dominant m moments
where affective pressures have lessened and psychopathologic symptoms have dissipated, and the
client finds him or herself more able to access intellectual and emotional resources. The
teacher/coach role is thus in evidence more and more as therapy progresses.
Why Psychotherapy Works
From a rhetorical perspective, psychotherapy works when and if the client is enabled to
do the arguing that meets the challenges of their rhetorical situation, whatever that might be.
Complementarily, psychotherapy that does not (a) recognize that the client is in a situation that
requires some form of symbolic action in order for his or her well-being to improve, and (b)
create the conditions for that symbolic action to occur, is likely to be ineffective.
Take, for example, the 45-year old male intellectual who has been undergoing
psychoanalytic psychotherapy twice a week for seven years, and yet who remains generally
anxious, uncertain about his capacities to flourish in relationships with women, and frightened of
worsening his already poor relations with his colleagues. His psychoanalyst has focused
throughout these seven years on the client's childhood, mostly by probing him with questions
and encouraging him to engage in free-association. This client has learned that his repressed
mother—who doted on her son but who considered her husband a "dolt"—had "blocked him as a
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child from crossing over to his father." His mother's fundamental disparagement of her
husband's manhood-combined with her possess.veness towards her son-obstructed the cHent
as a boy from forming a healthy, vital male identity; and he is presumably suffering the ill effects
still.
This approach to therapy-which emphasizes knowledge and not communicative action,
rhetorical problems but not rhetorical solutions-unfortunately is not of much use to a rhetorical
being. In fact, if the therapist inadvertently caused the cliem to feel immobilized by an unhappy,
emasculating past, she might well have done him more harm than good. In contrast, if she had
helped him to take rhetorical action and feel successful in any one of the domains he experiences
as problematic, the results of the therapy would have likely been much more positive. Seven
unproductive years would not have elapsed, and the client may well have a far greater sense of
self-efficacy.
Happily, most psychotherapies preferred by therapists today are solution-focused.
Additionally, many of them -including the narrative, feminist, and constructivist schools (Rodis
& Strehom, 1997)—focus on harnessing the vital capabilities of the client. However, as has
been addressed elsewhere in this dissertation, there is extraordinarily little discussion (published
or otherwise) of argumentation.
This neglect is curious given that each of the major therapeutic strategies utilized by
these aforementioned schools may be construed as forms of argumentation. Specifically:
Narrative strategies work inasmuch as they encourage clients to construct Tife-stories' which
implicitly (a) depict the client's rhetorical situation, and (b) place the client in the role of the
rhetor-author, empowered to carry out chief rhetorical tasks which improve his or her situation.
Feminist strategies work inasmuch as they assist oppressed minorities (especially women) to
articulate, critique, and make empov/ered retort to the disparaging arguments (embedded both in
the general culture and in the psyches of those who inhabit it) which deplete their well-being.
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And constructivist therapy works inasmuch as encouraging clients to discover how they
"participate in cocreating the dynamic personal realities to which they individually respond"
(Guidano, 1995, p. 93) results in an activation of their actual rhetorical potentialities and
responsibilities.
However, a psychotherapist committed to utilizmg an explicitly rhetorical approach to
psychotherapy must be able to think and work in terms which are explicitly argumentative. More
specifically, the psychotherapist needs to be able to frame communication as argumentation, as
well as to understand how the client's capacities for real-life argumentation may be strategically
enhanced. In short, a psychotherapist must have a grasp of the roles played by argumentation in
everyday life (and abnormal processes) and also know how to go about the business of making
arguments work, both for their senders and their receivers. It is when argumentation is grasped
not as something peripheral to human behavior but as (a) one of the chief /ogo/ of human
behavior, and (b) one of the chief means by which persons participate in intellectual, relational,
emotional, and discursive processes that psychotherapy rests on a firm rhetorical basis.
What is Argumentation?
In order for clinicians to be able to assist clients in developing their capacities as arguers,
some formal understanding of argumentation is essential. Ideally, this understanding might
develop through a systematic and extended course of study; in fact, integrating courses on
argumentation into the curriculum of therapist training programs would be an excellent
mechanism. The justification for this admittedly extravagant wish is that argumentation is an
immense and rich field, drawing upon findings in communication and composition studies,
linguistics, pragmatics, and psychology, as well as rhetoric. Even efforts to condense the
practical essentials of the field—such as Joan Mulholland's (1994) very useful Handbook of
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Persuasive Tacics: A Pracical Lan^ua.e Gu,de~,s a tome of more ,han 400 pages, offering
sun,maries of more than 300 specific argumenia.ive devices. And even a survey of ,l,e chief
theories and models of argumentation advanced in the last 30 years would easily occupy a
'
serious student for a seminar. More valuable yet would be to involve students in the observation
and study of argumentation as it occurs naturally in families, in dyads, in classrooms and schools,
and, of course, in the setting of psychotherapy.
For the purposes of this discussion, however, it will have to do to quickly review one
working model of argumentation. While several such models might be identified, a particularly
good one for our purposes is pragma-dialectics, an argumentation theory developed by Frans van
Eemeren and Rob Gootendorst of the Speech Communication Department of the University of
Amsterdam (1996).
According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1996), argumentation is a phenomenon of
communication "characterized by the use of language for resolving a difference of opinion. The
quality and possible flaws of argumentation are to be measured against criteria that are
appropriate for the purpose of such discourse" (p. 275). It will be noted that this definition
(following Perelman & Obstrechts-Tyteca (1969)) is appropriately weighted by the notion that
the purpose of argumentation is to resolve differences of opinion—not to create such
differences. Accordingly, judging the functionality and value of any process of argumentation is
strictly guided by the question. How successful is it in achieving this purpose—or of realizing
what Burke (1966, 1989) calls 'consubstantiation'?
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst identify four cardinal features in all 'true' (which is to
say resolution-oriented) argumentation processes. Naturally, the absence, rejection, or distortion
of any one of these features can help to explain how and why an argumentative process has gone
amiss, and so may provide not only insight into—but also a way of operationalizing solutions
to—the problems that beset clients.
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1. The first of these features is external.anon. Simply, for an argument to be externalized
is for it to be expressed, or used as part of a symbol.c action towards an other. Attitudes which a
person holds-but which lie 'dormant' in the mind-do not, therefore, qualify as arguments.
Attitudes-and any number of other psychological phenomena-become parts of argumentation
only when they are actively addressed to^^rds an audience (even if the audience is oneself). By
externalizing (or addressing) a feeling, idea, proposition, or wish, a speaker creates the basic
conditions for discourse or dialogue, or for an audience-speaker interaction. Thus,
argumentation begins—and only continues so long as-persons address themselves to an
audience.
When it comes to working with clients in psychotherapy, extemalization is an essential
issue. Often, for example, therapists work with clients who have (a) failed to express their
'arguings' openly to the intended audience, (b) forgotten or are unable to discern to whom their
arguings are addressed, or (c) gotten their addressees confused. In the first sort of case-
common amongst timid, anxious, or 'repressed' clients—the failure to have externalized an
argument places the client in a state of perpetual tension and irresolution; until they have voiced
their arguments, no transformative dialogue can occur. In the second sort of case—common
amongst persons with chronic problems or with unresolved childhood issues—clients may carry
about intensely felt arguings that appear to them—and often to others—as disconnected from any
identifiable audience; like a master postal worker, reconstructing the correct address for an old,
smeared piece of psychic 'mail' puts a therapist in position to begin helping such clients. In the
third sort of case—common in persons with anger issues and personality disorders—clients seem
to use a shot-gun approach to argumentation; that is, rather than engaging in dialogue with those
specific persons who are, in some respect, appropriate, they may engage with anybody at all.
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In all of these cases, argumentation is flawed at the very point of linkage betxveen the
speaker and the audience. Until this link is repaired (a process which often requires the therap.st
to forge a primary link between the client and him or herself), the client cannot hope to get h,s or
her argumentation working in the direction of resolution.
2. The second cardinal feature of argumentation identified by van Eemeren and
Grootendorst (1996) is socialization. Socialization refers to the fact that argumentation is not a
solitary process but rather an inherently social and affiliative one, and so "should be put in the
social context of a process ofjoint problem-solving" (p. 277).
Argumentation presupposes two distinguishable participant roles, that of a "protagonist"
of a standpoint and that ofa—real or projected— 'antagonist." It reflects the
collaborative way in which the protagonist in the fundamentally dialogical interaction
responds to the—real or projected—questions, doubts, objections, and counterclaims of
the antagonist, (p. 277)
Socialization can only be achieved, then, when participants in an argument actively seek
agreement, and thus work collaboratively with one another to do so. So long as the
argumentation is improperly socialized—which is to say, guided by antisocial motives such as
the desire to crush or deceive the opposition, or by unsocial motives such as avoidance, fear, or
exasperation— it cannot hope to fulfill its essential purpose of bringing about unity and
resolution. But perhaps Perelman & Olbrechst-Tyteca (1969) expressed the principal of
socialization best:
To engage in argument, a person must attach some importance to gaining the adherence
of his interlocutor, to securing his assent, his mental cooperation ... He acknowledges
that he must use persuasion, think of arguments capable of acting on his interlocutor,
show some concern for him, and to be interested in his state of mind." (p. 16)
In psychotherapy, socialization problems are paramount: sometimes because the client
has not adopted a set of deliberately prosocial commitments, and sometimes because the client is
engaged with an unsocialized or antisocial audience. Indeed, the one typically creates the other;
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that is, the surest way to create an antisocial audience is to treat them antisocially. In this
category, then, we may place clients who have been raised by punitive or invalidating parents,
clients who have poor rhetorical partners for spouses, clients who have antisocial feelings and
attitudes, and who suffer from numerous other rhetorical difficulties. Often, rhetorically,
psychotherapy must assume the task of progressively socian.^ug clients, so that they may be able
to reconstruct their own argumentative processes in a fashion consistent with the goal of
achieving agreement.
oriented
3. Third \s functionalization—a. term which is synonymous with 'proficiency.' Naturally, if
the purpose of argumentation is to secure agreement, the best measure of its ftinctionality is how
IS
well it copes with—and overcomes—disagreements. Functionalization in argumentation
achieved when the arguer is able to think meaningfully about each strand or step in the
communicative process. Functional arguers (a) realize each argument is defined by an initial
"disagreement space", (b) understand that argumentation occurs through a series of
communicative performances or actions, each of which may be strategically shaped or
engineered, (c) pay close attention to the generic 'rules' which result in positive outcomes, and
(d) pay close attention to the specific attributes, demands, and claims of the audience, making
adjustments in their own communications as appropriate.
Deficits in the specific rhetorical skills of clients are often identified. As suggested
earlier, the enhancement of these skills may take place in any number of ways, including offering
the client didactic lessons in argumentation. However, more commonly—and in keeping with
the goal of keeping therapy affectively meaningful to the client—training aimed at increasing the
rhetorical proficiency of the arguer is delivered through the analysis and construction of specific
arguments (e.g., scripts) which the client might put to direct use.
4. Fourth is dialectification, which refers to the fact that argumentation is not one-sided, but
involves two or more arguers, each simultaneously advancing their own agendae. The co-
ocurrence and concatenation of two or more streams of communication, each attuned, to some
degree, to the other(s), makes argumentation-structurally speakmg-neither monoiogical (one-
voiced) nor merely dialogical (two-voiced) but dialectical (two voices set on transforming one
another). Arguers unable or unwilling to acknowledge that both they and their audience are
engaged in a change process when they argue, are unHkely to find agreement. In other words,
"Argumentation is appropriate for resolving a difference of opinion only if it is capable of
accommodating the relevant reactions of a critical antagonist" (278).
Dialectification has relevance to psychotherapy most often in helping clients deal with
the reality that their audiences are—in a certain fundamental fashion—like themselves: rhetorical
beings striving for agreement on terms beneficial to them. As client's come to see the 'other' as
a rhetorical being, they can better grasp that the nature of the dynamics between themselves and
this other derive from the fact that they are both fundamentally doing the same thing. Failure to
grasp the essential symmetry interferes not only with empathy, but more importantly, with the
possibility that the client can develop into a more deliberate and proficient rhetorician.
In terms of argumentation as a process, van Eemeren and Grootendorst propose that
argumentation moves through four stages:
1
.
The confrontation stage, in which a difference or conflict presents itself.
2. The opening stage, in which the parties advance their own wishes, demands, and
commitments.
3. The argumentation stage, in which each party "adduces arguments in order to overcome the
other party's doubts about the standpoint, and the other party reacts to those
arguments" (p. 282).
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4. The concluding stage, in which "the parties draw conclusions about the result of the attempt
to resolve a difference of opinion" (p. 282). If the parties do not agree on the outcome of
their discussion, they must essentially start over agam at stage 1, albeit under the obligation
to offer either a new description of the difference or a new set of wishes, demands,
and commitments.
As applied to psychotherapy, this 4-stage theory may initially appear lacking in
sophistication; and, certainly, it does not offer a particularly colorful description of therapy. But
its simplicity may disguise its value. For, if therapists think about configuring therapy
generally—and also many of the 'movements' in therapy specifically—according to this rough
model, it sets the stage for working in ways that encourage therapeutic argumentation. For, once
clients have been placed into argumentative contexts-contexts, that is, in which their symptoms,
complaints, wishes, desires, and so forth can be actively addressed to some other with the aim of
achieving agreement—therapeutic processes are set into motion. For, in therapy as in life, it is
when painful matters can be actively and fairly argued that they may be transformed.
Part 2: The Psychotherapeutic Process
Given the conceptual framework for rhetorically-oriented psychotherapy just described,
it is possible now to discuss the psychotherapeutic process itself—which is to say, the unfolding
of the dynamic rhetorical activity of the client, oriented to the solution of a
psychological/rhetorical problem and guided by the therapist. From a rhetorical perspective, this
process may be succinctly described as therapeutic argumentation. Using a wide lens, all
argumentation is therapeutic to the extent that it meets the basic conditions described by van
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Eemeren and Grootendorst (1996): for when rhetorical interactions are motivated by a clear
desire-and a true capacity-to achieve consubstantiation with self or others, they are
fundamentally solution-oriented, and thus healing. More narrowly, therapeutic argumentation
occurs within the context of psychotherapy when (a) a client-through a series of arguings-
endeavors to confront and resolve a psychologically-pressurized rhetorical dilemma, and (b) a
therapist-through effectively playing the audience roles described above-encourages, shapes,
and helps to consummate the rhetorical activity of the client.
Regardless, however, of whether the lens one uses is wide or narrow, the process of
therapeutic argumentation may be set in contrast to psychopathogenic argumentation, which is a
process of rhetorical engagement which—for one reason or another—frustrates the
accomplishment of consubstantiation, and so gives rise to psychological distress. In its mildest
forms, psychopathogenic argumentation can be observed in everyday interactions: the employee
who, refused a day off to take care of important personal business, weeps at her desk, or the child
who—scolded by a teacher for being noisy—reacts by writing a nasty word on his desk. In its
more severe forms, persons who have a pressing psychological need for agreement on some
aspect(s) of living fail to find it. Take, for example, a child whose only parent is drug-addicted,
and so unavailable to meet the child's need for a secure attachment. No matter what the child
does to induce his parent to engage with him, to recognize his existence, the parent is unable to
come through. The child's arguments unanswered, he not only fails in his pursuit of anxiety
relief, but he grows increasingly aggressive towards and assaultive of other children at school.
Regardless of severity, each of these cases involves a process of agreement-seeking that— in
failing or having failed
—
produces obvious signs of disturbance.
Thus, psychotherapy as a process has its origins in failed arguments. At its outset,
psychotherapy typically finds the client engaged in some process of argumentation that has gone
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awo-. The essence, ,he„, of .he therapeutic process-and the
..easure of its success-lies in
assisting the client to somehow turning these rhetorical defeats into successes.
m practical temts, there are three major focal points^r frameworks-for therapeutic
argumentation in psychotherapy. Put another way, cases seen in therapy tend to sort into one of
three basic baskets.
The first involves clients manifestly engaged in a process of acute psychopathologic
argumentation, and thus in need above all of symptom relief. In this framework, the first task for
the therapist and the client is to understand the clients' psychopathology as part of an organized
(even if 'irrational") effort at persuasive communication. Thus, for example, an OCD patient's
compulsions may be defined as efforts to reassure (persuade) self that perceived threats to one's
well-being are under control; or they may alternatively be reframed as efforts to persuade
(propitiate) external forces not to hurt him or her. As in every other rhetorical situation, it is
critical that the client-therapist team understand (a) to whom the argument is addressed (i.e.,
primary audience), (b) what message it is sending, (c) what the arguer's purpose is, and (d) how
the therapist might aide the client in not only delivering his or her argument, but in achieving
affective and psycho-symbolic agreement with some important audience.
The second basket contains cases which emerge out of specific aggravated rhetorical
situations in the present. This framework, in other words, deals with (a) the distress clients are
experiencing because of their difficulty meeting the demands of a particular rhetorical situation,
and (b) discovering how shifts in clients' rhetorical outlook and strategy may produce increases
in power and efficacy, decreases in distress, and improvements in social relationship and
functioning. Such cases may include persons undergoing divorce, persons who must deal with a
serious physical illness, persons who must deal with a new and stressful school or work
environment, and so forth. What is salient here is that—even while larger developmental or
personality issues may be involved—the distress the client feels at the outset of therapy is
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reduced or extinguished by formulating an effective rhetorical response to the situation
experienced as problematic. Thus, for example, the divorcing client fmds relief from distress
through formulating a set of arguments effective in dealing with (a) his or her spouse as a former
relational partner, (b) his or her spouse as a current antagonist in court, (c) his or her
disappointed parents, and so forth. And, the overxveight third-grade boy teased mercilessly by
his peers may be enjoined in a process of treatment whereby (a) broad arguments regarding the
right of persons to be individually different are considered, (b) concrete ways of dealing with the
taunts and accusations of peers are formulated, practiced, and evaluated, (c) the boy's own goals
regarding his physical person are explored, (d) arguments are developed which can help the boy
control his relationship to food, and so forth. In each of these cases, the power of the rhetorical
situation to cause distress is directly acknowledged, and the therapy is oriented towards creating
truly sufficient rhetorical responses.
The third basket is for developmental problems, or disturbances in a client's efforts to
form or mature as a rhetorical being. Such cases tend to include problems of a chronic nature
(e.g., schizophrenia, attachment disorders, nonverbal learning disabilities), they tend to be
involve other members in the client's family of origin (usually parents), and they usually feature
a wide array of symptoms. These problems may have either a clear physiological or genetic
origin, or they may be categorically environmentally-based (e.g.. sustained childhood sexual
abuse). From a certain perspective, however, all of these cases—like those in the second
basket—have a situational origin, regardless of whether the 'situation' is the body or the home,
lesions on the left cerebral cortex or the loss of a nourishing parent at age three. These
situations, however, are neither short-lived nor do they require merely the acquisition of specific
new rhetorical skills; these situations, rather, have a protracted temporal basis, they often
produce deep affective and cognitive disturbances, and they often create fundamental rhetorical
confusions or misapprehensions. Psychotherapeutic argumentation in such cases thus involves
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the making of arguments which (a) deal with primal relational needs and desires, (b) focus on
structuring (if the client is a child) or restructuring (if the client is an adolescent or adult) primary
rhetorical understandings and behaviors, and (c) encourage the patient and incremental sculpting
of the client's often uniquely limited rhetorical capacities.
The Diagnostic Process
As has been implied throughout, a rhetorical framework for individual psychology—and
for the practice of psychotherapy—is not necessarily antagonistic to the classification of mental
illnesses embodied in the DSM-IV (1994). For the most part, the DSM-IV taxonomy—and the
many discrete niches it contains—is a useful means of identifying the qualities of any given
individual's distress, as well as for conceptualizing some of the end goals of the therapeutic
process.
However, in emphasizing psychopathic symptoms as aspects of argumentation, a
rhetorical approach to diagnosis requires that a therapist go beyond merely naming the client's
symptomology in order to situate it within a rhetorical framework. Following Bakhtin (1981), a
rhetorical approach to diagnosis may be described as "novelistic," or as an attempt to view
symptoms as phrases or emergences of some sort of dialogic process. Even where symptoms
have a clear physiologic basis, they nonetheless call the persons suffering them into a kind of
conversation. For the schizophrenic, these conversations are ostensibly vocal: Voices are heard,
the voices issue commands and make comments, and the subject struggles against them for self-
possession and self-determination. Yet, even where the body does not generate voices per se, its
suffering creates pressures, seems to possess it own will, and engages the subject in a process
quite fairly considered argumentative. Many clients suffering from physical symptoms of
anxiety (e.g., panic attacks, sweating, stomach aches, etc.), depression (e.g., fatigue, loss of
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appetite, sleeplessness), and bipolar disease (e.g., storms of energy, restlessness, and irritability),
are quite articulate about the extent to which they are compelled to work hard to resist the
persuasions of their bodies and to exercise their own wills over it.
In rhetorically-oriented psychotherapy, then, the diagnostic process requires at a
minimum that the following three tasks be performed.
1
.
The client is cast as a rhetor engaged in an argumentative process with other voices,
be they the voices of other persons, voices in or from the body, voices in the mind,
etc. In essence, the accomplishment of this task may be compared to creating a ^'cast
of characters" such as is found at the beginning of a play.
2. The arguments or messages of each identified voice are identified and fleshed out.
3. The arguments or messages of the client are identified and fleshed out.
When all three tasks have been accomplished, the therapist has gained not only a name or label
for the client's condition (e.g., Narcissistic Personality Disorder or Oppositional-Defiant
Disorder), but also a picture of how this condition is produced by and functions in order to
perpetuate or surmount a given rhetorical situation. Again, if a comparison is made to theater, at
the conclusion of these three tasks, the therapist has attained enough knowledge of character,
setting, and conflict for a working script. It may be useful at this juncture to remember the early
work of Freud, who likewise viewed his neurotic clients in dramatic and rhetorical terms. The
rhetorically-oriented therapist, however, should not feel constrained to view clients in archetypal
terms—as an Electra or an Oedipus—but rather should recognize that each drama—and the
impact of each drama on a rhetorical subject—may well be unique. Again, what is gained by this
dramatization of the client's symptomology is that it lays open the argumentative structures
contained in it and surrounding it. As these arguments are articulated as such, the client may be
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empowered to evolve those arguments which can turn the drama in the direction of some form of
consubstantiation, if not with the other players, than at least with him or herself.
A set of guiding questions for the diagnostic stage is as follows:
a. Who is the arguer in dialogue with? Or, who is the arguer 's chiefaudience, interlocutors?
b. What has been already ^said' to the arguer? (Or, what counter-argument(s) has already
been articulated?)
c. What have been the effects on the arguer of the counter-argument(s)? How do these affects
shape or alter the arguer 's rhetorical stance, resources, clarity, and/or sense ofefficacy?
d To what extent is the addressed audience the cause of failure to achieve consubstantiation?
Is the audience an ideal audience?
e. To what extent is the client the cause offailure to achieve consubstantiation? Is the client an
ideal audience?
f How does the arguer represent his or her rhetorical situation?
g. What is the arguer attempting to achieve? (or, what is the arguer 's purpose?) who is the
arguer trying to persuade?
k Is the arguer aware/conscious ofhis purpose? (e.g., is the arguer aware that he or she seeks
cooperation or consubstantiation?)
i. Does the arguer 's conscious/expressed purpose ^make sense '?
j. Is the arguer open to a redefinition of his or her purpose? What might be done to increase an
arguer ^s openness to a redefinition of his or her purpose?
k. To what extent is the arguer *s position or strategy ofargumentation expressed
'pathologically that is, through an intensification ofemotion or intellectualism; self-
destructive, bizarre, or dangerous behaviors; or some otherform ofpsychopathology?"
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/. To what extent does the arguer seek to move the audience 's emotions? And, to what extent is
the moving ofemotions a rhetorically appropriate goal?
m. In terms of its orientation vis a vis social rules, is the arguer 's strategy dramatistic or
dramaturgic?
n. How does the arguer 's position contribute (negatively or positively) to his or her social
status/power?
o. To what extent is the arguer overly constrained by a concern with social rules (propriety)?
p. To what extent is the arguer 's communication weakened by its failure to work within social
rules?
Setting the Stage for Therapeutic Argumentation
As suggested in the discussion above of the roles of the therapist, it is essential for a
successful therapeutic process that the therapist to early on (and then continually) establish him
or herself as an ideal audience, thereby securing the speaker-client's trust in (a) the person of the
therapist him or herself, (b) the therapeutic process, and (c) the possibility that—even in real-
life—the resolution of rhetorical problems may be accomplished.
As part of this process, the therapist must determine the best way—once a rhetorical or
dramatized model of the client's current situation has been obtained—to share this information
with the client.
For some clients, the best way to do this sharing is to be explicit: i.e., to lay the 'script'
right out in the open. Such a strategy—which effectively makes an external, intellectualized
'object^ of the rhetorical problem—leaves the therapist outside the drama, in the neutral position
of witness and consultant, able, then, to help the client identify what is causing suffering and how
to argue his or her way to a solution. The externalization of the problem may also bring some
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degree of immediate relief to the client, for now the suffering has been demystified, normalized,
and validated as an understandable response to an inherently difficult problem. Once the script
has been laid out, the therapist and client can begin to engage in the processes of more ftilly
fleshing out the client's argument, shaping it so that it meets the demands of the primary
audience, and so forth.
For other clients, such an explicit strategy may not be feasible—perhaps because the
client lacks the intellectual capacity or psychological maturity to look at his or her own situation
via a rhetorical model, perhaps because the client is too emotionally aroused, perhaps because
the client's cognitive disturbance is too profound, or perhaps because the client is simply unable
to believe or buy in to this interpretation. In such cases, the therapist must lead the client into
therapeutic argumentation—as well as, ultimately, rhetorical self-awareness—more subtlely,
concretely, and experientially. Sometimes, the therapist may do this simply by involving the
client in a bit-by-bit engagement-and-then-analysis of some part of the rhetorical situation. Take,
for example, the case of a depressed 13 year old boy, referred to therapy because he has been
acting out in school and at home. The boy's rage at what he perceives as his overpowering by
ruthless adults is acute. In the therapy session, he is noticeably agitated and highly irritable. A
therapist aiming to engage the boy in an analysis of his situation is likely to have a hard time of
it. If, however, the therapist invites the boy to engage in the argumentation most fresh in his
mind—i.e., his confrontation earlier in the day with the assistant principal—a more constructive
process can ensue. The boy may be asked directly: What's making you mad? The boy may then
launch into his argument: "F@#$ing Mr. Farelly suspended me for nothing! I was just going to
the bathroom and this kid slams into me and calls me queer, and I do what anybody would—
I
shove him back—and I get suspended, not the other kid!" The therapist need only stay with the
flow of argumentation (please see the next section belovy/) in order, eventually, to be able to help
the boy grasp—in concrete if not more universal terms—his particular predicament.
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In this example, the therapist remains in the position of the ideal audience. The therapist
may, however, choose instead to play the audience's proxy, leading the client to the point of
greater self-awareness (or awareness of his or her diagnosis) through entering the role of the
client's disputant. In the case of the depressed boy, the therapist, then, might articulate Mr.
Farelly's position (without, of course, assuming his affect or antagonistic stance). The therapist
might, for instance, say, "Now, if I was Mr. Farelly, I know that my number one job would be to
make sure that nobody in my school got hurt. Also, I'd be committed to seeing that everybody
that came into my office got treated justly. Now, I know that people can't be safe—and get
justice—if they can't take responsibility for their own actions. OK, so let's assume I've spoken
to this other kid—the one who pushed you—and I've gotten his story. Now, I'm going to ask
you about your story, and I want you to tell it to me in a way that explains—as best you can-
why you acted the way that you did." Through this redramatization, the therapist may not only
bring forth the boy's rage at and sensitivity to being hurt by others, but also the sadness and
sense of hopelessness that underlies it. When the therapist—still in the role of an idealized Mr.
Farelly—acknowledges the boy's depression in a way that is both sympathetic (and thus
validating) and yet firm in defending every person's right not be abused, the client begins to get a
concrete sense of his predicament: He is a (self-perceived) victim who is at risk of victimizing
others. Now, as the therapist treats the boy's rage as a way of his arguing against his own
powerlessness and/or justice, the process of therapeutic argumentation can begin.
Regardless of how it is done, the therapeutic process demands that client's have—early
on in the process—a rhetoricized picture of their current situation, as well as a sense that they are
going to gain rhetorical power as the therapeutic process moves forward.
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Engaging in Therapeutic Argument^t ion
ite
In treating the process of therapeutic argumentation, it should be remembered that the
chief goal of the process is to assist and support the rhetor-client in arguing his or her way to
meaningful consubstantiation. Such consubstantiation must, it should be warned, have a defini
quality of integrity to it; that is, the consubstantiation must be earned in the same way that all
good rhetors earn it—by having rightly read the rhetorical situation, stated a just case, met the
needs of the audience, and otherwise lived up to the four standards of the pragma-dialectical
model of van Eemeren and Grootndorst (1996). Much damage is done by therapists who offer
clients a false or immature sense of consubstantiation or argumentative success; take, for
example, the therapist who throws full support behind a client's complaints of marital
dissatisfaction without obliging the client to thoroughly consider and engage with the position of
the audience-spouse. The result of such consubstantiation between client and therapist may be
the sacrifice of consubstantiation with the spouse, which is to say a divorce. Typically,
therapeutic argumentation traverses difficult, highly vexed territory, and it succeeds not by
turning its back on real-life difficulties but by facing into them, giving rise to arguments which
squarely meet the exigencies of the situation. In difficult psychosocial circumstances—as in
difficult material circumstances (e.g., finding a way to get mineral resources out of the ground
without polluting the environment)—the solution often lies in the discovery of an effective
technology. In therapy, the technology needed is a technology of argumentation: i.e., an
argument-making process that leads clients—challenge by challenge, point by point—to desired
goals.
As has been suggested already, the process of therapeutic argumentation begins with
honoring, illuminating, and bringing to fullness the argument the client is already engaged in
making. Hearing out and honing the client's argument does not always imply agreement with it;
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indeed, not uncommonly, what is agreed with early on in the therapeutic process is simply the
client's right to argue, to be in a problematic rhetorical situation, to disagree, and to seek
agreement. In fact, client'sy?r5/ expressed arguments are often flawed from a rhetorical
perspective. Not only are these arguments often rhetorically unsophisticated (i.e., unadjusted to
audience and thus unpersuasive) but may also be impostor arguments, which is to say arguments
which do not represent the client's actual goals or desires. Take, for example, the 8 year old
child with ADHD who tells the therapist that she is in therapy "because I'm badr A therapist
who agrees with this statement is not, in fact, agreeing with the child, but with a
(counter)perspective on herself which she has somewhere absorbed or constructed. Rather, the
therapist will certainly want to challenge an argument that invalidates the child as a rhetorical
subject, entitled to pursue agreement in life on terms as much as possible amenable to her unique
nature. Nonetheless, the therapist needs to encourage the full expression of this impostor
argument, roots, truck, and branches. For, in 'outing' this argument—and in understanding how
it came to be embedded in the child's mind—the therapist can later strategically enter in and
dispute, reframe, or simply reject the particular premises on which this argument rests. For
beneath any impostor argument there is certain to dwell an argumentative process that has its
origins in the primary will of the client towards creating a life as much as possible in his or her
own image.
Indeed, what more often keeps a therapist from offering full agreement to a client's first
expressed argument is that it is too egocentric and too inconsiderate of other positions and
possibilities. It should not, however, be generally assumed that clients are egocentric as a fault
of their own. Rhetorical acumen, in fact, while certainly coming more naturally to some than to
others, is almost always learned; and it is learned best when acquired early through interaction
with sensitive, validating parents. Clients whose arguments are manifestly egocentric are often
the products of poor or obstructed developmental experiences, involving rhetorical partners who
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are themselves egocentric. Take, for example, the 45 year old schizoid client, who comes to
therapy after losing yet another job as an engineer because of his difficulty collaborating with his
colleagues. When asked how he imagines the ideal work setting, he states that "Each person
should be allowed to do his work without being bothered by others. As long as each person does
good work, why should it matter who he talks to?" It is no surprise that later, exploration of the
client's childhood reveals that he felt invisible and isolated as a child, his family preoccupied
with the mother's severe mental illness and frequent hospitalizations. Key to this client's
treatment was helping him to see how his withdrawal from others was, essentially, an
interactional strategy, a way of being (and being safe) in relation to others. When, in other
words, his behavior was reframed as part of a dialogue with others, he could begin to experiment
with ways of enriching and expanding his way of engaging in this dialogue.
But when it was stated above that therapeutic argumentation begins with the argument
the client is already engaged in, it is important to focus on the particular behaviors or other
symptoms of distress which have brought the client to therapy. These signs belie the process of
argumentation which is psychologically primary for the client and which most needs to be
engaged and brought into the light in therapy. A therapist who is able to effectively start the
therapeutic process here—by tapping into this living, urgent need to communicate a message,
persuade an audience, and transform a state of affairs— is likely to bring the therapeutic process
forward most quickly and surely. In other words, a therapist who asks about—and makes it clear
that he or she wishes to hear, receive, and affirm—that portion of the client's experience which
involves the most psychological distress, plays an important role in getting the client's expressed
arguments to line up sooner rather than later with the processes of psychological argumentation
which are primary to their well-being.
Once such primary argumentation has begun, the therapeutic process follows several
simultaneous agendae.
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The first of these is the cultivation and improvement of the client's essential argument(s).
As suggested earlier, this process may well be compared to the process of composing a
persuasive essay. Taking the argument as a kind of work-in progress, client and therapist work
together on devising ways to make it better. Often, this process demands an almost total
replacement of the argument which the client originally presented. Take, for example, the 54
year old woman who presents with symptoms of depression related to her
-pointless, thoroughly
unsatisfying marriage." When her catatonia is reconstructed as refusal to continue living her
relational life as usual, walking in the same traces, the client is challenged to take this thesis and
build for it a new mode of expression. Later, she can be challenged to restate her thesis so that it
declares a positive ambition, goal, or value (e.g., "I want my marriage to be focused on discovery
and sharing"), again "revising" her mode of expression so that it may be experienced as
persuasive by the person for whom it is intended: her husband. Prototypically, the client's
essential argument will eventually transform—after passing through several revisions—from one
which is psychopathological and egocentric to one which is solution-oriented (literally,
'therapeutic') and audience friendly.
The second is improvement in the client's real-world rhetorical situation. Because the
end-goal of argument-making is to affect or influence an audience, thereby transforming one's
rhetorical situation, the chief measure of an argument's value is how it plays in a real-world
setting. Therapy, then, necessarily involves a process of (a) crafting arguments designed to
achieve certain goals, (b) having the client deliver these arguments, (c) assessing how well they
work, and (d) as necessary, revising them. In some cases, then, therapy may very well resemble a
strategic consultation—rather like a war council. The client may describe a rhetorical problem,
and then, together with the therapist, craft a rhetorical solution to it. In some cases, this may be
as simple as formulating a basic thesis or position; in others, it may lead to the writing of an
actual script which the client may first rehearse and then put into practice. As the client's real-
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world status changes-that is, as relationships improve, social efficacy increases, stress decl
job and school performance rises, and so forth^lient and therapist may adaptively shifi focus
and emphasis.
The third is the cultivation and improvement of the client's awareness and capacity as a
rhetorician. As has been mentioned, while it is certainly valid to measure the success of any
therapy in reference to (a) the elimination or reduction of psychopathologic symptoms and (b)
improvements in the client's circumstances, it is also hoped that psychotherapy will result in the
client's acquisition of more generalized benefits, most notably rhetorical acumen. Therefore,
therapy will necessarily have an instructive or didactic dimension, sometimes quite explicitly
taking as its focus the teaching of a rhetorical skill or concept. It should be recognized, however,
that, in therapy, most persons learn by doing; skills are typically not generalized until they have
been successfully performed in a concrete setting at least once.
Again, if we deem 'therapeutic' all argumentation which results in the resolution of a
problem or the achievement of meaningful agreement between disputants, we have a fundamental
yardstick for how the process of therapy might proceed. In each of the dimensions of therapy so
far mentioned, the process always involves the maintenance of a speaker-subject-audience
perspective, treating most effects thereof as alterable via a shift in the speaker's own
argumentative activity.
Discussion
There should be no illusion that the description above constitutes a complete treatment of
rhetorically-oriented psychotherapy. Certainly, innumerable issues and problems have been
neglected, and many other problems and issues cry out for more detailed treatment. Still, it is
hoped that the gist of how to approach therapy as a process of argumentation has been conveyed.
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In short, this approach has to do with recognizing the client as a rhetor who is attempting to
accomplish some difficult rhetorical task, and then assisting him or her in accomplishing it. As
such, the approach validates the client as an energetic being, already at work-even in his or her
"illness"-on an understandably vexing rhetorical puzzle. By giving the client a fundamental
sense of success even when utilizing a weak rhetorical strategy, the therapist can then engage the
client in working to create a deliver truly effective arguments: Argument which reach the
intended audience, resolve disagreements, and positively transform existence.
Part 3: Conclusion
In concluding this dissertation, it is worthwhile to ask the following question: What is so
different or novel about a rhetorical approach to psychotherapy? After reviewing the materials,
positions, and strategies gathered here, skilled psychotherapists may recognize that many of these
have a strong quality of familiarity. Certainly, most therapists treat clients as communicative
beings; certainly most therapists attempt to help their clients—wherever possible—achieve
agreement with persons important to them: certainly therapists engage in argumentation, and
accept that their clients do, too; and so forth.
Yet, first of all, if the published literature on psychotherapy is taken as a reflection of
how—and in what terms—the majority of therapists think about what they do, it must be true
that most do not place such matters at the forefront of their conscious practice. Of course, they
engage in rhetoric: As Aristotle (1991) showed 2500 years ago, what person doesn't? But to do
so unknowingly—or at least without deliberation—is something quite apart from doing so both
consciously and conscientiously. Moreover, once a therapist does begin to think in explicitly
rhetorical terms, efficient, grounded, and empowering strategies suggest themselves. Without
necessarily leaving behind an attachment to object relations theory, constructivism, or any other
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Ties
one of the more than 300 identified approaches to therapy, therapists schooled in other theo
may-by thinking in terms of argumentation-measurably facilitate client healing and growth.
In fact, what some writers have considered one of rhetoric's chief problems-that
.s, its ubiquity
and elasticity, its lack of hard and fast boundaries-is certamly also one of it merits, for it may
be constructively set in relation to and integrated with more definable subject areas (like
psychotherapy), resulting in increased pragmatism and sensibility.
Secondly, although rhetorical concepts and practices may strike many psychotherapists
as familiar, this basic judgment should not be confused with a declaration of technical
proficiency or of theoretical depth of understanding. As current research in such disciplines as
social pragmatics, cultural anthropology, composition studies, and discourse analysis
demonstrate, there is much more to be learned about how persons from discrete social settings
argue, how emotion and cognition are structured, how language operates, and more.
Psychotherapists and psychological researchers would do well to go beyond an elementary
understanding of rhetoric, choosing instead—through more rigorous technical study—to position
themselves to learn more about how they can help persons with specific diagnoses, stressors, and
so forth. Using specific rhetorical concepts and strategies as the focus of research is clearly
justified, and it is hoped that some means of stimulating such research may be discovered.
Finally, it may be that psychotherapists exposed to rhetoric may recognize its capacities
for enriching professional training and discourse. Psychotherapy is a relatively young
enterprise, yet one which has demonstrated such sv*/ift and energetic growth that it often seems to
regard itself as autonomous and self-sufficient. Yet, even a shallow exposure to rhetoric should
suggest to many therapists that rhetorical literatures—both ancient and contemporar>'—can help
to situate psychotherapy among the disciplines, broaden its purview, and open it to relationships
with other intellectual and practical endeavors.
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APPENDIX
PREMISES OF A RHETORICAL PSYCHOLOGY
Rlietorical Ontology
• Human beings are rhetorical beings, who are by nature subject to, capable of, and enmeshed
in activities ofpersuasion.
• Human existence is agonistic, defined by the simultaneous but opposed impulses towards
unity with and separationfrom others.
Rhetorical Theory of Communication
• Communication arises mainlyfrom the need to secure agreement in a world defined by
difference.
• Efforts at achieving agreement via communication are generically known as argumentation.
• Persons typically ''argue'^ via informal (e.g., illogical, quasi-logical, incompletely
verbalized, and or non-verbal [yet still symbolic]) means.
• What is designed by one party as a strategyfor achieving agreement is often perceived by
the audience as causefor disagreement.
• Argumentation is ubiquitous and universal
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RJ-ietorical Theory of Social Existence
• Social existence is pluralistic^ polyvocal, and heteroglossic.
• Social spaces are spaces in contention.
• Social existence is organized by competing codes or norms, many ofwhich are ^unwritten "
and only infrequently articulated, taught^ and/or discussed
• Socialpower may be acquired or preserved by enacting social codes or norms (dramatisic).
• Social power may be acquired or preserved by disputing or transcending social codes or
norms (dramaturgic)
Rhetorical Theory of Language
• Language is a socialized entity, with its own history, character, andraison d'etre.
• Language is not neutral but is shot through with intentions (e.g., values, traditions, customs,
prosciptions, etc.).
• Language can shape and delimit the intrapsychic and interpersonal worlds of its users.
• Language can shape and delimit the intrapsychic and interpersonal worlds of its audience.
• Human beings are psychologically shaped by their activities as symbol-users.
• Lndividual personality is multiplicitous, reflecting the multiplicitous social existence ofthe
self.
• Because individual persons are internally muliplicitous, they are often in disagreement with
themselves.
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• Human beings are willful; that is, their behaviors are organized by their desires to achieve
certain ends.
• Human beings utilize persuasive (i.e., rhetorical) means to achieve their will.
• Human beings are susceptible and vulnerable to the persuasive efforts and actions of others.
Rhetorical Theory of the Emotions
• Emotions—or emotional life—possess a rhetorical dimension: that is, they mayfunction as
devices of persuasion.
• Emotions facilitate/inhibit the expression and reception ofmessages,
• Emotions are discursive acts; or. emotional life is a series of interconnected discursive acts,
as in a conversation or theatrical play.
• Emotional discourse is guided—but notfully circumscribed—by social rules.
Rhetorical Theory of Cognition
• Cognition is agonistic.
• 77?^ mind is a community affair.
• The cognitive worlds of individuals are polyvocal. dialogic, and rhetorical, mirroring the
polyvocal, dialogic, and rhetorical social worlds in which these individuals live.
• To a degree, the ''community " ofattitudes and beliefs ofperson are ''given " to them during
the process oftheir social development.
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• Thought is shaped to some degree by language (i.e., the particular words we have learned
and the particular meanings attached to them) and discourse (i.e., ideology as embedded in a
tradition oflanguage usage),
• But, more fundamentally, thought is shaped by our ^will towards others " or our efforts to
communicate our intentions to others.
• Thinking is a process which may be defined as (a) '^arguing with one 's self' or (b) arguing
with others within one 's own mind.
• There exist social norms and rides for thinking.
• Who we are in the habit ofarguing with determines much ofhow we think.
• Effective thought is thought which isfound by one 's audience to he persuasive.
Rhetorical Theory of Psychopathology
• Psychopathology may be placed under the rubric ofargumentation or symbolic action.
• Psychopathologic symptomology may be renamed psychopathologic argumentation.
• Psychopathology is addressed.
• Psychopathology may be caused by the rhetorical miseducation of the individual.
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